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Three Essays on Financial Economics
Kunal Sachdeva
This dissertation presents three essays in financial economics. The essays discuss
how market frictions can affect outcomes in the real economy, the returns earned by
investors, and the investment decisions made by asset managers. The first essay stud-
ies how the liquidity of assets can affect outcomes in the real economy. In particular, it
focuses on the life settlement market to show how increased liquidity of life insurance
contracts are causally linked to greater life longevity. The second essay studies how
inside investments relate to managerial compensation and fund performance. The
essay focuses on the decreasing returns to scale to arbitrage strategies and the profit
maximizing motive of asset managers as the central friction affecting return. The
final essay analyzes the role that information acquisition and communication have on
the choice to be a principal, agent, or both. The results emphasize how the choice to
be either a principal or an agent strictly dominate the mixed strategy of being both,
in a highly generalized model.
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Access to wealth is vital for our rapidly aging population. This paper studies the
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This effect is stronger for people in fragile health, with severe disease diagnoses, and
those with limited access to hospitals. The regional supply of primary healthcare,
and the social-economic background of the policyholder does not seem to explain the
longevity effect. Taken together, these results appear to be related to the high-cost of
care for individuals and the importance of financial liquidity for people nearing their
end of life.
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1.1 Introduction
The United States is facing an unprecedented challenge in funding its rapidly aging
population.1 In order to address this need, seniors have utilized annuities, reverse
mortgages, and the proceeds from selling personal assets to fund their consumption.
Indeed, a recent study of people nearing their end of life found wealth to be an
important consideration for out-of-pocket expenditures, with the average household
spending $11,618 during their last year of life.2 Previous papers have emphasized
that inadequate resources can affect life longevity. However, there still remains the
question if, and how, the accessibility of one’s wealth, especially nearing one’s end of
life, can affect longevity?
This paper presents a quasi-experimental evaluation of the liquidity of wealth for
individuals nearing their end of life. The paper finds that the financial liquidity of
one’s bequest allocation has a statistically significant and economically large effect
on longevity. Studying the possible mechanisms by which the accessibility of wealth
relates to longevity, this paper documents that gains are accruing to individuals in
fragile health, with severe disease diagnoses and limited access to healthcare. These
results appear to be related to the high-cost of care for individuals and the importance
of financial liquidity for people nearing their end of life. Lastly, this paper provides
further evidence that shocks in the financial sector are both important and can have
unintended spillover effects into the real economy.
It is difficult to study the effects of the accessibility of wealth on longevity. In
developed countries, health insurance, education about basic nutrition, and the ex-
istence of social infrastructure makes the relation between wealth and longevity less
1From the US Census Bureau: "In 2050, the population aged 65 and over is projected to be
83.7 million, almost double its estimated population of 43.1 million in 2012." See Ortman, Velkoff,
Hogan, et al. 2014.
2See Marshall, McGarry, and Skinner 2011, spending in the last year of life is is skewed, with
the 90th percentile equal to $29,335.
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plausible. Further, assuming that a relationship does exists, there are numerous
channels by which wealth influences longevity. This makes the inference of a causal
relationship difficult.3 Ideally, a randomized trial would provide the conditions to iso-
late the effects that wealth has on individual-level mortality. However, for developed
countries like the United States, implementing such a trial is highly cost-prohibitive.4
This paper solves this data challenge by using a proprietary dataset that is particu-
larly well suited to study the liquidity of wealth on longevity: the sale of life insurance
contracts by policyholders to investors in the secondary market, also known as the life
settlement market. Life settlement transactions are typically large lump-sum bequest
adjustments for individuals nearing their end of life. As such, data from this market
makes an ideal setting to test both if and how the accessibility of wealth enables
longevity. The data used in this paper comes from a leading life settlement broker
in the United States, with the data representing $4.5 billion in death benefits from
2009 to 2017.5
Naturally, the main econometric challenge in causally estimating how wealth af-
fects longevity stems from the issue of reflexivity and endogenous choice, Manski
1993. In this paper’s setting, individuals who sell their policy die sooner than those
who do not, as seen by the stratification in Figure 1.2. This observation could lead to
the misleading inference that capital providers are contributing to these policyhold-
ers’ deaths, or that they are advantageously selecting distressed policyholders in the
secondary market. Even if the econometrician controls for individual level health, a
longer observed life following the sale of one’s life insurance policy is not sufficient
3From one perspective, wealth enables an individual to live longer through the routine consump-
tion of healthier foods, better healthcare, and safer housing as compared to less wealthy individuals.
Alternatively, an individual may have private information and know that they are likely to live
longer than their average population, and thus rationally accumulates wealth to better smooth their
lifetime consumption.
4Researchers have instead relied on quasi-experimental settings to study this relationship.
5The data used in this paper is a subsample of all transactions executed by the broker. A
discussion of this can be found in Appendix 3.8.
3
evidence to claim that wealth contributes to longevity.6 Thus, understanding the
causal contribution of how wealth affects longevity has proven to be difficult.
This paper addresses these identification challenges by focusing on a quasi-
experimental shock through the Great Recession that reduced and often eliminated
the ability of policyholders to reallocate their wealth from the future to the present:
the re-pricing of counterparty risk of life insurance companies and their associated
policies in the secondary market. Prior to the Great Recession, insurance companies
were generally thought to be safe, long-lived institutions. However, as the Great Re-
cession unfolded, this assumption was challenged, with many insurance companies’
financial strength rating downgraded to reflect the increased probability of impair-
ment at the insurance-company level. Due to the uniqueness in how life insurance
policies are priced, the shock to the financial strength rating reduced or eliminated the
desirability of a life insurance policy from the perspective of an investor.7 I use this
heterogenous shock to insurance companies’ financial strength rating to instrument
for the liquidity of wealth through the secondary market.
Using a Cox proportional hazards model in a control function specification, I
estimate the relationship between the accessibility of wealth to an individuals life
longevity. The analysis is made between individuals who both approach a broker,
where one group is able to complete a settlement while another is not. The primary
dependent variable is life longevity, as measured by the number of months lived post-
settlement. The main explanatory variable is observed sale, or settlement, of the
policy. Due to the possible endogeneity in observing a settlement, I instrument this
6A longer observed life could be attributed to other channel, such as adverse selection in the
secondary market, or unobservable health differences.
7This is driven by two features that are unique to life insurance policies: First, the cost of
insurance for a universal life policy is negative and typically growing over time. Thus, a small
reduction in the expected death-benefit can greatly reduce the valueness of a policy, resulting in a
negative price. Second, the participation constraint of a policyholder is at least zero dollars. All
policies have a costless abandonment option through lapsation. Because a policyholder can freely
walk away from a contract by suspending all future premium payments, a negative price would not
be supported in this market.
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variable using the financial strength rating, or rating, of the insurance company at
settlement. The null hypothesis is that policyholders who are able to sell their policy
can live longer, as compared with the individuals that don’t sell their policy.
Armed with a plausibly exogenous instrument, I am able to attribute if the liquid-
ity of wealth can enable longevity. The first-stage estimate suggests that the financial
strength rating of the insurance carrier positively relates to the observed sale of an
insurance policy. These results are economically and statistically important, with a
single level downgrade in the companies rating relating to a 5.2% decrease in marginal
contribution to sell a policy. This suggests that investors are not just concerned about
the longevity risk of an individual policyholder, but also the counterparty risk of an
insurance company.8
From the paper’s preferred baseline specification, the second-stage estimate shows
that the liquidity of wealth positively relates to longevity. Using a hazard model to es-
timate longevity, the accessibility of wealth decreases baseline hazard rate by roughly
30?. Estimating the gain to longevity from standard actuarial tables, an 80 year
old, non-smoking male in sub-standard health would gain roughly nine months in life
expectancy. The sign and magnitude are plausible in context of the hazards model, as
the baseline sample of the study is comprised of older and sicker individuals. The av-
erage age of the sample is 79 years, with a majority coming from sub-standard health
background.9 To further validate these results, the paper implements a standard
two-stage least squared approach and finds a similar longevity result.
Having shown that the liquidity of wealth causally relates to longevity, the pa-
per conducts four separate tests to pin down the mechanism by which the gains
to longevity are accruing policyholders. The paper first explores how the gains to
longevity works through the health channel by considering the treatment effect to in-
8This is further validated by consulting market participants.
9To provide context, aging by just one year in this estimate increases the hazard rate by roughly
5?.
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dividuals from more fragile age-adjusted health as compared to individuals in perfect
health. This test is motivated by the range and natural upper limit to life expectancy,
as illustrated in Figure 1.6.
Consider Jane Doe (censored identity) who initially purchased life insurance at
the age of 47 to provide security for her family. Unfortunately, she was diagnosed
with cancer and decided to sell her policy at the age of 61. With the net death benefit
amount of the policy over $130,000, she settled her policy for $75,000 in proceeds. In
a testimonial, Jane Doe’s husband said:
“These funds will be life changing as we battle for my wife’s prolonged time
with us....these funds will help ease that work in ways we haven’t begun
to imagine, beyond only paying treatment expenses as we hold out for the
next targeted therapy to hit the market, at some astronomical price?”
For people like Jane Doe, selling her policy in the secondary market may have
enabled her to consume wealth to extend her longevity.10 The paper tests the hypoth-
esis that the treatment effects are accruing to individuals with more fragile health
conditions by splitting the dataset on health fragility and re-examining the effect of
liquidity on longevity.
The results of this test suggest that the improvements to longevity are primarily
driven by the fragile health subsample, with improvements of roughly 50? from
baseline hazard rates.11 Interpreting this result, the sign and magnitude are plausible
in context of the hazards model, as the baseline sample is comprised of individuals
that are old and with severe health conditions. When testing the converse, individuals
10Many other anecdotal examples illustrate the possible link between current wealth and health.
An recent example from Dr. Saltz at the American Society of Clinical Oncology Annual Meeting
discusses the current per-mg costs of drugs: $28.78 for nivolumab and $157.46 for ipilimumab;
pembrolizumab (Keytruda), costs $51.79/mg. "As a clinician, I want these drugs and others like
them to be available for my patients. As one who worries how we will make them available and
minimize disparities, I have a major problem—and that is that these drugs cost too much. ... To
put that into perspective, that’s approximately 4000 times the cost of gold", Helwick 2015.
11Estimating the gain from standard actuarial tables, an 80 year old, non-smoking male in poor
health would gain nearly 18 months in life expectancy.
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in mild to perfect health, there are no measurable gains to treatment. Instead, only
well known observables such as health status, level of death benefit, and how seasoned
a policy is predict longevity outcomes.
The second test considers if the treatment has heterogenous effects on longevity
based on an individual’s primary medical diagnoses. It is hypothesized that it is
unlikely that all medical diagnoses are equally affected by the treatment of wealth,
and as such, gains in longevity are concentrated among certain types of ailments.
Interacting settlement status with diseases, the paper finds that health improvements
are primarily concentrated among individuals with severe diagnoses. This result is
consistent with the previously mentioned fragility test and anecdotal evidence from
discussions with several capital providers in the life settlement market.
The third test considers how the accessibility to hospitals relate to longevity.12 It
is possible that the individual distance or time to the nearest hospital is an impor-
tant, but omitted, variables that are predictive of longevity.13 Further, it is posited
that policyholders may be able to use their wealth to move closer to a hospital in
an effort to access healthcare and affect their longevity.14 To investigate this pos-
sibility, the paper uses geocoded data to measure the distance and travel time to
the nearest hospital for each policyholder. Using these new measures in the baseline
specification the paper uncovers that there exists a positive, yet weak, relationship
between distance and mortality. More interestingly, when splitting the data based on
distance, the paper finds that the treatment effect is more important for individuals
living further from a hospital. The results provide evidence that access to wealth is
plausibly important for individuals with poorer access to healthcare.
12This possibility was raised in a conversation with an institutional investor in life settlement
assets.
13In the baseline regression, county level healthcare supply does not relate to longevity. However,
the lack of a result may be driven by averaging individual distances at the county level.
14The paper would ideally use a panel data on housing. However, at this point, it is not able to
access this data.
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The fourth test considers how the liquidity of wealth interacts with the financial
background of policyholders. It is hypothesized that the benefits of selling one’s
policy affects policyholders differently, either based on their current financial position
or their social-economic background. Ideally, an econometrician would be able to
observe panel data for each policyholder. To this end, this paper is currently merging
against panel data of credit and consumption. However, at the time of writing this,
the merge and analysis is not complete. This paper instead uses proxies of wealth,
such as the the policyholders social-economic background as inferred by the United
States Census data, to measure wealth. Using the median tract level income of
each policyholder in the baseline regression,15 the paper does not find a relationship
between social-economic background and longevity. While this specification may be
averaging the heterogeneity at the tract level, it is suggestive that the social-economic
background of the policyholder isn’t a significant driver of the main results.
To complement the previous analysis, the paper conducts several robustness tests
to rule out alternative explanations that have been suggested — other than liquidity
— to be driving the results. As a first test, the paper includes additional covariates
that have been suggested as important in the selection of policies. As a second test,
the paper investigates the possibility that the longevity result is driven by the life
expectancy aggregation method. As a final test, the paper conducts a placebo test to
rule out the possibility that the baseline results are driven by spurious correlations.
The results of the robustness tests are consistent with the baseline results in the
paper.
These results improve on previous research by addressing many of its data and em-
pirical limitations. First, previous research has relied on subjective health measures,
which typically contain well-known biases in reported health status.16 In contrast,
15Tract is a small geographical unit, with a population size between 1,200 and 8,000 people, and
an optimum size of 4,000 people.
16See Bago d’Uva et al. 2008. As pointed out in Erixson 2017, subjective measures can be biased
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this paper relies on a rich dataset of objective life expectancy estimates from special-
ized underwriters which is free of biases found in subjective health measures. Second,
other papers have used data from life settlement transactions from a single investor or
underwriter, but this may be subject to firm level biases that limit the extendability
of their results. Instead, this paper has the unique advantage of using broker-level
data that is free of the inherent selection bias driven by an investor’s preferences and
strategy.
While this paper emphasizes the importance that the liquidity of wealth has on
longevity and the possible mechanisms for these gains, the results also come with
numerous caveats that should be mentioned. First, the paper is unable to account
for the possibly important inter-generational effects of wealth.17 However, previous
studies have suggested that such intergenerational effects are negligible or small.18
Second, the sample of individuals in this paper are wealthier than the average popu-
lation in the United States, which may limit the extendability of the results. Although
the results are based on a selective sample, the effects are postulated to be larger for
individuals from poorer and more financially constrained backgrounds. Third, the
paper focuses on the secondary market for life insurance policies which may limit
the extendability of results. While the secondary market is relatively small, the total
market size of the life insurance industry is $20.8 trillion of policies in-force,19 and has
an ownership rate of 70%.20 These facts suggest that the paper is both extendable
and important, especially given the rapidly aging population.
due to the substitutability of wealth and health. An example comes from smoking, where can
improve mental health while being harmful to one’s health.
17It is posited that the potential wealth benefits to the current generation may come at the expense
of future generations welfare.
18See papers such as Meer, Miller, and Rosen 2003; Kim and Ruhm 2012; and Carman 2013,
which have studied the affect of inheritances using PSID and HRS data.
19See ACLI 2016.
20See LIMRA 2014 for the market size of the life insurance industry. In comparison, see Mankiw
and Zeldes 1991 for the household ownership of stocks.
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In light of these caveats, this paper makes five important contributions. First, it
uncovers an important friction that limits the liquidity of life insurance policies in the
secondary market: the counterparty risk of insurance companies as measured by the
financial stability rating. Second, the paper overcomes both data and sample selection
problems of previous research, to uncover a new and important gradient by which
wealth can affect health: the liquidity of wealth for individuals nearing their end
of life. Third, the paper documents that gains are accruing to individuals in fragile
health and with severe disease diagnoses. Fourth, the paper presents evidence against
channels such as regional supply of healthcare and social-economic background to be
driving the results. Fifth, this paper shows that spillover effects of financial risk of
an institution can have real, and large effects on one’s longevity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the contribution of this paper
makes to several strands of literature. Section 1.3 provides necessary institutional
details, outlines the data, and methodology used in this paper. Section 1.4 outlines
the censoring issue with mortality data and discusses the instrumental variable ap-
proach. Section 1.5 presents causal evidence that the liquidity of wealth relates to
longevity. Section 1.6 explores the possible mechanisms driving these results. Section
1.7 presents robustness tests. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Contribution to Literature
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. It first contributes to the
literature linking the effects of wealth shocks on health outcomes.21 This literature
has studied numerous channels by which wealth shocks can effect health outcomes,
including but not limited to, debt forgiveness (Dobbie and Song 2015), lottery win-
21The relationship goes both ways, with health shocks also affecting economic factors: For ex-
ample, unanticipated health care expenditures and personal bankruptcies Himmelstein et al. 2005,
household borrowing and expansion in number of credit cards Gupta et al. 2015, medicaid expansion
and the associated reduction of individual level bankruptcy Gross and Notowidigdo 2011.
10
nings (Apouey and Clark 2015; Cesarini et al. 2016; Gardner and Oswald 2007; Lin-
dahl 2005), job displacement (Sullivan and Von Wachter 2009), inheritance (Carman
2013; Kim and Ruhm 2012; Meer, Miller, and Rosen 2003), stock market fluctuation
(Engelberg and Parsons 2016; Schwandt 2014), and housing and foreclosures (Cur-
rie and Tekin 2015; Fichera and Gathergood 2016). Other studies have focused on
quasi-experiments from emerging markets including, pensions (Case 2004; Jensen and
Richter 2004), and economic improvements through German reunification (Frijters,
Haisken-DeNew, and Shields 2004). However, to the author’s knowledge, this is the
first paper in this literature studying the liquidity of wealth, for individuals nearing
their end of life, and its possible effects on longevity.
This paper also contributes to the literature studying the life settlement market.
Papers have studied the equilibrium implications of the life settlement market (Daily,
Hendel, and Lizzeri 2008; Fang and Kung 2010a; Hendel and Lizzeri 2003). Other
papers have considered the welfare implications of this market (Fang and Kung 2010b;
Fang and Wu 2017). The closest papers to this are Januário and Naik 2014, and
Bauer, Russ, and Zhu 2014. These papers have studied the null of adverse selection
in the life settlement market. In contrast, this paper proposes a possible hidden action
story, where individuals can affected their health through accessing their wealth. This
paper also differentiates itself by overcoming selection issues driven by specific market
participants.
Lastly, this paper relates to the literature studying the relationship between social
economic status (SES) and longevity. It is a well known fact that individuals from
better SES live longer, as shown in recent papers by Bosworth, Burtless, and Zhang
2016, and Chetty et al. 2016. This result is robust to many other settings, including
but not limited to, social security data in Snyder and Evans 2006, Census and NCHS
data in Lynch et al. 1998, English survey data in Adda, Banks, and Von Gaudecker
2009, and the Whitehall study of British civil servants in Marmot et al. 1991. While
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this correlation persists between measures of income and longevity, there is no consen-
sus of the mechanisms driving this result (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006).
This paper makes a contribution to the broad literature studying SES on longevity
by investigating factors such as regional supply of healthcare, distance to hospitals,
and social-economic background of the policyholder’s neighborhood.
1.3 Institutional Setting and Data
There are three main challenges in causally estimating the effects of wealth on an
individual’s longevity. First, in a developed country, it is important to find an ap-
propriate sub-population where such an effect could be plausibly important and em-
pirically measurable.22 Second, the treatment size would need to be large enough to
be empirically measurable. Reallocating a small amount of wealth would not plau-
sibly affect longevity. Third, relating bequest reallocations to longevity suffers from
the issue of reflexivity and endogenous choice, Manski 1993. Observing a positive
correlation between individuals who sell their policy and ex-post longevity is equally
consistent with individuals being more attentive to their health and with individuals
having superior knowledge of their longevity.
This paper overcomes these three challenges by focusing on a quasi-experimental
setting and novel dataset from the secondary market for life insurance policies. First,
individuals who can access this market are nearing the end of their lives, have a
median sample age of 79 years, and are often of sub-standard health, as shown in
Table 1.1. Second, the reallocation amount is substantial, with the gross median
settlement value of $235 thousand dollars, and thus plausibly large enough to matter.
Third, the dataset is for the post-crisis period of 2008 and exploits a market feature
22This paper posits that any wealth effect would most likely be important for older individuals,
nearing their end of life, and in poorer health.
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that affects the desirability of policies, that are plausibly exogenous to longevity,
other than its effect on liquidity of a policy.
The following subsection presents institutional details about the life settlement
market and the data used in this paper.
Institutional Setting
Introduction to Life Settlements
Life insurance policies can be characterized as mortality-contingent contracts that pay
a pre-defined benefit when the insured individual dies. Policyholders pay premiums
on a periodic schedule to an insurance company and in exchange, in the event of
the policyholder’s death, the insurance company pays the policyholder’s beneficiary
a death benefit.23 This contract can be thought of as a continuation option, as
the contract terms are determined ex-ante and typically in nominal terms, but the
policyholder learns about health as they continue to pay for the policy’s coverage.24
A policyholder may decide to discontinue their coverage prior to their death.25 A
policyholder has several options if they choose to dispose of their coverage. The first
and most common option is to allow their policy to lapse by suspending payments
on premiums.26 Alternatively, a second option, policyholders may put their policy
back to their insurance carrier. In exchange, the policyholder receives an immediate,
23Premiums tend to be front loaded, with policies at origination typically resulting in a negative
NPV at any non-negative discount rate Cawley and Philipson 1999. This is done to ensure a pooling
equilibrium.
24Life insurance policies have been characterized as a contract with one-sided commitment with
learning, Hendel and Lizzeri 2003. This is a adaptation of Harris and Holmstrom 1982.
25This can be driven in part by learning, where one discovers positive improvements to their health,
in effect rendering the policy worthless. Alternatively, it can also be motivated by background risk
such as a change in bequest motive, or even a financial constraint, where a policyholder can no
longer fund the periodic premiums.
26Previous research has empirically shown that policyholders adjust, and often reduce, their cov-
erage throughout their life. About 4.2% of all life insurance policies lapse each year, see Gottlieb
and Smetters 2014.
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one-time lump-sum, cash payment also called a cash surrender value (CSV). The CSV
is often a small fraction of the death benefit and is a function of past premiums paid,
policy size, and underwriting classification. Importantly, it is independent of the
insured’s health condition at the time of surrender and often de minimus compared
to the death benefit. Taken together these options can be expressed as ??? (CSV, 0),
have a non-negative value and, most importantly, are independent of the insured’s
health.
As a third option, and the main empirical observation in this paper, a policyholder
can sell their life insurance policy to an investor through the life settlement market.27
The original policyholder would receive a one-time lump-sum payment at the time
of sale, and in exchange, the capital provider would assume all future premium pay-
ments. Upon death of the original policyholder, the investor would receive the death
benefit associated with the policy.
Data
This section discusses major components of the dataset and reasons for inclusion in
the next subsections. For brevity, much of the merging information is relegated to
the Appendix.
Policy and Insured Data
The primary dataset in this paper comes from a broker in the life settlement market
that acts as an intermediary between buyers and sellers.28 Hand checked for accuracy,
the broker-level data is comprised of three main datasets: (i) All Observations, (ii)
27See Appendix 3.8 for a brief overview of the life settlement market.
28The broker represents the selling policyholder in these transactions and is incentivized through
a commission schedule to obtain the best price.
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Main Set, and (iii) Settled Data, and summarize in Table 1.1.29 Policy data include
death benefit and level premiums to maturity, while the policyholder data include
age and gender.30
Life Expectancy Estimates and Mortality
Life expectancy estimates are pivotal in valuing life insurance policies. This is because
the insured’s survival probability is the main source of uncertainty.31 Although age
and gender are good first-order estimates of one’s life expectancy, there can be great
heterogeneity at the individual level. To increase the precision of their longevity
estimates, insurers typically require individuals to release their medical history, which
insurers submit to a third-party underwriter.32 The underwriter evaluates the medical
history to provide an objective estimate of the individual’s survival duration. From
these, the paper also calculates an age-gender adjusted measure of health fragility.33
The broker matches the sample of the insured against a third-party death
database.34 The paper constructs the primary outcome variable used in this paper,
29Although many potential sellers may contact the broker, not all policies or policyholders are
ideal for a life settlement transaction. Thus, the level of detail for each policy and policyholder
varies with the level of engagement.
30The number of policies and policyholders are not equal, due to joint and multiple policies per
individual.
31While longevity is the primary source of risk, the paper acknowledges there are additional
sources of risk. This includes the uncertainty related to the change of cost of insurance (COI) of
policies. Further, depending on the funding structure of the assets, there may also be interest rate
and funding risk associated with these assets. These are seen as secondary concerns to longevity.
32These underwriters are akin to a credit underwriter like Moodys, S&P, and Fitch in the fixed-
income securities market, but instead for medical data.
33Using broker level data, this paper observes over 4000 third-party life expectancy with a mean
life expectancy for settled policies of 82 months. An overwhelming majority of estimates come from
three leading medical underwriters, see Appendix 3.8. Adjustment are made in the analysis to
account for the passage of time between the underwriting and settlement date, see Appendix 3.8.
34Enrichment is done to account for the re-interpretation of Section 205r of the Social Secu-
rity Act in November 2011. The Social Security Death Master File (SSDMF) doesn’t disclose state
death records unless these deaths were independently reported to the Social Security Administration
through a “First-Party Source”. These are generally family, friends, funeral homes, coroners, hospi-
tal, and so forth. More detail about mortality data considerations can be found in the Appendix,
Section 3.8.
15
life achievement. This measures the amount of time from the last date of contact
with the broker (typically the settlement date) to either: (i) their date of death, or
(ii) the final date of the study, March 1 2017.
Financial Strength
To establish a measure of financial strength, the paper uses A.M. Best data for its
broad coverage, long time series and informational content in its rating. This dataset
tracks the insurance carriers’ financial strength rating and forms the basis of my
instrument for causal estimation.35 The paper translates the letter grade into a linear
scale ranging from zero to seven, with the best rating corresponding to the highest
rating. The resulting dataset was linked to the policy data.
Regional Data
To control for regional-level data, the raw address data was standardized, geocoded,
and merged against 11-digit FIPS code. For regional social-economic factors, tract-
level FIPS codes were matched against the 2010 Decennial Census dataset to include
median household income. To control for regional supply of healthcare, the data
was matched against the 2016 County Health Rankings & Roadmaps at the county
level. Next, both the individual’s distance and travel time to the nearest hospital
were calculated.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
There are two challenges when estimating the causal contribution of wealth accessi-
bility to an individual’s life longevity. The first section discusses the issue of right
censoring of mortality data and the motivation for using a hazard model. The second
35The author is grateful for the generosity of A.M. Best.
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section outlines the identification strategy used to causally link settlement status to
longevity.
Censoring of Mortality Data
The first empirical challenge is the issue of censoring. The event of interest in this
paper, death, is not always observed by the end of the study period and thus is
right censored. However, there is still valuable information in knowing that they’ve
survived until the end of the study period. As such, an empirical strategy should
incorporate this information into its estimates.
To be more precise about the empirical challenge, consider Figure 1.5, which
illustrates the issue of right censoring. Panel A shows the case in which the longevity
period is observed, ∆tA2 . Depending on the ex-ante life expectation, it is clear if the
individual outlived their expectation. In contrast, Panel B shows the more common
case: individual surviving through the end of the study, with the longevity period
of ∆tB3 going unobserved. Again, conditional on ex-ante life expectancy estimates,
an unobserved mortality event does not necessarily imply that an individual lived
shorter or longer than expected.
Hazard Model
The appropriate estimation method for the available data and question asked is a haz-
ard model.36 With regards to the mortality events, consider P (t) = ?? (T ≤ t) and
p (t) = dP (t)/dt as the cumulative distribution function and the probability density
function, respectively. Then the conditional instantaneous probability risk of mortal-
ity at time t, conditional on survival to that time is given by h (t) = p (t) / (1− P (t)).
This hazard function forms the measured variable of the main analysis.
36The following discussion is based on Kiefer 1988, Lancaster 1992, and chapters 17-19 of Cameron
and Trivedi 2005.
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The paper’s preferred structural equation is the Cox proportional hazards model,
and is generally expressed as:
hg (t,X) = h0g (t) ??? {β′X} (1.1)
It is among the most popular method due to the flexibility of its baseline hazard
function. The econometrician avoids having to make arbitrary, and possibly incorrect,
assumptions about the form of the baseline hazard function. The first factor, h0g (t),
is the baseline hazard function, and is left unspecified. The second factor, ??? {β′X}
is the shift factor, with the regressors entering linearly. Notice that if the covariate is
equal to zero, the shift factor equals one, and does not contribute to the hazard rate.
It is called a proportional model because estimated covariates are assumed to
affect the baseline hazard rate, h0g (t), across the entire domain of time. This model
can be further estimated by using stratifications g = 1, . . . , k∗. Stratification may
be appropriate, as the baseline hazard function, h0g (t), may be different for each
stratum specified in an estimation.37
Identification Strategy
The second empirical challenge is the issue of identification. This is because using the
observed sale, settlement, of the policy as the main explanatory variable for longevity
may be problematic due to the issue of reflexivity and endogenous choice. There
are countless stories that could overstate (or understate) the relationship between
settlement and longevity. For example, a policyholder may have private and superior
37This paper stratifies the sample into terciles based on age and health impairment and verifies the
appropriateness of this assumption by examining the product-moment correlation between the scaled
Schoenfeld residuals. The results of these tests are found in Appendix 3.8. Note, the assumption
of proportionality should also be tested to ensure appropriateness of the model. This can be done
by looking at the product-moment correlation between the scaled Schoenfeld residuals and the time
for each regressor.
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information about their health and thus would upward bias an estimate.38 Conversely,
investors may have a superior ability to infer longevity from medical data and are
advantageously selecting policyholders. These and other many possible stories pre-
vent the econometrician from making causal statements from a simple correlation.
Further, these stories make it unclear in which direction a bias, if any, would exists.
The paper overcomes this challenge by proposing an instrumental variable ap-
proach and, in particular, uses the heterogenous shock to the rating of insurance
carriers as an instrument for the settlement of an insurance policy. An insurance
company’s financial strength rating affects the desirability of a policy as this, in part,
affects the counterparty risk of the policy and thus its valueness. Using an instru-
ment for settlement status allows me to make causal inferences based on the extensive
margin of one’s ability to access their wealth.
The following subsections details the instrument, mechanisms by which it oper-
ates, the exclusion restriction, and empirical considerations.
Insurance Companies Through the Great Recession
Prior to the Great Recession, insurance companies were thought to be safe, long-lived
institutions. However, at the onset of the Great Recession, insurance companies were
shown to be systematically important to the financial and real economy, Koijen and
Yogo 2016b. Further, the recession challenged the conventional wisdom that the in-
surance industry was simply maturity-matching between their assets with liabilities,
Chodorow-Reich, Ghent, and Haddad 2016. While the near failure of AIG was well
covered in the popular media, it was not the only insurance company that faced fi-
nancial distress. As pointed out in Koijen and Yogo 2016a, insurers like AIG was
challenged both by their default swaps and security lending, McDonald and Paul-
son 2015; Peirce 2014. Several insurance companies applied and received assistance
38This would be consistent with an adverse selection story, see Akerlof 1970.
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Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), while others were rejected, or withdrew their
application for TARP. Other firms took corporate actions such as cutting dividends
or issued equity.
In the event that an insurance company went bankrupt, the underlying policies
would be partially guaranteed by state-level co-insurance programs.39 While there are
explicit and implicit guarantees for the policies underwritten by insurance companies,
the limits on coverage can materially impact their expected value. These limits are
established at the state level, with most states consistently setting limits in line
with the NAIC Model Act, provide coverage up to $300,000 in life insurance death
benefits.40 While this is sufficient for policies with a low face value, it would imply
a possibly large drop in value for any policy of value greater than $300 thousand in
death benefit.
Non-Positive Pricing of Insurance Contracts
The increased risk in the insurance industry had real implications for the associated
policies that were underwritten by these institutions. The issue can be seen in the















39This parallels the federally-mandated insurance for the potential failure of banking (FDIC) and
investing (SIPC), but at the state level and for insurance companies. If an insurance company fails,
it is taken over by all other insurance companies at the state level, who honor the claims or transfer
them to financially stable insurance institutions. If this is not possible, the failed insurance carrier
is taken over by the insurance department of the regulating state.
40Note, there are limits for overfunded policies. Often, the limit is up to $100,000 in cash surrender
or withdrawal values for life insurance policies. For more information, see https://www.nolhga.com/.
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where ?? (Deaths) is the instantaneous probability of death, t and T˜ represent
time, and the mortality date of an individual, respectively. The F is the death benefit
to the beneficiary upon the insured’s death. Pt is the minimum premium required for
a given period, and there is no uncertainty in the cashflows.
Given the cashflow structure of equation (1.2), it is often the case that there does
not exist a positive expected price for a life insurance policy (See Hendel and Lizzeri
2003).41 This uniqueness is driven by two features that are unique to life insurance
policies: (1) front-loaded premiums and (2) a costless abandonment option.
The front-loaded premiums allows an insurance contract to have negative values
for a long position. Unlike a normal financial asset such as a coupon bond, insurance
policies must pay premiums until maturity. If, however, there is a reduction in the
expected death benefit of an insurance policy, the valueness can be greatly reduced
or eliminated, resulting in a negative expected price.
The costless abandonment option prevents negative prices from being supported
in the secondary market. Lacking commitment, policyholders can walk away from a
contract by suspending all future premium payments. Therefore life insurance policies
in the secondary market must have a positive expected price at settlement. Thus,
shocks to the financial strength rating can reduce or entirely eliminate the desirability
of a life insurance policy from the perspective of an investor.
These two facts together creates a naturally occurring separation between valuable
and valueless policies. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Instrumental Variable Analysis
The paper uses this plausibly exogenous shock to the insurance carrier’s financial
stability rating as an instrument to estimate the causal contribution of liquidity on
41Nearly all life insurance policies are front loaded, Gottlieb and Smetters 2014, and as such, not
all life insurance contracts have positive price. Further this statement is not claiming that the value
of the insurance policy is negative for a policyholder, as in fact, it can provide a hedge to the loss













































(D) Null Hypothesis of Longevity
Figure 1.1: Cashflows Associated with Life Settlement Transactions
This figure illustrates the quasi-experiment and the null hypothesis of this paper. For exposition, the
policyholders on the left- and right-hand-side of the figure are named Alex and Bob, respectively, and
are identical among all dimensions except for the company they used for their insurance contract.
Panel A shows the similarity of the two policyholders prior to the Great Recession. Panel B shows
the difference in expected value of the death benefit for Alex and Bob. Alex’s insurance company
has a lower counterparty risk, as compared to Bob’s insurance company. As a result, Alex’s death
benefit has a higher expected value versus Bob’s. Panel C shows both how Alex’s insurance policy
has a positive expected value, and thus can be sold in the secondary market. In contrast, Bob
attempts to sell his policy, but is unable to. Panel D illustrates the null hypothesis of the paper.
Alex was able to move his wealth to the present, as compared to Bob, and thus will outlive his
identical counterpart.
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longevity. However, in order for the rating to be a good instrument, it must satisfy
several conditions that are discussed below.
First, the instrument must statistically drive the endogenous variable of interest.
In this paper’s setting, the rating of the insurance company must relate to the liquidity
of the policy in the secondary market. Empirically, the decision if a policy settles
correlates with the rating of the underlying insurance carrier. This is confirmed
by first-stage regressions in Table 1.3. Anecdotally, according to both brokers and
investors, this is also part of the consideration when purchasing a policy.
Second, the exclusion restriction must be satisfied. Here the exclusion restriction
is that the carrier rating affects the policyholder’s wealth, but only through their
ability to access the secondary market, and through no other way. While this cannot
be directly tested, I conduct randomized correlation tests as shown in Figure 1.4 to
provide further suggestive evidence that the rating is correlated to the policyholder’s
longevity, but only through affecting the ability to sell an insurance policy in the
secondary market.
Third, the instrumental variable must be economically important. The paper
confirms this by examining historical impairment rates of insurance carriers. As
illustrated in Figure 1, the ex-ante rating of a carrier is highly related to the gross
impairment level of insurance carriers over time. This means that the current rating
of an insurance company is meaningful when measuring the future risk of an insurance
company.
Outside of these three considerations, there are very limited stories why the finan-
cial stability rating would not be an ideal instrument. One possible concern would be
that policyholders who are planning to sell their insurance seek carriers that are bet-
ter rated. However, this story is limited by the fact that policyholders must hold their
policies for a minimum of two to five years, depending on their state of insurance, and
thus eliminates any prior knowledge channel. I also control for the historical rating
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of the policy, either at the time of origination or for pre-crisis levels. Further, prior to
the Great Recession, insurance companies and their associated policies were assumed
to carry little to no default risk. Investors in life insurance assets were primarily con-
cerned with the expected maturity date of the policy. However, following the Great
Recession, the riskiness of insurance company was also an important consideration.42
1.5 Results
Main Specification, Control Function
The paper’s preferred specification uses a control function approach as proposed by
Hausman 1978, and specifically a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method devel-
oped by Terza, Basu, and Rathouz 2008.43 The structural equation is a hazard model
in which the duration and event variables of interest are life achievement and death.
The key explanatory variable is the sale, or settlement status, of a policy, which is
captured by a dummy variable. Because observing the settlement of a policy may be
an endogenous explanatory variable, it is instrumented for with the financial stability
rating, or rating, of the underlying insurance company.
The following describes the general approach: the first-stage estimates the variable
of interest, settlement, by instrumenting for it with the rating of a carrier.44 Next, as
an intermediate step, I use the estimated first-stage regression to calculate generalized
residuals from this model. Finally, in the second-stage, I include both the original
settlement observations and the generalized residual in the structural model. This
departs from the standard two-stage least squared method where only the estimated
42Koijen and Yogo 2016b, Table 6 documents companies applying for TARP, or taking corporate
action.
43I resort to a 2SRI approach used in medical research, similar to a method used in Chen et al.
2013.
44This is akin to a first-stage regression in a 2SLS approach.
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variable from the first-stage is included in the structural equation. In this alternative
specification, the generalized residual can be thought of as a nuisance parameter, that
absorbs the unobserved variation in the structural equation.
The next subsections discuss the first-stage and the second-stage regressions.
First-Stage Regression, Control Function
Using an instrument for reallocating wealth in the life settlement market, the first-
stage regression uses a probit model with the outcome variable of Settledi,j,t, the
settlement status of a policy. The first-stage is defined as:
?? (Settledi,j,t = 1) = Φ (µ+ β′Individuali,t + θ′Policyj,t + γRatingj,t) (1.3)
i, j, and t correspond to policy-policyholder, insurance carriers, and time, respec-
tively. The outcome variable Settledi,j,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if a policyholder sells a policy, and zero otherwise. The right-hand-side function Φ
is the cumulative normal distribution function. The controls include individual-level,
policy-level, and regional characteristics.
Equation 1.3 is instrumented using the financial strength rating, Ratingj,t, at the
time of settlement. This variable is constructed by converting a letter rating into a
numerical scale ranging from zero to seven. The scale is linear, with larger numbers
indicating greater financial strength. The exogeneity assumption is that the change
in financial rating affects a policyholder’s health only through their ability to access
the secondary market. I argue that only the ability to sell one’s life insurance policy,
not the financial rating of their insurance carrier, affects an individual’s health
Table 1.3 presents the estimates of Equation 1.3, with Column (1) corresponding
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to the main sample. The instrument, Ratingj,t, is an important predictor of the
settlement of a policy. A single unit change in the rating results in a 5.2% change
in marginal contribution to observing a settlement. Column (1) has other important
covariates that also predict the settlement status of a policy. Policies that come from
policyholders that are older and in fragile health have a greater probability of having
value, and thus have greater market demand. Conversely, policy characteristics such
as the size of the death benefit does not drive the likelihood of the policy settling.
Second-Stage Regression, Control Function
The paper uses a hazard model that estimates the contribution of observables on the
longevity of policyholders. The second-stage structural equation is defined as:
hg (t|X,P ) = h0g (t) ??? (ωSettledi,j,t + β′Individuali,t + θ′Policyj,t + γηˆi,j,t) (1.4)
i, j, and t correspond to policy-policyholder, insurance carriers, and time, respec-
tively. The g subscript denotes stratification, done on age and health impairment
terciles. The vector Individuali,t is for each policyholder-time observation and in-
cluding age, health impairment, and gender. The ηˆi,j,t is the generalized residual
from the first-stage regression. Table 1.4 presents the estimates of Equation 1.4. The
results in this table are presented as coefficient estimates.45
The main result of this paper can be seen in Column (1) of Table 1.4. The
variable of interest, Settled, corresponds to the settlement status of the policy and
is suggestive that the liquidity of wealth is important for longevity. This result
is both economically and statistically significant. In contrast, the un-instrumented
45As a reminder, β corresponds to estimated coefficient, while the hazard ratio HR = ??? (xβ).
Thus, when β > 0, HR > 1, and will multiplicatively increase with the baseline rate h0 (t). The
converse is true for β < 0. There is no contribution to baseline rates when β = 0 and HR = 1.
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estimate in column (2) of Table 1.4 suggests that selling one’s policy has no statistical
contribution to longevity.
Careful consideration is needed when interpreting the estimates of Table 1.4. First,
the Settled coefficient, −0.379, must be interpreted through a hazard ratio. As such,
the estimate corresponds roughly to a 30% increase in the baseline hazard rate.46
Second, the estimated contribution to longevity is made with respect to the baseline
hazard rate, h0g(t). In this paper’s sample, this correspond to old and health impaired
policyholders. To put this into context, the regression also estimates that a aging a
single year relates to a 5% increase in the baseline hazard rate. Taken together, these
results seem both large, plausible, and point to the importance of the liquidity of
wealth nearing one’s end of life.
There are additional relationships that should be highlighted in Column (1) of
Table 1.4. The most important observable when estimating longevity is the health
impairment, or fragility, of the individual. This economically makes sense as it is
based on objective measures of health and is a direct determinate of longevity. Empir-
ically, the second most important policyholder characteristic is their age, where aging
a single year increases the baseline hazard rate by 5%. The size of the death benefit
strongly relates to longevity, with each million in coverage reducing the baseline haz-
ard rate by nearly 15%. This confirms the broad consensus in research that wealthier
individuals unconditionally have greater longevity.47 Surprisingly, how old the policy
is as measured by the time from origination is a strong predictor of longevity. This
result was one of the most robust results of the empirical analysis. Speaking to a
large asset manager of life settlement assets, this effect was anecdotally confirmed. It
is postulated that this effect is coming from concerns about asymmetric information,
and the original motivation for purchasing a life insurance policy.
46As a reminder HR = ??? (xβ), and thus -0.349 reduces the baseline hazard rate by ~30%.
47This is not, however, making a causal statement between wealth and longevity.
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The generalized residual coefficient also serves as an augmented regression test,
with its significance supporting the possibility of endogenous effects in the model
specification. The resulting control function specification allows for estimation of
endogeneity in the settlement decision to settle one’s policy. Column (1) of Table
1.4 suggests that there is a small degree of endogeneity that is controlled for in the
control function specification.
Taking these results together, they provide, to the paper’s knowledge, the first
evidence relating the liquidity of one’s assets to the life longevity. This result is im-
portant when considering the unprecedented challenge to fund a rapidly aging popu-
lation. Unlike many other financial assets, insurance products have broad ownership
in the United States. In the context of the household balance sheet, this provides a
real and important source of wealth that can be used to possibly fund life and enable
longevity.
Two-Stage Least Squared, Alternative Specification
The previous section showed that accessibility to wealth is positively related to an
individual’s longevity. The main structural equation was a hazard model and was
chosen, in part, because the mortality events were right censored. For causal estima-
tion, I resorted to a control function specification, specifically, a two-stage residual
inclusion (2SRI) method due to concerns about consistency of the estimate. However,
this approach presents a trade-off between the benefits of including information from
all observations in my estimation, versus rendering the results with simplicity and
clarity.
As an alternative approach, the paper considers a linear estimation method where
the main dependent variable is life achievement, as measured by the number of
months a policyholder has survived past the date of settlement. While the proposed
estimation and results are more straightforward, there are numerous drawbacks. Even
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in light of these concerns, the results are of interest due to the clarity in the approach
and are often accepted in applied microeconomic research.
This section proceeds by estimating the causal link that the accessibility of wealth
has on enabling longevity using a standard two-staged least squared (2SLS) approach
with fixed effects to confirm indeed that settling a policy is positively related to
longevity. The first-stage regression estimates Settled, the propensity to sell a policy,
and uses the carrier’s financial rating as an instrument. The second-stage regression
estimates the contribution of observable factors on the longevity of policyholders
in months. The regressions control for policy and policyholder characteristics, and
include a fixed effect for the pre-crisis rating of the insurance carrier. The results
confirm the analysis from the previous section, individuals who can access their wealth
tend to live longer, even after controlling for health, policy, and social-economic
characteristics.
2SLS, First-Stage Regression
The first-stage regression is given by:
Settledi,j,t = a+ b1
′Individuali,t + b2′Policyj,t + b3′Ratingj,t + δt0 + ei,j,t (1.5)
i, j, and t similarly correspond to individual, carrier, and time, respectively. The
equation controls for policy- and policyholder-level observations including health,
death benefit, and how seasoned a policy is. The regression uses fixed effects for the
pre-crisis rating to control for possible differences in insurance companies pre-crisis.
The settlement status of the policy-policyholder, Settledi,j,t, is instrumented using
the financial strength rating, Ratingj,t, of the insurance carrier.
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2SLS, Second-Stage Regression
The second-stage regression is given by:
Longevityi,j,t = β1
′Individuali,t + β2′Policyj,t + β3′Ŝettledi,j,t + δt0 + εi,j,t (1.6)
The equations subscript, controls, and fixed effects are similar to the first-stage
regression. The second-stage regression includes the predicted settlement status,
Ŝettled from Equation 1.5. The dependent variable, Longevity measures the time
duration (in months) from either settlement date or last day of record for each ob-
servation.
2SLS, Reduced-Form Regression
A reduced-form analysis is also estimated and is given by:
Longevityi,j,t = β1
′Individuali,t + β2′Policyj,t + β3′Ratingj,t + δt0 + εi,j,t (1.7)
The equations subscript, controls, and fixed effects are similar to the first-stage
regression. A reduced-form approach, the predicted settlement status, Ŝettled, is
replaced with the first-stage instrument Rating.
2SLS, Results
The results of the 2SLS approach is summarized in Table 1.8. The analysis of this
table confirms the previous analysis of Section 1.5. That is, the accessibility of wealth
positively relates to longevity, as suggested by the large and positive relationship in
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Column (4).
The first-stage regression of Equation 1.5 is presented in Column (2) of Table 1.8 .
The result of the first-stage regression matches the previous probit analysis of Section
1.5, both in sign and magnitude. Further, this result from a linear approach passes
a weak instrument test48, and has a reasonably large R2.49 This provides further
confidence in the previous sections analysis.
The second-stage regression of Equation 1.6 is presented in Column (4) of Table
1.8. The results suggests that there is a large and positive relationship between
the accessibility of wealth and longevity. This is in contrast to the un-instrumented
estimate in Column (1) where a small and negative relationship exists. This result
exists even after controlling for policy and policyholder characteristics. Using fixed
effects for the pre-crisis insurance company rating ameliorates concerns that there are
pre-crisis differences in the underwriting standards or selection in policyholders.
Lastly, the reduced-form regression of Equation 1.7 is presented in Column (3) of
Table 1.8. Similar to Column (4), the results provide further confidence in the result
and approach used in this section.
1.6 Mechanisms
Establishing that the liquidity of wealth is related to longevity, this section considers
the possible mechanisms that may be contributing to this result. The paper conducts
four separate tests to shed light on the mechanism driving the results. The paper
first considers the treatment effect for people of different health fragility. Second,
within the treated group, the paper looks for any specific types of diseases that may
be driving this result. Third, the paper considers the importance of distance and
48See Stock and Yogo 2005.
49See Jiang 2017, Section 3.2.
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time to hospital on longevity. Fourth, the paper considers the financial background
of policyholders and its association to longevity.
Interpreting the results of these tests, the results are suggestive that wealth ac-
cessibility is important for individuals nearing their end-of-life, with the effects more
important for individuals with fragile health, and with severe diseases diagnoses.
While other mechanisms may be operating simultaneously, these results present sup-
porting evidence of the effect of wealth on longevity, especially for individuals nearing
the end of life.
Improvements to Fragile Health
This paper first tests if the treatment of wealth effects individuals with severe health
impairments differently than individuals with near-perfect health. To motivate this
analysis, consider Figure 1.6 which shows scatter plots of life expectancy estimates
across different age groups. Holding age constant, it appears that there is a natural
upper-bound at each age-gender pair that an individual can live. Any positive treat-
ment effect to an age-gender pair is likely to move an individual upwards on this plot,
but is unlikely to effect individuals already near their age-gender upper-bound. Said
plainly, it is difficult to improve the longevity of an individual in perfect health.
In order to test the effect on people from a fragile health background, the pa-
per sorts policyholders based on age-gender measure of health fragility and re-tests
the baseline results. Of all the candidates, the paper settles on using the health
impairment level of individuals at the time of settlement. This measure is chosen
because it is a well-established metric used by actuaries and incorporates an individ-
ual’s age, gender, and life expectancy into a single point estimate. The impairment
can roughly be thought of the gradient to healthiness for an age-gender pair, or al-
ternatively the fragility of their health. From this example it is emphasized that
impairment is increasing with ailments, with individuals with standard health having
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100? impairment (1×), while unhealthier individuals having larger values.50
The paper tests if there is a difference in the treatment effect between individuals
with perfect versus severe health. This is done by splitting the sample based on
health impairment and re-implementing the control function specification of Section
1.5 to test the casual contribution of settling a policy. The null hypothesis is that
the high-impairment group should see improved longevity while the low-impairment
group should see little to no improvement.
Table 1.4 presents the second-stage regression for the sorted samples. Splitting
based on health impairment (fragility), Column (5) highly corresponds to the health
impaired sample. The coefficient of interest, settled, shows that indeed there is larger
treatment effect for individuals with higher impaired health, of a magnitude larger
than the full sample estimates.
In contrast, Column (3) of Table 1.5 shows that there is no measurable gain to
the healthy sub-sample. The coefficient for Settled is indistinguishable from zero,
which intuitively makes sense, as these individuals are near their empirical upper-
bound, and the treatment effect is predominately coming from individuals with health
impairments. Further, common risk factors such as impairment, age, and years since
origination also appear to affect the health impaired subsample and have similar sign
and magnitudes to the baseline results in Column (1).
Improvements to Diseases
The paper next tests if the treatment effect accrues to specific health diagnoses. The
previous result was suggestive that individuals with more fragile age-adjusted health
are benefiting from settling their policies. However, this raises the question of whether
50For a concrete example of how impairment relates to life expectancy. Consider two 80-year-old
males that do not smoke with an impairment of 100% and 300%, respectively. Their corresponding
impairment measure would roughly map into a life expectancy of 10 years (standard health) for the
first person, while only 4 years life for the second person.
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the benefits to treatment is concentrated within certain types of diagnoses, and if so,
which ones?
The paper posits that severe diseases are more affected by wealth, through funding
large medical expenditures for individuals nearing their end of life. While there
exists Medicare for seniors within the United States, there is limits and constraints
to services that can be rendered. Notably, Medicare Schedule B is mandated to cover
80% of outpatient procedures, and as a result, certain expensive yet vital treatments
are either out of reach, or can place individuals in financial strains.
The paper next considers if gains to longevity are concentrated among particular
conditions by using indicators of primary disease diagnosis. While still controlling for
personal characteristics and policy characteristics, the paper implements a propor-
tional hazard model that interacts settlement with disease dummy variables. Broad
health conditions such as cancer, Parkinson and Alzheimers is included in this analysis
to account for possible contributions to the baseline hazard rates.51
Table 1.5 presents the results of the improvements and hinderances to specific
disease diagnoses. Exploring the subsample that match with disease diagnoses data,
the regression finds that policyholders that enter in to settlements and have severe
diagnoses benefit more than those who do not. An example of this can be seen by
contrasting between policyholders that do and do not settle their policy and have
stage-IV cancer.52
While causal statements cannot be drawn from this test, it provides further evi-
dence of how the wealth to longevity channel may be working. To explore this further,
the paper next considers the local supply of healthcare and its relation to longevity.
51Note, each policyholder may have multiple primary disease diagnoses. Also, to preserve
anonymity of the sample only diseases with at least 20 observations were included.
52The control for health impairment is dropped to allow for variation with the primary disease
diagnoses.
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Distance and Time to Hospital
This section tests if the individual-level distance and time to the nearest hospital
relates to longevity. Using geocoded data, the paper is able to match over 95% of
the main sample, within 60 minutes or 100 miles of the policyholder address on file.
Their distributions of their distance and time can be seen in Figure 1.8. To validate
this new covariate, the paper first conducts a sanity test by analyzing the distance
and time variables against contract and policyholder characteristics. Results of this
test can be found in Appendix 3.8. The estimates confirm that the choice of where
to live is not random. Indeed, policyholders who are older and sicker live closer to
hospitals.53
Establishing the importance of these covariates, the paper tests how the access to
healthcare relates to longevity. The paper first includes the new distance to hospital
measure in the baseline specification. Using the fully matched sample, the paper finds
that policyholders that live further from a hospital have a lower longevity rate. This
is shown in 1.7 Column (1).
The paper tests if there is a difference in treatment effect between individuals
near a hospital versus those who live further away. This is done by splitting the
sample based on distance and re-implement control function specification of Section
1.5.54 Using the subsample of policyholders that live in the nearest two terciles, the
paper finds no relationship between wealth accessibility and longevity. This result is
shown in 1.7, Column (3). However, using the subsample of policyholders that live
in the further two terciles, the paper finds a stronger relationship between wealth
accessibility and longevity. This result is shown in 1.7, Column (5). The results
provides evidence that access to wealth is plausibly important for individuals with
53See Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams 2016 for an excellent analysis of geographic variation
of healthcare utilization.
54Due to the reduced sample size and concern of empirical power, the splits are done based on
terciles.
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poorer access to healthcare.
Financial Background
This section considers how the financial background of a policyholder is related to
their longevity.55 One hypothesis is that the proceeds from a life settlement can
ease the financial constraints of a policyholder, which in turn, could translate into
greater longevity. Another hypothesis is that the treatment effect operates differently
for individuals from different social-economic backgrounds. Understanding if and
how the financial background of a policyholder interacts with the treatment effect is
important when considering the mechanism and possible policy implications. Ideally,
the econometrician would be able to observe a panel of economic factors for each
policyholder. To this end, this paper is currently merging the data against panel
data of credit and consumption. However, at the time of writing this, the merge
and analysis is not complete.56 This paper instead uses geographic data and census
data to understand the relationship between longevity and the financial background
of policyholders.
The rich geographic variation, as illustrated in Figure 1.7, allows the paper to
infer the financial background of each policyholder from Census data. The paper
is able to proxy for wealth by merging the main dataset to the median tract level
income. While this isn’t a direct measure of the policyholder wealth or consumption
over time, it directly captures their social-economic background. From the baseline
specification, the paper finds that the Median Income does not relate to longevity
in any of its specifications. This can be seen in Table 1.4. Bifurcating the data based
on income does not yield any relationship either.57 Taken together, these results are
55The paper is based on elderly individuals, and as such, income is less of a consideration.
56Future draft of this paper will include this analysis.
57This table is omitted due to the non-result, but is available upon request.
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suggestive that the social-economic background aren’t driving the main results in this
paper.
1.7 Robustness
This section complements the previous analysis by conducting several robustness
tests to rule out alternative explanations that have been suggested — other than the
liquidity of wealth — to be driving the results. As a first test, the paper includes
additional covariates that have been suggested as important in the selection to sell
a policy. As a second test, the paper investigates the possibility that the longevity
result is driven by the life expectancy aggregation method. As a final test, the paper
conducts a placebo test to rule out the possibility that the baseline results are driven
by spurious correlations. For brevity, the paper provides a summary of the results,
with the supplementary analysis available upon request.
Including Covariates to Measure the Expense of the Policy
The first test considers if the costs of the policy to keep in-force is driving the longevity
result. The paper addresses this possibility by including additional covariates such as
the annual level premium and carry rate and re-estimates the baseline specification.
The paper first includes a measure that captures the annual premium for each
policy. For a typical universal life policies, the cost of insurance is an increasing func-
tion of time. As such, using the premium from any given year would not accurately
capture the expected cost of the policy. As a first solution, a level premium is calcu-
lated by annualizing the entire structure of future premiums. As a second solution,
the carry rate of the insurance policy is calculated. The carry rate is simply defined
as the annual level premium divided by the death benefit of a policy. Normalizing
the premiums by the death benefit, this measure captures how expensive the policy
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is with respect to the benefit of keeping it in-force.
Including either level premium, or carry, produces similar results to the baseline
specification, as seen in Table 1.9. From Column (2), the level premium is included in
the baseline specification. From Column (3), the carry rate is included in the baseline
regression. Both show no significant difference from the baseline results.
Aggregation of Life Expectancy Estimates
The second test analyzes if the results are driven by the life expectancy aggregation
method. In order to more accurately predict the policyholder’s life longevity, both
brokers and capital providers use external third-party underwriters to provide esti-
mates of the policyholder’s life expectancy estimates. This paper has incorporated
all available estimates by using an equal weighted, mean, aggregation method in all
of the analysis. Yet, it may be possible that an equal weighted aggregation is biased,
and instead, using a median aggregation method may be more appropriate.
To rule out the possibility of biases introduced through aggregation, the paper re-
examines the baseline results using a median aggregation method. Using the median
life expectancy estimate produces similar results to the mean life expectancy estimate.
This can be seen in Column (4) of Table 1.9. The outcomes of this test are similar
to the baseline results and provides further evidence that the aggregation method is
not driving the results.
Placebo Tests
Lastly, the paper rules out the possibility that the baseline results are driven by
spurious correlations by randomizing the rating of the insurance carrier throughout
the post-crisis period. I generate a placebo rating and re-estimate the baseline results.
The placebo rating is unrelated to Settled in the first-stage. In the second-stage, both
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the generalized residuals and Settled status are statistically unrelated to longevity.
This can be seen in Column (5) of Table 1.9.
1.8 Conclusion
Does the accessibility of wealth near one’s end of life increase longevity? This paper
presents new evidence by studying a unique corner of the market that is well suited
to answer this question: the secondary market for life insurance policies, also known
as the life settlement market. Using the shocks to the financial strength rating of
insurance companies to instrument for settling a policy, the paper is able to show
that the accessibility of wealth near the end of life is important for longevity. Testing
mechanisms for this effect, the paper provides evidence that individuals with more
fragile health, those with severe diagnoses, and limited access to healthcare benefit
most from accessing their wealth. The paper test alternative stories to show that
the results are not driven by the regional supply of primary care doctors, social-
economical factors, biases in life expectancy estimates, or spurious correlations.
In addition to providing evidence of a liquidity-longevity relationship and explor-
ing possible mechanisms behind it, this paper’s unique setting serves as a possible
starting point for future research. I have outlined three possible areas that follow
directly from this paper.
Household Finance – There are two strands by which this research can be
extended to better understand households and their financial decisions. The first is
to study the role that financial wealth has on household outcomes. This paper strives
to better understand how the liquidity of wealth affects longevity, and focuses on
individuals nearing their end of life. While this paper provides suggestive evidence of
its importance, more work is required to understand the intensive margin of wealth,
and if there is a minimum level of wealth required for improvements to longevity.
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A second strand of research could look to better understand the choices and
consequences of retirees in relation to their household balance sheets and bequest
motives.58 Previous research has emphasized the role financial products such as
annuities and reverse mortgages.59 This paper suggests that life insurance contracts
are another important source of wealth that is relatively under-utilized, and may
have an important role in the context of household balance sheets. This question will
become increasingly important in the context of the aging population in the United
States. Future research could look to better understand the scale, accessibility, and
welfare implications of life settlement transactions.
Information Economics – Disparate market participants and their informa-
tion are aggregated through asset prices (Hayek 1945), yet our ability to impute
the information content from equilibrium asset prices is made difficult due to the
role they play in risk-sharing, enjoyment, and information transmission (Wolfers and
Zitzewitz 2004). However, the high level of information available in the broker-level
data provides an ideal setting to further investigate if and how equilibrium prices and
competition for assets can predict the policyholder mortality at the individual level,
above and beyond health data.60
Real Effects of Finance – More broadly, this paper provides another impor-
tant example of how seemingly disparate parts of the economy are related. Finance
pervades all areas of our lives – it shapes our companies, funds our governments, and
enables us to save and consume. Financial markets should not be seen as independent
of one another, but instead, relating across sectors and asset classes. Recent papers
58Previous research has presented the annuity puzzle, Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes 2004 and De
Nardi, French, and Jones 2010. Others have approached this question using survey data, Ameriks
et al. 2011.
59Other possible assets include disability insurance and tontine.
60Previous empirical papers have studied the informativeness of markets. A famous example is
the Orange Futures Market, Roll 1984, Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek 2006, and Boudoukh et al.
2007. Other research has focused on predictive markets including Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004, and
Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2006.
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have shown how financial constraints at the individual level also relate to health,
including housing Currie and Tekin 2015, Fichera and Gathergood 2016, stocks En-
gelberg and Parsons 2016, Schwandt 2014, bankruptcy protection Dobbie and Song
2015, car crashes Morrison et al. 2013, and business cycles McInerney and Mellor
2012.61 This paper highlights the importance that seemingly unrelated parts of the
market may have on one another, and posits this as an important area of future
research.
61This is a partial list of studies looking at shocks affecting health. Other research looks at the
opposite relationship, where health affects financial health, including Domowitz and Sartain 1999;
Gupta et al. 2015; Himmelstein et al. 2005; Himmelstein et al. 2009; Hollingworth et al. 2007; Jacoby





















Figure 1.2: Survival Curves, Stratified on Settlement Status
This figure plots the kaplan-meier survival curves for all policies, and are stratified by their settlement
status. The vertical axis represents the probability of survival while the horizontal axis represents
time since the final date in the sample. The dark gray lines are the unsettled policies, while the light
gray lines are the settled policies. This evidence suggests that policyholders that sell their policy
are unconditionally more likely of dying sooner. The crosses on each curve represent the censoring
























Figure 1.3: Drop in the Financial Strength Rating Through the Great Recession
This figure plots the financial strength rating of the underlying insurance companies in the paper’s
sample. The vertical axis corresponds to the mapping of the policy rating to a linear scale ranging
from zero to seven, with a larger number indicating a strong financial position. The horizontal axis
corresponds to the year of the rating. The line illustrates the dramatic repricing of risk of insurance









































































































































































(b) Settlement as Instrumented by Rating
Figure 1.4: Randomization Check, Regression Coefficients
This figure examines the relationship between policyholder characteristics and the outcomes of
settling a life insurance policy. Panel A shows the coefficients of a bivariate regression of settlement
status on a set of characteristics. Panel B shows coefficients of the instrumented version of the
regressions in Panel A, with the rating measure instrumenting for the binary indicator for settlement.






































































































(b) Mortality Event Unobserved
Figure 1.5: Motivation for Hazard Model, Right Censoring of Mortality Events
This figure illustrates the issue of right censoring and motivation for using a proportional hazards
model. Panel A illustrates the case where the event date, mortality of an individual, is observed
prior to the end of the study. Panel B contrasts this by demonstrating that the mortality date may
not be observed prior to the end of the study date. The event date of interest goes unobserved, yet,
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Number of Estimates ● One Two Greater Than Two
(b) Females
Figure 1.6: Plot of Life Expectancy Estimates and Age
This figure plots the age versus life expectancy for the main dataset. Panel A is comprised of male
observations, while Panel B is comprised of female observations. The vertical axis corresponds to
the mean life expectancy estimate in months, while the horizontal axis correspond the age at last
record date for the individual. The shape of each points indicate the number of life expectancy that
correspond to each individual. This figure is meant to illustrate the relative impairment of each
individual as compared to their age peer group. The upper frontier corresponds to the healthiest
































(b) State of Florida
Figure 1.7: Geographic Diversity of Observations
This figure highlights the geographic distribution of the dataset used in this paper. Panel A il-
lustrates how nationally representative the life settlement market is. Panel B illustrates the rich
geographical variation that is used in the paper. Each circle represents a policy, with its radius and
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(b) Histogram of Travel Time to The Nearest Hospital
Figure 1.8: Access to the Nearest Hospital
This figure describes the policyholder’s individual level access to the nearest hospital. Panel A
is a histogram of the distance to the nearest hospital (km) for each policyholder. Panel B is a
histogram of travel time to the nearest hospital (minutes) for each policyholder. The dashed red
line indicates the median of the sample. The data suggests shows large variation in the access to the
nearest hospital. As expected, the time and distance measures are highly correlated, with a Pearson
correlation of 90.2%
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics, Policy and Policyholder
This table provides broad summary statistics for the dataset made available by the life settlement
broker. The data is organized into three columns depending on the progression that the policy and
policyholder made in selling their asset: (1) All Observations, (ii) Main Set, the set of observations
that have a reliable level of information, and (3) Settled, indicates the policy was sold. Rows capture
life outcome data, objective life expectancy estimates, and key policy data. Note, policies that didn’t
fall into the criteria of the study (eg. too large, retained death benefits, etc) were excluded from
this study. See the Appendix for details of the data and merge.
All Observations Main Set Settled
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Policies 2188 1912 536
Number of Insured Individuals 1639 1466 450
Number of Policy × Individual Obs 2337 2050 566
Life Outcome Data
Total Number of Observations 272 248 92
Fraction of Deaths 16.6% 16.9% 20.4%
Life Estimates
Mean Age (Years) 78.3 78.7 79.8
Median Life Impairmnet 1.71x 1.73x 2.36x
Mean Life Expectancy Estimate (Months) 114 110 82
Standard Deviation of Estimates (Months) 63.4 60.9 48.5
Mean Number of Life Estimates (Count) 3.7 3.9 5.1
Policy Characteristics
Mean Policy Face Value (Million) $2.12M $2.18M $2.11M
Mean Annual Level Premium (Thousand) $96K $109.8K $105.1K
Mean Premium to Face Ratio 4.6% 5.3% 5.6%
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics, Baseline Covariates and Dependent Variables
This table summarizes the variables used in the analysis and provides point estimates of their mean,
standard deviation, minimum value, maximum value, and number of observations. It should be noted
that the number of deaths and life achievement observations correspond to the policy-policyholder
observations.
Variable Type Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Demographics
Age Cont. (Years) 78.81 79.92 7.97 37.31 98.45
Male Dummy (0-1) 0.65 1 0.48 0 1
Tract Median Income Cont. ($K) 86.03 77.99 45.12 14.27 250
County Health Supply Cont. (Per Capita) 0.86 0.79 0.31 0 2.37
Policy Details
Death Benefit Cont. ($M) 2.20 1.20 2.10 0 10
Annual Level Premium Cont. ($K) 110 58 125 0 913
Annual Carry Rate Cont. (%) 5 5 4 0 49
Years Since Originated Cont. (Years) 11 9 7 0 33
Life Expectations and Achievement
Life Expectancy Estimate Cont. (Months) 115.57 109.83 56.93 10 414
Health Impairment Estimate Cont. (%) 2.69 1.84 2.49 0.75 16.88
Life Achievement Cont. (Months) 47.14 44.64 26.69 0.03 98.56
Dead Dummy (0-1) 0.16 0 0.37 0 1
Bids and Competition
Number of Bids Per Policy Count 4.39 2 4.90 1 38
Number of Bidders Per Policy Count 2.08 2 1.26 1 8
Winning Bid/Death Benefit Cont. (%) 17.28 11.86 18.68 0 90.40
Improvement, First to Winning Bid Cont. (%) 64.19 18.80 129.56 0 940
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Table 1.3: First-Stage of 2SRI, Health Fragility Analysis
This table presents the first-stage in a 2SRI setting, and estimates a probit model. The dependent
variable, Settled, is an indicator that equals 1 if the policy is sold to an investor. The independent
variables correspond to the covariates of the second-stage regression. These includes policy,
policyholder and regional characteristics. The estimate is instrumented by the Financial Strength
Rating. Column (1) presents the main specification of the paper, and uses the entire dataset.
Column (2) and Column (3) splits the dataset based on health fragility and re-estimates the
baseline specification. Column (2) is the subset of policyholders that are healthy. Column (3) is
the subset of policyholders in fragile health. The average marginal effects in percentages (%) are
shown in square brackets.
?? (Settledi,j,t = 1) = Φ (µ+ β′Individuali,t + θ′Policyj,t + γRatingj,t)
Settled (TRUE)
Health Fragility
Full Sample Low High
(1) (2) (3)
Financial Strength Rating 0.160∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.057) (0.044)
[0.052] [0.032] [0.069]
Health Impairment 0.150∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.103) (0.017)
[0.048] [0.108] [0.039]
Male (TRUE) 0.169∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.122
(0.069) (0.103) (0.095)
[0.054] [0.054] [0.045]
Age (Years) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
[0.012] [0.014] [0.010]
Death Benefit (Millions) −0.007 0.018 −0.039∗
(0.016) (0.024) (0.023)
[−0.002] [0.005] [−0.014]
Regional Healthcare Supply −0.203∗ 0.017 −0.366∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.165) (0.140)
[−0.066] [0.004] [−0.136]
Median Income 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.0004] [0.001] [0.0002]
Years Since Origination 0.004 −0.0003 0.004
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
[0.001] [−0.0001] [0.001]
(Intercept) −5.181∗∗∗ −7.069∗∗∗ −3.966∗∗∗
(0.470) (0.736) (0.619)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.62 0.48
Observations 2,050 1,026 1,024
Log Likelihood −1,113.193 −463.014 −631.845

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5: Settlement and Disease
This table shows the hazard rate contribution of specific diseases diagnoses to longevity. The
main dataset is merged against disease diagnoses where at least 20 observations exists to preserve
anonymity. The resulting merge results in 1012 observations. Interacting diagnoses with settlement
status, the regression shows the contribution to hazard for observations that do and do not settle
their policy. Column (1) is the coefficient estimated from a Cox proportional hazard model. Col-
umn (2) is the computed hazard. Column (3) computes the confidence interval of the hazard rate.
Column (4) computes the p-value of the estimate.
Life Achievement
coef HR = exp(coef) 95% CI p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age (Years) 0.04 1.04 [1.00, 1.09] 0.08
Death Benefit -0.18 0.84 [0.73, 0.96] 0.01
Years Since Origination 0.04 1.04 [1.02, 1.07] 0.0019
Stage I-III Cancer × Settled -0.01 0.99 [0.61, 1.59] 0.96
Stage I-III Cancer × Not Settled 0.28 1.32 [0.68, 2.57] 0.41
Stage IV Cancer × Settled 1.14 3.12 [1.28, 7.61] 0.01
Stage IV Cancer × Not Settled 1.83 6.25 [1.38, 28.21] 0.02
Hyperlipidemia × Settled -0.36 0.70 [0.47, 1.03] 0.07
Hyperlipidemia × Not Settled -0.98 0.38 [0.20, 0.72] 0.0033
Parkinson × Settled 1.01 2.75 [1.51, 5.00] 0.00096
Parkinson × Not Settled 1.40 4.07 [1.81, 9.17] 0.00071
Alzheimer × Settled 0.51 1.66 [0.69, 3.99] 0.26
Alzheimer × Not Settled 1.68 5.36 [1.82, 15.79] 0.0023
Stroke × Settled -0.03 0.97 [0.61, 1.55] 0.91
Stroke × Not Settled 0.26 1.30 [0.68, 2.48] 0.43
Cognitive × Settled -0.44 0.65 [0.31, 1.33] 0.24
Cognitive × Not Settled -0.47 0.63 [0.18, 2.15] 0.46
Obesity × Settled 0.50 1.65 [0.95, 2.85] 0.07
Obesity × Not Settled 1.44 4.22 [1.93, 9.22] 0.0003
Observations 1012
Score (Logrank) Test 109.89 *** (df = 19)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.6: First-Stage of 2SRI, Distance to Nearest Hospital Analysis
This table presents the first-stage in a 2SRI setting, and estimates a probit model. Using geocoded
data, the paper is able to match 1962 observations (over 95% of the main sample), within 60
minutes or 100 miles of the policyholder address on file. The dependent variable, Settled, is
an indicator that equals 1 if the policy is sold to an investor. The estimate is instrumented
by the Financial Strength Rating. Column (1) presents the main specification of the paper,
and uses the entire dataset. Column (2) and Column (3) splits the dataset based on the
individual level distance to the nearest hospital. Column (2) uses the subset of policyholders that
live in the closest to two terciles. Column (3) uses the subset of policyholders that live in the
further to two terciles. The average marginal effects in percentages (%) are shown in square brackets.
?? (Settledi,j,t = 1) = Φ (µ+ β′Individuali,t + θ′Policyj,t + γRatingj,t)
Settled (TRUE)
Distance to the Nearest Hospital
Full Sample Near Sample Far Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Financial Strength Rating 0.175∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.040) (0.044)
[0.057] [0.068] [0.044]
Health Impairment 0.151∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.021) (0.018)
[0.049] [0.056] [0.051]
Male (TRUE) 0.180∗∗ 0.150∗ 0.170∗
(0.070) (0.086) (0.087)
[0.058] [0.047] [0.056]
Age (Years) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
[0.012] [0.015] [0.011]
Death Benefit ($M) 0.005 −0.031 0.043∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.025)
[0.001] [−0.010] [0.014]
log(Distance to Hospital (km)) 0.032 0.078 −0.012
(0.035) (0.064) (0.063)
[0.011] [0.025] [−0.004]
Healthcare Supply −0.228∗∗ −0.179 −0.309∗∗
(0.110) (0.133) (0.139)
[−0.074] [−0.058] [−0.104]
Median Income 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0003]
Years Since Origination 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
(Intercept) −5.326∗∗∗ −6.277∗∗∗ −4.566∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.601) (0.574)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.4 0.37
Observations 1,962 1,308 1,307
Log Likelihood −1,069.571 −696.145 −729.257
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Using a comprehensive and survivor bias-free dataset of US hedge funds, we doc-
ument the role that inside investment plays in managerial compensation and fund
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funds with less "skin in the game" on a factor-adjusted basis and exhibit high return
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2.1 Introduction
Delegated asset managers are commonly seen as being compensated through fees
imposed on outside investors. However, access to profitable, but limited, internal
investment opportunities can also be a form of compensation for managers. Consider
the hedge fund industry, which manages more than $3 trillion in assets, of which $400
billion can be attributed to investments from insiders and related parties.62 This large
allocation of insider capital suggests that an important, and previously overlooked,
component of hedge fund compensation is the channel of returns on personally in-
vested capital. This paper examines insiders’ decisions to allocate private capital
to funds under their control, and the impact of this "skin in the game" on returns
received by outside investors.
The role of managerial discretion over internal capital allocation across funds can
be seen in the case of Renaissance Technologies.63 The company’s Medallion Fund
is one of the most successful funds in history and is predominately a fund for insider
investment (as we confirm in Figure 2.1). News accounts of Renaissance Technologies
emphasize how the company prioritizes strategies with greater excess returns and
lower scalability in the Medallion Fund, while shifting strategies with lower return
profiles (for reasons of scalability or staleness in execution) to other funds in the
family characterized by greater outside investor participation and lower fees.
The scope of personal capital commitments can be seen in Table 2.1, which lists
the top hedge fund manager paychecks in 2016. In aggregate, the top-10 fund man-
agers earned over $6.9 billion, reflecting a combination of management and incentive
fees, as well as gains on personally committed capital. Our Figure 2.2 examines the
62For the size of the industry, see figures provided by the Securities and
Exchange Commission: https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/special-studies/
im-private-fund-annual-report-081514.pdf Inside investment is estimated using the in-
side ownership measure from Form ADV.
63See, for instance https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-21/
how-renaissance-s-medallion-fund-became-finance-s-blackest-box
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distribution of insider capital across the top-10 earner funds (of which James Simon
at Renaissance was the top performer), and finds considerable discretion over private
capital investment within these fund families. The role of this discretion in GP capital
commitment has been the subject of considerable investor and regulatory interest.64
This paper first proceeds by extending the Berk and Green 2004 framework to
include several key features that better capture institutional features of compensation
structures in hedge funds. In our model, managers face capacity constraints in deter-
mining the optimal level of invested capital, can choose to endogenously create new
funds with different strategies, and can allocate internal capital across funds. When
managing personal capital, managers internalize the fact that raising additional cap-
ital is dilutive to existing investors in the sense that it causes the strategy to operate
closer to its capacity constraint, lowering the returns for all existing investors.
This basic framework yields several key predictions about the relationship between
inside investment and fund performance. We predict that when firms face a menu of
investment strategies with different excess return and scalability: 1) Inside investment
will be concentrated in particular funds within a family; 2) Funds with a greater
percentage of inside investment are smaller, as they are further from their capacity
constraint; and 3) Because they are operated further from their capacity constraint,
funds with greater inside capital outperform on a risk-adjusted basis. Taken together,
our model predicts that greater inside investment better aligns incentives between
managers and investors and induces managers to limit the size of their funds, resulting
in higher alpha even in equilibrium.
We examine these predictions on the relationship between inside investment and
64See Mary Jo White, SEC Chair on Oct. 16, 2015: "Examiners observed that some hedge fund
advisers may not be adequately disclosing conflicts related to advisers’ proprietary funds and the
personal accounts of their portfolio managers. Examiners saw, for example, advisers allocating
profitable trades and investment opportunities to proprietary funds rather than client accounts
in contravention of existing policies and procedures." Also see BlueCrest: https://www.ft.com/
content/4eb275f2-a4dd-11e5-a91e-162b86790c58.
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fund returns through a novel usage of a comprehensive and survivor bias-free dataset,
Form ADV, provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This reg-
ulatory form requires all hedge funds with assets over $100m to disclose the fraction
of fund assets held by insiders yearly at the fund level. We merge Form ADV data
with numerous commercially available datasets on hedge fund returns to understand
the connection between "skin in the game" and fund returns.65
We analyze the relationship between inside investment and hedge fund perfor-
mance using a panel regression. Using both the Fama and French 1992 and Carhart
1997 factors, as well as the Fung and Hsieh 2004 seven factors, we control for factor
exposure of returns at the fund level. We find that inside investment—as measured
either by percentage or gross investment—remains an important predictor of excess
returns even when comparing different funds within firms. An investor who changes
their allocation from a fund with the mean inside investment to one with a stan-
dard deviation increase in inside investment will see a rise in excess returns of 1.46%
annualized. This significant and economically large magnitude indicates that inside
investment is an important, and previously neglected, cross-sectional predictor of
hedge fund returns.
Having established the superior performance of insider investment funds, we in-
vestigate the main drivers of this result by examining standard return predictability
and fund flow-performance specifications. We find that funds with little inside capital
operate according to standard Berk and Green 2004 logic: good returns are followed
by large fund inflows, so there is little predictability in excess returns. However, we
find that funds with greater inside investment do not follow this pattern. For this
subset of funds, very high returns do not lead to excess inflows; instead excess returns
appear to be substantially persistent for this subgroup of funds. This pattern is con-
sistent with the idea that that managers manage and limit fund inflows into funds
65Including HFR, CISDM, eVestment, BarclaysHedge, and EurekaHedge.
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with greater amounts of their own managerial capital in order to operate the fund
further away from its capacity constraint. The joint behavior between fund flows,
performance, and inside investment suggests that capacity constraints are an impor-
tant driver of hedge fund performance; and that managers of hedge funds choose to
deploy less capital (and so gain greater alpha) when their own personal capital is
involved.
Next, we examine the heterogeneity across funds. Consistent with the role of man-
agerial discretion over capacity constraints, our results are driven by funds engaged
in specialist roles, arbitrage strategies, and equity funds that might be expected to
deploy trading strategies subject to diminishing returns to scale. We also investigate
alternate explanations for our result, such as superior information on the part of fund
managers and agency conflicts. Our tests suggest that these alternate factors are
unlikely to fully explain our result. While we cannot fully rule out the relationship
between inside investment and other fund attributes, understanding inside investment
through the lens of fund capacity constraints appears to best explain our results.
Finally, we investigate whether insiders are able to "cream skim" outside investors
through fund formation and strategic capital allocation. Specifically, we use an event
study framework to analyze firms that begin as a single-fund firm and create a new
fund. This transition is illustrated in Figure 2.3. The generation of a second fund
provides a test case to analyze the effects of inside investment on fund performance,
because insiders have a discretionary choice of private capital allocation: 1) Keep
their money in the old fund, and invite outsiders to invest in the new fund; or 2)
Move internal capital into the new fund. The two cases present differing predictions
on the performance level of the initial fund: when inside capital remains in the
original fund, we expect the original fund to outperform relative to when insiders
move their capital out of the newly formed fund. We find evidence consistent with
this hypothesis, suggesting the possibility of "skimming" motives on the part of fund
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managers.
Our results come with several caveats which we emphasize here. Though we es-
tablish inside ownership as an important predictor of excess returns and highlight
the role for capacity constraints in understanding this result from a theoretical and
empirical perspective, it is possible that other mechanisms operate in addition to the
ones we emphasize. We discuss in section I.C possible mechanisms behind our re-
sult. It is possible that inside investors are better informed about the skill of various
fund managers and deploy capital accordingly; alternatively, high-skin-in-the-game
funds may be less subject to agency conflicts and engage in superior research analysis
(see Berk and Binsbergen 2017). Inside investment may also serve as a signal to
outside investors by providing costly evidence of managerial commitment. Finally,
it is possible that higher returns from high skin-in-the-game funds are a proxy for
some risk factors (unrelated to either the Fama-French, Carhart, or Fung-Hsieh fac-
tors, such as tail risk as mentioned in Agarwal, Ruenzi, and Weigert 2017). While
more research is needed to establish the precise reasons for the outperformance of
high inside-investment firms, we emphasize that our work provides novel evidence
that managerial ownership is an important predictor of cross-sectional fund perfor-
mance in ways consistent with a basic model including capacity constraints and inside
investment.
Our work is related to literature assessing the role of inside investment as a pre-
dictor of cross-sectional returns among mutual funds. The papers closest to ours
are Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge 2007a, Evans 2008a, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang
2008a, and Cremers et al. 2009a Ibert 2017, which find evidence that greater insider
investments improve mutual fund performance. By contrast, we explore inside invest-
ment in the context of hedge funds, which feature substantially greater amounts of
internal investments in a less regulated industry. Other papers investigating skin in
the game in hedge funds include Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft 1999, which
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documents substantial managerial investment in hedge funds and Qiu, Tang, and
Walter 2016, which finds no relationship between inside investment and hedge fund
failure rates. Papers examining hedge fund personal stakes and outcomes include
Brown et al. 2008, which uses a single cross-section of hedge fund inside investment
and finds that high-skin-funds exhibit worse returns and are more likely to exhibit
conflicts of interest. Ozik and Sadka 2015 analyzes the role of managerial investment
on fund flows. Our paper differs by providing a much more comprehensive series of
managerial investments drawn from regulatory filings, and investigating the role of
inside investment in a complete dynamic panel of hedge funds. We find substantial
evidence that high-skin-funds outperform, and explore the mechanisms of this result
within a Berk and Green 2004 style context.
Other research in mutual funds has investigated the role of skill and ability of
delegated asset managers. Recent papers such as Kosowski et al. 2006, Berk and
Binsbergen 2015, Koijen 2014 find evidence of mutual fund managerial skill in port-
folio selection, with Berk and Binsbergen 2015 emphasizing a value-add measure of
managerial skill and Koijen 2014 adopting a structural approach. Fama and French
2010 suggests instead that few managers outperform on a factor-corrected basis, while
French 2008 suggests delegated asset managers add little value. This paper instead
focuses on the managerial skills of hedge funds managers, and find suggestive evidence
that high-skin-funds systematically outperform on a risk-adjusted basis.
This paper also relates to the literature examining the role of fund families. Re-
lated papers include Massa 2003, which documents strategy differentiation across
funds in a family; Berk, Binsbergen, and Liu 2017, which examines the allocation of
talent across funds within a family; while Sialm and Tham 2017 analyzes the rela-
tionships between the performance of funds and their overall management companies.
Our research expands on this literature by highlighting the differential allocation of
internal capital within a family of funds and the link to within-family performance.
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Our work is also related to the literature on financial compensation and incentives.
Previous papers have explored the compensation contract structure of investment ad-
visors (such as Das and Sundaram 2002), or investigated empirically the relationship
between manager pay and performance (such as Ibert et al. 2017, and Ma, Tang,
and Gomez 2016). The closest papers to ours examine the role of managerial con-
tract structure on hedge fund performance, such as Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 2009
and Burasachi, Kosowski, and Sritrakul 2014, and the connection between managerial
compensation and fund size (such as Yin 2016). Relative to this literature, we empha-
size that managers have another option for personal compensation—investing their
own private capital—and examine both the theoretical and empirical implications.
Underpinning the motivation of this paper, our model and analysis of managerial
skill is also related to the equilibrium modeling approach of Berk and Green 2004,
and Berk and Binsbergen 2017, evidence on capacity constraints, as in Ramadorai
2013, and funding constraints as in Homberta and Thesmar 2014. We build on this
literature by by decomposing capital contributions into insider and outsider sources
and including the returns on internally invested capital as a part of the overall com-
pensation of the fund manager. Our work is also related to the information spillover
model in Glode and Green 2011, which also focuses on hedge funds and examines
return persistence in a theoretical context.
In the context of the literature on financial intermediation compensation, we em-
phasize that access to superior investable opportunities helps explain why financial
intermediaries—particularly hedge funds—appear to be so highly compensated even
in the face of stiff competition. Our findings are relevant in understanding the recent
rise in inequality among the top 1%, who are disproportionately financial managers of
capital (See Kaplan and Rauh 2013, Philippon and Reshef 2012, and Alvaredo et al.
2013).
Finally, our work also contributes to the broader literature on ownership, firm
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performance, and agency conflicts. Berle and Means 1932a, Jensen and Meckling
1976b, Fama and Jensen 1983, and Holmstrom 1985 have analyzed the consequences
of firm capital structure and internal ownership on governance and agency conflicts
as well as firm performance. Demsetz and Lehn 1985 and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and
Palia 1999 find little evidence that managerial ownership affects firm performance,
while Randall, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988 emphasize the non-monotonicity of the
relationship between board of directors’ ownership and firm performance. Porta et
al. 2002 find that corporate ownership is more concentrated in climates of weaker
investor protection. Our work extends this literature, which has largely analyzed
non-financial companies, by focusing on delegated asset managers and emphasizing
the conflict between managers and investors regarding the internal capital structure
and fund formation decisions of hedge fund managers in the presence of capacity
constraints. Decisions of funds to open up additional funding to outside capital (in
order to earn management fees) have material consequences on the returns of existing
investors. We find, both in our model and in the data, that firms extract considerable
surplus through the allocation of internal capital to funds which do not hit their
capacity constraint, representing a potential conflict of interest between hedge fund
managers and investors. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
1 outlines our data and empirical strategy, and also comments briefly on the nature
of corporate governance in hedge funds as well as mechanisms. Section 2 presents
our main results, while Section 3 concludes. The Appendix contains further details
on our model and auxiliary results.
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2.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
Data
Our dataset combines regulatory Form ADV filings with commercial hedge fund re-
turn series from HFR, eVestment, BarclaysHedge, Eurekahedge, and CISDM. Form
ADV is a required regulatory disclosure form used to register with both the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and state securities authorities. Reporting under
Form ADV is governed by the US Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended by
Dodd-Frank. Disclosure requirements under this form have changed over the years.
In the period from 1996–2011, funds with assets under management below $25 mil-
lion, or fewer than 15 clients, were generally exempt from registration. Hedge funds
in this period frequently used complex fund structures to evade disclosure even when
assets were above this threshold.
Private fund reporting increased in 2005, when the SEC went to court to force
funds to count all investors as clients. Though courts ultimately struck down the
SEC’s interpretation, disclosure through Form ADV increased throughout this period.
Our primary sample is formed after 2011, after changes in required disclosure imposed
by Dodd-Frank. Under prevailing regulations, all investment advisors—including
hedge funds—are now required to file a Form ADV with the SEC if they (1) reach
a $100 million threshold for assets under management for a typical fund, (2) reach a
$150 million threshold if the firm has only private clients, (3) have over $25 million
in assets and are not subject to examination in their home states (states that do not
require examination currently include New York and Wyoming). Subsequent to their
initial filing, firms must refile once a year (as long as their assets under management
exceed $25 million), or if there have been changes in material information since the
last filing.
We obtain Form ADV from the SEC over the period 2011–2016. We link Form
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ADV information together with information on hedge fund returns obtained from a
combination of five datasets: HFR, eVestment, BarclaysHedge, Eureka Hedge, and
CISDM. We begin the merge with HFR, eVestment and BarclaysHedge, which contain
for many firms an SEC identifier common to both the commercial hedge fund datasets
and Form ADV. If we do not have an SEC identifier, we next look for close matches
(selecting only perfect matches) among firm and fund names in both datasets, after
eliminating extraneous stop words (such as LLC, LP, etc.).
In 2012, Form ADV was updated to include questions about the internal invest-
ment of their funds. Figure 2.4 shows a sample Form ADV for Renaissance Tech-
nologies.66 Panel A captures firm-level information for the filing firm, Renaissance
Technologies LLC. Panel B identifies a specific fund as listed in Section 7.B.(1), in
this case Medallion Fund, L.P. Panel C of 2.4 displays the precise question we draw
on from Section 7.B.(1), question 14 of Form ADV: “What is the approximate per-
centage of the private fund beneficially owned by you and your related persons.” This
question asks funds to disclose the percentage of investment stakes in the fund which
can be attributed in ultimate ownership to “related persons.”
Summary Table 2.2 shows basic summary information about both our core Form
ADV dataset taken from 2016, while Table 2.3 reports information on our merged
sample. The broad ADV sample is able to establish key statistics about the overall
size and scope of the entire hedge fund industry beyond prior work. Figure 2.5
demonstrates our merge rate across the range of firm ownership. We find that funds
with complete inside investment (100 percent) and no inside investment (0 percent)
exhibit worse merge rates into our ADV dataset. These funds also pose additional
identification questions—either outsiders cannot invest, or insiders have chosen not
to invest in these funds. For these reasons, we focus the remainder of our analysis
66Form ADV is publicly available through the SEC’s website, https://www.adviserinfo.sec.
gov/.
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on funds in the interior of the internal investment distribution: between one and 99
percent inside investment, inclusive.
A breakdown of “related parties” is provided in Table 2.4, which illustrates all
possible responses for which parties constitute related parties. The most common
response is “Sponsor of GP,”67 suggesting that the definition of related party most
often corresponds to a vehicle used by the actual managers or general partners of the
fund. Alternately, related parties can include other closely-related entities, such as
asset investment by a broker/dealer. A separate set of questions asks the legal name
of all related parties: these entities are typically closely related to the management
company, share a supervised person three quarters of the time, and over half of the
time share a common physical office. Despite the limitations of this measure in exactly
calculating managerial stakes, we document that related parties are typically vehicles
for fund investment by the general partners, and typically represent asset management
on behalf of closely-related entities that can be considered “inside capital.”
Panel B of Figure 2.1 illustrates the density of fund responses across different
fund vehicles for our example of Renaissance Technologies, and demonstrates a clear
dispersion of fractional inside investment across different funds within the firm family.
Figure 2.2 illustrates other sample inside investment distributions across funds for
selected well-known hedge funds. The common pattern is one in which hedge funds
operate a variety of vehicles with varying degrees of inside investment. The dispersion
of inside investment is consistent with our model (see Appendix A), which predicts
that insiders do not deploy capital evenly across funds within their family, but instead
preferentially allocate inside capital in certain funds as a function of the excess return
and scalability of investment strategies.
Panel A of Figure 2.6 illustrates the density of responses on inside investment
across our full merged dataset. Panel B of Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of assets
67We verify that results hold when we subset on firms for which this is true.
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under management attributable to inside investment, shown on a log-dollar scale.
Conflicts and Disclosure
Hedge fund operating agreements demand few fiduciary obligations of managers to
prioritize one fund over another, or to prioritize funds with their own internal capital
on the same basis as funds with a greater preponderance of outside capital. As noted
in Nowak 2009 and quoted in Morley 2014, the manager:
is required to devote to the [fund] only that amount of time and atten-
tion that the [manager] in its sole discretion deems reasonably necessary
to achieve the [fund’s] objectives.
Discretion is typically left in the hands of the manager to handle any conflicts
of interest across classes of investors, different funds in a family, or in accepting
additional outside capital. Corporate governance within hedge funds is deliberately
minimal due to strong exit rights among investors, and restrictions on investment to
classes of accredited or well-informed investors.
Mechanisms
Our model (see Appendix A) yields sharp predictions on the relationship between
inside investment and fund returns and size. In this section, we outline the key mech-
anisms underlying the relationship between inside investment and fund performance
from our model, as well as other complementary explanations.
1. S ize Performance Tradeoff: Our model explanation for the role of inside invest-
ment as a predictor of cross-sectional fund performance relies on the tradeoff
between managerial compensation through fee income on delegated asset man-
agement and returns on privately invested capital. With limited commitment,
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managers cannot credibly commit to not increasing the size of their fund in
the future to the point that the excess returns to investment strategies are
driven down to zero. Personal capital commitments better align the incentives
of managers and outsiders, and provide greater incentives for managers to scale
their funds less aggressively in a manner which results in greater returns for all
investors.
2. Moral Hazard: Another possible mechanism driving the relationship between
fund performance and inside investment is the possibility for managers to al-
locate additional attention or trade differently on funds which have greater
amounts of privately invested capital. While our main proposed explanation
highlights one aspect of this—the ability for managers to preferentially manage
fund size on funds managing private capital—managers can potentially change
other attributes of funds managing private capital. These include allocating
additional attention or superior managerial quality to these funds, or execut-
ing superior trading strategies. Potentially, funds can take different risks on
funds managing private capital than on funds managing the capital of outside
investors.
3. Superior Information: An alternate, and complementary, explanation for the
relationship between inside investments and fund performance is that inside
investors are simply better informed about managerial ability within the fund
family, and allocate their capital to the better fund managers.
4. S ignaling: One potentially offsetting role for managerial capital allocation to
funds lies in the role of public signaling. Fund managers, particularly for less es-
tablished funds, may need to demonstrate private capital commitments in order
to convince outside investors of fund quality. When managers are required to
hold costly private stakes in order to demonstrate quality and earn management
fees on outside capital; inside investment could potentially be a poor predictor
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of ultimate fund performance. As Form ADVs are commonly used by outside
investors to assess fund quality, managerial stakes in this context are unlikely to
be purely “cheap talk” but reflect verifiable and costly personal commitments.
These channels need not be mutually exclusive; for instance, the greater the role
of moral hazard or risk-shifting effects in driving managers to exert effort or allo-
cate trades differentially depending on private capital investments; the more private
information there will be on the success of different funds within a family.
In subsequent analysis, we will first establish the role of inside investment as
a predictor of cross-sectional hedge fund performance, focusing on return variation
within the fund family. We find support for our main hypothesis that managerial
control over fund sizing appears to help describe the superior performance of insider-




Our main specifications tests the relationship between inside investment stakes and
fund-level returns. The starting point of our analysis is the investing decisions of an
institutional investor interested in allocating across the broad investable universe of
fund managers.
We estimate the impact of ownership on returns on a fund-by-fund level, adjusting
for factor exposure:
rit − rft = αit + γOwnershipit + βˆ1,itRMRFt + βˆ2,itSMBt + βˆ3,itHMLt + εit (2.1)
where we examine ownership as proxied by both the percentage of the fund which
consists of insider investment, as well as the gross insider exposure. We value-weight
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this regression by assets under management to better proxy the portfolio allocation
decision of an institutional investor (we also examine equal-weighted returns). The
key variable of interest is γ, which captures the predictive role of greater inside
investment on excess returns.
We are particularly interested in this analysis using firm and year fixed effects, as
well as other fund level controls Xit:
rit − rft = αiT + γOwnershipit + βˆ1,iTRMRFt + βˆ2,iTSMBt + βˆ3,iTHMLt
+ δFIRMi + ηY eart +X′itφ+ εit
(2.2)
This allows us to control for other year, firm, and fund factors driving excess
returns. The interpretation of γ in this case is the amount of excess return attributed
to investing in a high-skin fund relative to a low-skin fund within the same company,
year, and fund type.
In addition to the above factor model, we also use the Fung and Hsieh 2004
seven-factor model:
rit − rft = αiT + γOwnershipit + βˆ1,iTS?Pt + βˆ2,iTSC − LCt + βˆ3,iT10Yt
+ βˆ4,iTCredSprt + βˆ5,iTBdOptt + βˆ6,tFXOptt + βˆ7,tComOpt+X′itφ+ εit
The interpretation of γ in this equation is similar, and allows us to examine the
role of additional “skin in the game" on fund performance.
Finally, to test for size, we perform a comparable analysis regressing the assets
under management of funds against the fraction of inside investment:
AUMit = ψOwnershipit + δFIRMi + ηY eart + εit (2.3)
The ψ coefficient here captures the relationship of size and fractional inside in-
vestment, within firm and year.
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Fund-Flow Sensitivity and Return Predictability
Following prior literature, such as Chevalier and Ellison 1997, we define fund flows
using net flows ri,t as:
FLOWit =
AUMit − (1 + rit) · AUMi,t−1
AUMi,t−1
(2.4)
Using this definition, we also test standard fund-flow sensitivities:
FLOWit = β(1 + r
e
i,t−1→t) + εi,t (2.5)
The coefficient of interest, β, captures the sensitivity of fund flows to excess returns




i,t−1→t + εi,t (2.6)
We next turn to our main results testing the relationships outlined in this section.
2.3 Results
Regression Results
We start with regressions that control more closely for fund factor exposure. Our
model suggests that, within a firm, funds with a greater proportion of inside capital
will outperform because managers internalize the capacity constraints of the invest-
ment strategy when accepting new capital. Funds with greater inside capital retain
greater alpha, in equilibrium, because managers maximize profits by not accepting
additional outside capital to the capacity limit of the investing strategy.
To analyze the role of inside investment and risk-adjusted returns, we examine in
Table 2.5 fund-level regressions as outlined in our Empirical Strategy Section above.
In Panel A, we focus on the standard four-factor model to correct for factor exposure
and regress excess returns against measures of inside investment. Column 1 of Table
2.5 regresses the percent of a fund’s assets under management that can be attributed
to insider investment against excess returns. Inside investment is statistically asso-
ciated with excess returns, even unconditionally. This relationship persists in our
preferred specification in column 2, which controls for year and firm effects. Addi-
tional fund level controls include: a size control (log of gross asset value), the fund’s
inception year, and the fund’s strategy. Our estimates in that column suggest that a
fund with a 1 percentage point increase in inside investment experiences a 0.55 basis
point higher excess return; relative to another fund in the same family and year of
observation with the same strategy, size, and inception year.
Scaling our result; we find a 1.46% increase in alpha per year for a fund with a
standard deviation increase in the amount of inside investment relative to another
fund in the same firm with similar characteristics. These results are quite large
quantitatively, and suggest a strong importance for internal investment as a predictor
of cross-sectional fund performance. The larger magnitude and significance of results
when controlling for firm fixed effects suggests the importance of discretionary fund
allocation by insiders: there is high dispersion of fund returns within firms in our
sample, and insiders choose which investment strategies to pursue in which funds,
and which funds to invest in. Our results suggest that their private capital is more
likely deployed in funds that outperform others within the family.
We find similar results in columns 3 and 4, which examine the gross amount of
inside investment, rather than the fractional amount (also controlling for size and
other fund-level characteristics). We also find substantially larger estimates in Panel
B, which uses the Fung and Hsieh 2004 measure of hedge fund returns. In this
specification, we find that inside investment is associated with internal investment (as
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measured on a percentage or gross level) unconditionally, as well as in conjunction
with fund and firm results. Our results in these specifications are large in magnitude,
and suggest that a fund with an additional percent skin in the game can expect 1.1
basis points higher excess return, monthly.
Following prior literature, we present the main results value-weighted in order
to better match the composition of the investable universe and mirror the decision
of an outside investor. All results in Table 2.5 are value-weighted using the Gross
Asset Value field in Form ADV, which is present for all funds. Table 2.6 presents
equally-weighted results, which yields very similar results.68
These results are subject to several important caveats. First, while these results
suggest that fund-level inside investment predicts superior excess returns, the rela-
tionship might not be causal. It may well be that our measure of inside skin in the
game is a proxy for other fund-level characteristics. Another important caveat is that
we are not able to fully control for whether our results are driven by some element
of risk or are instead due to agency conflicts within the firm. Despite our attempts
to control for risk using the benchmark fund factors, it is also possible that the out-
performance of high skin-in-the-game funds is due to a novel risk factor. To further
analyze the mechanisms driving our main result, we examine fund decisions along
other dimensions.
2.4 Main Mechanism: Capacity Constraints
Having established that investment by insiders predicts fund outperformance, we next
consider the possible drivers of this relationship. In order to investigate the source
of relative out performance of high investment funds, we are guided by our model
68Results are also similar when weighting by AUM as measured using the commercial hedge fund
datasets.
77
(discussed in Appendix A), which yields key predictions on the mechanisms behind
inside investment and fund performance.
First, we consider how lagged excess returns relate to asset flows to funds. Figure
2.7 plots a non-parametric relationship between lagged returns and fund inflows by
funds with a greater or lesser degree of insider investment. Insider funds are defined
as those with a greater-than-average (> 20.8 percent) amount of fraction of fund
assets attributable to insiders. Flows are winsorized at a 1% level, and the range of
excess returns is restricted from -20–20%.69
The figure illustrates that outsider funds exhibit a standard fund flow-performance
relationship as documented in prior research on hedge funds and mutual funds. How-
ever, insider funds demonstrate a different profile: insider funds that experience very
positive excess returns do not exhibit subsequent high inflows, consistent with the
idea that high performing funds with greater insider capital manage funds further
away from their capacity constraint.
Complementing the results on flow performance, Figure 2.8 plots a non-parametric
relationship between excess returns over time. Outsider funds demonstrate low return
predictability: high excess returns are followed by lower returns in the subsequent
period, consistent with the standard Berk and Green 2004 logic that high returns
encourage fund inflows, driving down returns in future periods. High-performing
insider funds, however, exhibit more persistent returns over time: high excess returns
are followed by high returns over time.
Table 2.8 illustrates the flow performance and return predictability specifications,
as outlined in equations 2.5 and 2.6. The independent variable in these specifications
is the same (lagged excess returns); the dependent variable is either fund flows or
subsequent excess returns.
69For all flow-based analysis, we exclude eVestment from our sample due to unreliable NAV infor-
mation from this data provider.
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While the flow and performance relationship in the regressions appears compara-
ble for both high- and low-inside ownership funds; we find very high return persis-
tence among inside investment funds (column (3)). The joint relationship between
inside investment, flow performance, and return predictability—particularly for high-
performing funds—provides some evidence that the ability of fund insiders to manage
capacity constraints helps account for their outperformance. By limiting fund inflows
in periods in which funds experience high returns, insider funds are able to maintain
persistently high excess returns over time. In doing so, funds are foregoing manage-




Figure 2.9 illustrates the main effect (as in column 2 of Panel A Table 2.5) by fund
categories. Panel A of this figure plots the coefficient of inside investment against
excess return by categories as measured in our set of commercial hedge fund datasets.
The main effects are driven by funds that engage in specialist absolute return strate-
gies, arbitrage strategies, and equity funds. Within equity funds (Panel B), effects
are driven by long-short funds and those focused on emerging markets. These fund
strategies more plausibly feature capacity constraints in their investment strategies.
By contrast, effects are insignificant among fund-of-funds and CTAs, which are typi-
cally associated with lower capacity constraints.
In Figure 2.10 we examine a quantile regression in which we examine the relation-
ship between inside investment and fund performance across the distribution of inside
investment. We plot the coefficient for percentage inside investment when regressed
against Fama-French and Carhart excess returns (controlling also for size) across the
79
quantiles of the distribution of inside investment. We find that our results are largely
being driven by funds with higher levels of inside investment; those funds for which
inside capital provides a substantial component of the capital base, for which we
expect to see the highest-powered incentives.70
In Table 2.7 we examine our basic regression across different fund size levels. We
re-run our specification (2) from Panel A in Table 2.5 across the quantiles of the
fund size distribution. We find significant effects for the top three fund size quantiles
(corresponding to fund sizes of at least $43 million).
Fund Size
We also analyze the role of size and inside investment. Again, we hypothesize in
our model that a key mechanism driving the superior performance of insider funds is
their smaller size, due to decreasing returns to scale in investment technologies. To
test this hypothesis, in Table 2.9, we regress the size of the fund against a measure
of proportional inside investment. In column 2 of Panel A, we focus on our matched
dataset and find that an additional percent of inside investment is associated with a
$6 million smaller fund. This relationship persists when we examine a specification
where the dependent variable is the log of assets under management in column 4.
We are also able to run this specification on the Form ADV dataset only, in Panel
B. These specifications use the field “Gross Asset Value” derived from fund-level
information in Form ADV. Gross asset value differs from assets under management
in that it does not subtract out the value of short positions from the portfolio, and
so overestimates true fund size. Despite the limitations of this measure, using this
field as a dependent variable enables us to avoid losing observations on the merge
70Our findings are weaker if we exclude high inside-investment funds from our sample. When
we impose a $500m cutoff and restrict to funds with inside investment of < 50%, we find similar
results as in the analysis in Kruttli, Monin, and Watugala 2017 based on a linkage of Form PF-
ADV. However, our focus is on the larger universe of hedge funds, including those smaller funds not
required to file Form PFs and those funds with substantial inside investment stakes.
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between our Form ADV dataset and the commercial hedge fund datasets. Results
are very similar when not restricting on funds that merge into commercial hedge
fund datasets: we find in column 2 that within a firm, funds with an additional
percent of inside investment are around $10 million smaller in gross asset value.
These results provide additional support for the model: inside investment funds are
both smaller and outperform, suggesting that managers do not hit the limits of the
capacity constraints of their investment strategy when their own private capital is
deployed. The reluctance to accept additional outside capital on these funds explains
why they continue to outperform and gain excess returns, even in equilibrium.
Superior Manger Information
An alternate and complementary mechanism in explaining our main result that
greater insider investment predicts higher excess returns is that managers have supe-
rior private information on the abilities of fund managers than do outside investors,
and so deploy personal capital to the superior managers. To test this hypothesis, we
estimate the following specification in Table 2.10:
rei,t−1→t = βInsiderInflowit + γOutsiderInflowit + εit (2.7)
This specification tests whether changes in insider investment predict excess re-
turns. We find that changes in neither inside nor outside flows predict excess returns.
While this test is not fully conclusive regarding the channel of superior inside infor-
mation, this result suggests that insiders do not appear to be able to time their capital
allocation decisions in ways that predicts future excess returns. Put differently: levels
of inside investment, rather than changes, predict future returns. In conjunction with
the results on fund flows and performance, this result is perhaps unsurprising: fund
insiders appear to frequently extract funds from their best performing funds, rather
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than further invest, in order to continue to operate funds further from their capacity
constraint and gain excess returns.
Event Study
The results from the previous section provide evidence of a role for insider investment
in driving fund returns and suggest that the possibility of insider investment should
be seen as a critical component of the compensation of managers in addition to
management and incentive fees. They raise the prospect that fund managers may
seek to further take advantage of this relationship by further steering clients into
lower performing funds.
We explore this possibility in Figure 2.11, which conducts an event study in the
aftermath of the creation of a new fund among firms which previously only had one.
The creation of an additional fund presents two possibilities for fund managers: they
can either keep their internal capital invested in the original fund (using the new
fund to attract new capital); or they can shift their own capital to the new fund
(and market the original fund to investors). If the amount of insider capital is an
important determinant of fund performance, we expect different fund performance in
the original fund under the two cases. If managers are shifting their capital outside
of the fund, we expect the performance of the original fund to deteriorate (since
managers are no longer as invested in success of the fund). If, on the other hand,
managers keep their capital in the original fund, the performance of the original fund
should remain strong.
To test this possibility, we focus on all cases in which a hedge fund, which pre-
viously only operated one fund, opens a second. We isolate two cases: one in which
the new fund has less internal investment than the original (the new fund has “low
skin”), and another in which the new fund has more internal investment than the
original. We plot cumulative returns of the fund for the two-year window both before
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and after the fund creation date.
Our results suggest that fund performance is relatively similar before the event
date for the original fund, regardless of whether the firm subsequently creates a new
fund with high or low internal investment. Differences grow more pronounced in
the aftermath of fund creation. We find that when the new fund has “low skin”—
suggesting that managers keep their internal capital in the original fund—fund per-
formance suffers relative to when the newly create fund has “high skin.” We expect
to see this difference because managers are more invested in the success of the initial
fund if their capital remains deployed in the fund. If their own capital has moved to
a different fund, performance tends to suffer in the window after fund creation.
Though these results are not fully conclusive, they are suggestive of the possibility
of “skimming” motives on the part of fund managers. If managers are able to shift
their internal investments across funds within the same family, they seem able to focus
their investments on successful funds, while steering outside capital into the lower
performing funds. These results therefore provide additional context to our model and
previous empirical results, suggesting that active decisions made by fund managers
regarding fund creation and where capital is deployed play a role in determining
returns for outside investors.
To be clear, this analysis does not distinguish whether this is due to insiders having
better information on which fund managers can outperform relative to outsiders, or
because managers devote more effort when greater amounts of personal capital are
on the line. Despite the multiple possible explanations, we emphasize that our result
provides novel evidence on the role of inside investment in shaping fund performance
as new funds are created.
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Firm-Level Equity
In addition to the choice of investing personal capital in the fund alongside outside
investors, managers also have the option of investing in equity at the firm level.
Analysis of the ownership structure of the partnerships that comprise typical hedge
funds has been limited due to scarce data. In this section, we use Form ADV data to
shed light on the ownership structures of hedge funds.
Figure 2.12 illustrates the imputation process for firm-level equity. We use frac-
tional ownership codes, found on Schedules A and B of Form ADV. These ownership
fields track both direct and indirect owners, allowing us to examine the ultimate ben-
eficial owners of hedge fund structures, even when shielded behind shell structures
such as LLCs. A limitation of our analysis is that ownership codes are fractionally
allocated (i.e., ownership fields will track an owner with a stake between 10%-25% of
the firm’s equity). We tabulate for this reason a minimum and maximum estimate of
the firm’s equity, illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2.12.
Panel B of this figure plots a histogram of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
measure of dispersion in firm-level ownership. Many hedge funds feature no dispersion
in ownership (e.g. are beneficially owned by only one individual or entity); however
many firms have fractional ownership.
In order to investigate the implications of dispersion in firm-level ownership and
its relation with fund-level inside investments, we regress both measures in conjunc-
tion in Table 2.11. Column 3 of this table suggests that inside investment at the
fund level remains a significant predictor of excess returns, even when controlling for
measures of firm-level ownership. In addition to fund-level inside investment, we find
that the number of equity owners (as a measure of the dispersion in a hedge fund
family’s ownership structure) negatively predicts excess returns. While this result
would be consistent with the idea that dispersion in a firm’s equity structure is a sign
of agency frictions and internal firm conflict, other explanations might also poten-
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tially explain the relationship between the dispersion in firm-level equity ownership
and fund performance. Despite the limitations of our measures of firm-level equity,
we emphasize that our paper is the first to our knowledge to examine measures of
insider capital allocations for a comprehensive sample of hedge funds at the levels of
fund allocation, as well as firm-level equity contributions.
2.6 Conclusions
The ability to access and allocate capital to profitable, but highly limited, invest-
ment opportunities within the companies they oversee is a substantial element of
fund manager compensation. However, this has rarely been explored in empirical
and theoretical analysis of delegated asset management. We explore how the possi-
bility of inside investment alters fund performance in the context of an equilibrium
model along the lines of Berk and Green 2004. Our model highlights the tradeoff
between management fees earned by managing funds close to their capacity con-
straint, and earning excess returns on private capital invested in strategies further
from capacity constraint, as well as the role of inside investments in better aligning
incentives between managers and investors. Our model yields clear predictions on the
role of inside investment and fund performance: we predict that when intermediary
firms have access to a variety of different strategies that vary along the dimensions
of excess return and scalability, managers will differentially allocate private capital
across funds at their disposal to maximize private returns. The model predicts that
we should find a dispersion of inside investment across funds, and that greater inside
investment should predict excess returns and smaller fund size.
We take these predictions to the data using a comprehensive and survivor bias-
free dataset of hedge fund characteristics taken from Form ADV. We document novel
patterns of inside investment in hedge funds by related parties, which typically include
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sponsors of the general partners and closely-related entities, and find confirmation
of our hypothesis that firms—including several prominent hedge funds—typically
operate a variety of funds with varying degrees of internal investment.
To better understand the relationship between inside investment and returns, we
begin with an implementable hedge fund investment strategy that selects high inside-
investment funds. We find this strategy outperforms a portfolio invested in funds with
low insider allocations. We further analyze the role of inside ownership by regressing
excess returns (controlling for the Fama-French factors and the Carhart factor, as well
as the Fung-Hsieh seven factors) against measures of ownership. We find that funds
with higher internal investment have greater excess returns, even when we control
for firm fixed effects. Our results are large in magnitude, that a fund with a one
standard deviation increase in inside investment relative to the mean will provide an
additional 1.46% of excess returns annually.
We find that high inside-investment funds have both different fund flow-
performance and return predictability characteristics compared with funds largely
catering to outside investors. In response to very positive excess returns, they do
not accept as many inflows of capital as do outsider funds, and in tandem experience
greater persistence of high excess returns. The joint relationship between internal
investment, fund flows, and performance suggests that funds better manage capacity
constraints when managers have personal capital at stake, leading to superior per-
formance. This finding is consistent with our model explanation that insider funds
operate at a smaller scale because managers internalize the costs of fund expansion.
We also find suggestive evidence that fund managers are able to strategically
deploy fund creation and private capital allocation to further “skim” investors. We
find performance follows inside investments – when internal assets are shifted to newly
created funds they tend to outperform; however when managerial commitment remain
with the original fund, the returns tend to persist. Overall, we find that funds that
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rely more on insider money outperform funds that do not “eat their own cooking.”
These results, taken as a whole, provide powerful support for our hypothesis that
hedge funds face capacity constraints in their operations, and differentially allocate
capital across their funds to maximize profits, depending on the mix of inside and
outside capital. Our results suggest that the capital structure of hedge funds has a
substantial impact on operating performance. When funds rely on outside capital,
managers are compensated primarily from managerial fees and leave little value to
outside investors. Greater reliance on internal financing better aligns incentives of
managers and outside investors, leading them to leave substantial “slack” in fund size
and operate strategies on a lower scale, thereby receiving excess returns, even in a
competitive equilibrium.
Our results contribute to ongoing debates regarding the presence of managerial
alpha and financial rents. Many observers are puzzled at the apparently outsize rents
earned by financial intermediaries such as hedge funds, even in the wake of apparently
strong competition and the role of fund inflows on diminishing returns. In turn, these
managerial rents have driven top-end wealth and income inequality (see Kaplan and
Rauh 2013). We suggest a possible reconciliation of these facts can be found in
examining the option that fund managers have of not only of earning management
and performance fees, but also of deploying their own capital in funds they manage.
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(b) Panel B: Within-Fund Investment Distribution
Figure 2.1: Anecdotal Evidence, Relating Performance to Insider Investment
This figure highlights the performance and heterogeneity of insider ownership. Panel
A shows a Bloomberg article from November 21, 2016 discussing Renaissance Technologies’ highly
successful insider fund, the Medallion Fund. Panel B is a histogram of percent insider capital across
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(f) Two Sigma Investments, LP
Figure 2.2: Heterogeneity of Insider Investment Across Numerous Funds
This figure shows
the heterogeneity of insider investment for a set of sample firms. The horizontal axis corresponds
to the percent of insider investment and the vertical axis corresponds to the count of funds. The
histograms correspond to 2016 ADV filings, and excluded any funds smaller than $100 million.
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(a) Panel A: One Firm, One Fund (1F1F)
(b) Panel B: Different Insider Investment, Within
Firm)
(c) Panel C: Event Study Analysis)
Figure 2.3: Firm and Fund Analysis
This figure outlines the difference between firm and fund in the context of this paper and emphasizes
the different setups we analyze. Panel A describes a one firm one fund (1F1F) structure and the
comparison of incentives between two hypothetical firms. Panel B describes a firm with two separate
funds with different insider capital. Our within firm analysis compares Fund 1 against Fund 2, within
firm. Panel C shows the time evolution of Firm A, transitioning from a one fund to multi-fund firm.
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(a) Panel A: Section 1, Form ADV
(b) Panel B: Section 7.B.(1), Fund Identity, Form ADV
(c) Panel C: Section 7.B.(1), Ownership Reporting, Form ADV
Figure 2.4: Sample Form ADV — Renaissance Technologies
This figure shows three excerpts from the SEC’s Form ADV for a sample firm, Renaissance Technolo-
gies LLC. Panel A shows basic information to identify firms. Panel B shows basic fund information
for our sample fund, Medallion Fund L.P., and is found in Section 7.B.(1). Panel C shows ownership
data such as minimum investment, number of investors, and basic composition of investors, and
is reported at the fund level. We rely primarily on question 14, at the fund level, when studying













Figure 2.5: Bias Analysis of Merged Sample
This figure plots the merge rate between the insider investment observations from Form ADV and
the hedge fund commercial return databases (outlined in the Data section). It is generated by
dividing the empirical distribution of the merged sample against the unmerged sample of funds.
The red, dotted line, highlights the unbiased boundary. Larger than one indicates a higher match
rate relative to the average match rate. Observations for 0% and 100% inside investment have been
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(a) Panel A: Distribution of Insider Investment Across Funds,
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(b) Panel B: Distribution of Insider Across Funds, NAV
Figure 2.6: Distribution of Insider Investment from Merged Sample
This figure plots the insider investment into hedge funds from the merged sample
of hedge fund returns and ADV forms. Panel A is a histogram of insider
investment, and is in units of percent of total investment. This displays the
“dumbbell" insider investment pattern common across fund types. Panel B is a
histogram of log(NAV) of insider investment across funds for the merged sample















Ownership of Fund Insider Outsider
Figure 2.7: Flow Performance of Funds by Insider Status
This figure plots the relationship between lagged excess return and contemporaneous
flow. The flow measure is defined as: FLOWit = AUMit−(1+rit)·AUMi,t−1AUMi,t−1 . Excess returns
are defined using the Fama-French and Carhart 4 factors. Funds are divided by the
average level of inside investment into insider funds (> 20.8% Inside Investment) and

















Ownership of Fund Insider Outsider
Figure 2.8: Return Predictability Funds by Insider Status
This figure plots a kernel density between lagged and contemporaneous excess return.
Excess returns are defined using the Fama-French and Carhart 4 factors. Funds are
divided by the average level of inside investment into insider funds (> 20.8% Inside























(b) Panel B: Effects by Fund Type Among Equity Funds
Figure 2.9: Main Effects by Fund Type
This figure illustrates the main specification, as shown in column (2) of Panel A
Table 2.5, broken out by fund category. Funds are categorized based on descriptions
in commercial hedge fund datasets listed in the Data section. The error bars indicate
95% confidence interval for the estimated coefficients.
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Figure 2.10: Quantile Regression of Inside Investment on Excess Returns
This figure plots results from a quantile regression of percentage inside investment
against fund-level Fama-French and Carhart 4 factor corrected excess returns, con-
trolling also for fund size. Across each of the five quantiles of percentage inside
investment, we examine the slope of the relationship between inside investment and
excess returns. The shaded grey area illustrates the 95% confidence interval. We find

















Original Fund High Skin Low Skin
Figure 2.11: Event Study, Transition From One Fund to Multiple Funds
This figure plots the net cumulative returns of a firm which launches an additional fund after
previously only having one. Event times correspond to months from the fund creation date. The
lines plot the cumulative performance of the original fund; with the red line tracking a fund in
which inside investment increases in the original fund after new fund creation (suggesting that
the newly created fund is marketed to outside investors). The blue line tracks the performance of
funds in which inside investment the original fund falls after new fund creation (suggesting that the
original fund is marketed to outside investors). The post-fund creation rise in returns of the red
line indicates that fund performance improves when inside investment is strengthened in the fund.
In a Difference-in-difference regression, the interacted term of High Inside×Post has a coefficient of
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(b) Panel B: HHI of Firm-Level Equity Ownership
Figure 2.12: Firm-Level Equity Ownership
This figure illustrates the firm-level equity ownership estimates of all hedge funds in the Form ADV
data. Panel A presents both minimum and maximum estimate of aggregate equity ownership of
hedge funds from recursively linking Schedule A B. Panel B presents the concentration of equity
ownership at the firm-level and described by the HHI of ownership.
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Table 2.1: Top 10 Hedge Fund Manager Paychecks, 2016
This table reports the top ten hedge fund manager paychecks from 2016, as produced by Institutional
Investor’s alpha magazine in Taub 2017 and reported by the N ew York Times, May 16 2017. Es-
timates take into consideration individual share of management and performance fees, as well as
personal capital commitments. We thank our discussant Clemens Sialm for referring us to the
article.
Rank Name Fund 2016 Paycheck
1 James Simons Renaissance Technologies $1.6 billion
2 Ray Dalio Bridgewater Associates $1.4 billion
3 John Overdeck Two Sigma $750 million
4 David Siegel Two Sigma $750 million
5 David Tepper Appaloosa Management $700 million
6 Kenneth Griffin Citadel $600 million
7 Paul Singer Elliot Management Corp. $590 million
8 Michael Hintze CQS $450 million
9 David Shaw D.E. Shaw Group $415 million
10 Israel Englander Millennium Management $410 million
Total: $6.9 billion
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: ADV Data
This summary table describes data on investment advisors taken from Form ADV in 2016. Data
is only taken from funds which are registered as hedge funds; firms must have at least one hedge
fund and a minimum level of assets of $10 million. Panel A describes firm level information at the
level of the management company. Panel B describes information available at the level of individual
funds. Note that some assets may be double-counted due to the inclusion of fund of funds. Inside
Investment corresponds to ownership by management or related parties, the key variable explored
in this paper.
Panel A: Firm Level Variables
Names Total Median Mean Std.Dev
Custodial AUM ($m) 8, 525, 754.0 775.5 6, 458.9 28, 332.9
Regulatory AUM ($m) 18, 084, 715 1, 166.7 13, 700.5 72, 114.3
Discretionary AUM ($m) 17, 518, 589 1, 030.8 13, 271.7 71, 040.1
Non-Discretionary AUM ($m) 566, 126 0 428.9 2, 585.1
Number of Employees 139, 264 13 57.2 199.0
− Support Staff 81, 033 5 33.3 132.9
− Advisors 58, 231 7 23.9 75.6
Number of Firms 2, 433
Firms with Only One Fund 682
Panel B: Fund Level Variables
Names Total Median Mean Std.Dev
Gross Asset Value ($m) 6, 177, 174.0 127.8 632.7 3, 060.7
Gross Assets, Inside Investment ($m) 772, 663 3.8 79.1 553.2
Gross Assets, Fund of Funds ($m) 1, 160, 354.0 0 118.9 873
Gross Assets, Non-US Investors ($m) 2, 492, 344.0 4.7 255.3 1, 698.6
Number of Owners 19 66.8 544.3
Minimum Investment ($m) 1 7.5 70.3
Inside Investment (%) 3 16.7 28.6
Investment by Fund of Funds (%) 0 15.9 29.5
Non-US Investors (%) 4 30.7 39.0
Number of Hedge Funds 9, 763
Number of Fund of Funds 2, 322
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Merged Data
This summary table describes data on the primary dataset based on a merged dataset of Form ADV
and commercial hedge fund data providers (Eureka, HFR, BarclaysHedge, eVestment, and CISDM).
Data is taken as of 2016. Data is only taken from funds which are registered as hedge funds; firms
must have at least one hedge fund and a minimum level of assets of $10 million. Panel A describes
firm level information at the level of the management company. Panel B describes information
available at the level of individual funds. Note that some assets may be double-counted due to the
inclusion of fund of funds. Panel B reports additional variables not included in Table 1. Inside
Investment corresponds to ownership by management or related parties, the key variable explored
in this paper.
Panel A: Firm Level Variables
Names Total Median Mean Std.Dev
Custodial AUM ($m) 1, 377, 236.0 592.9 4, 918.7 15, 802.9
Regulatory AUM ($m) 2, 434, 374.0 967.2 8, 694.2 36, 653.3
Discretionary AUM ($m) 2, 356, 987.0 891.2 8, 417.8 35, 657.3
Non-Discretionary AUM ($m) 77, 386.9 0 276.4 1, 802.6
Number of Employees 22, 504 12 43.0 179.3
− Support Staff 13, 459 5 25.7 117.5
− Advisors 9, 045 6 17.3 63.2
Firms with Only One Fund 162
Number of Firms 613
Panel B: Fund Level Variables
Names Total Median Mean Std.Dev
Gross Asset Value ($m) 512, 843.5 79.5 320.6 1, 727.6
− Equity 203, 412.5
− Relative Value 108, 608.6
− Fund of Funds 53, 330.4
− Multi-Strategy 48, 415.9
− Fixed Income 29, 412.6
− CTA 25, 859.8
− Event Driven 22, 231.0
− Other 21, 028.0
− Options 544.8
Gross Assets, Inside Investment ($m) 52, 243.7 11.5 49.7 221.6
Gross Assets, Fund of Funds ($m) 78, 466.0 0 50.5 244.9
Gross Assets, Non-US Investors ($m) 170, 624.3 0 121.2 855.7
Number of Owners 43 116.5 570.4
Minimum Investment ($m) 1 0.9 1.2
Inside Investment (%) 11 22.8 25.4
Investment by Fund of Funds (%) 0 10.1 19.0
Non-US Investors (%) 0 19.4 32.3
Number of Hedge Funds 823
Number of Fund of Funds 175
Management Fee 1.5 1.4 0.5
Performance Fee 20 16.0 7.0
Leverage Ratio 1 1.4 0.9
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Table 2.4: Related Party Information
This table illustrates the identity of related parties. The rows need not sum to one: firms select as
many options that apply to identify all related parties.
Statistic Mean SD
Sponsor of GP 0.767 0.423
Other Investment Advisor 0.490 0.500
Commodity Pool 0.417 0.493
Broker/Dealer 0.156 0.363
Insurance 0.053 0.223
Sponsor of LP 0.045 0.208
Trust 0.039 0.195




Real Estate 0.019 0.137
Municipal Advisor 0.017 0.131
Futures Merchant 0.012 0.109
Swap Dealer 0.006 0.075
Swap Participant 0.001 0.027
Share Supervised Persons 75%
Share Office 60%
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Table 2.5: Inside Investment and Excess Return—Value-Weighted
This table shows the panel regression between the excess monthly return of an investment advisor
and percent investment from an insider or related party, skin. Column one regresses percent inside
investment against excess returns without additional controls. Column two adds additional firm
and year fixed effects, as well as fund controls (fund origination year and strategy). Column 3 and
4 repeat this exercise for a different measure of inside investment—total gross inside investment in
the firm. Specifications are repeated for the Fung and Hsieh 2004 factor model (Panel A) and the
Fama-French and Carhart four-factor model (Panel B). All results are value-weighted using fund
Gross Asset Value from Form ADV, and standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
Panel A Fung-Hsieh Excess Returns
Risk Adjusted Excess Returns (FH)
All Controls All Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (percent) 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0038)
Skin (log of gross) 0.0902∗∗∗ 0.1824∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0539)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Log(Fund Size) No Yes Yes Yes
Fund Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 63,978 63,978 63,978 63,978
R2 0.0022 0.1022 0.0033 0.1040
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel B: 4-Factor Excess Returns
Risk Adjusted Excess Returns
All Controls All Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (percent) 0.0047∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0014)
Skin (log of gross) 0.0525∗∗ 0.0707∗∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0146)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Log(Fund Size) No Yes Yes Yes
Fund Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 63,978 63,978 63,978 63,978
R2 0.0012 0.1096 0.0013 0.1096
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Table 2.6: Inside Investment and Excess Return—Equal-Weighted
This table shows the panel regression between the excess monthly return of an investment advisor
and percent investment from an insider or related party, skin. Column one regresses percent inside
investment against excess returns without additional controls. Column two adds additional firm
and year fixed effects, as well as fund controls (fund origination year and strategy). Column 3 and
4 repeat this exercise for a different measure of inside investment—total gross inside investment
in the firm. Specifications are repeated for the Fung and Hsieh 2004 factor models (Panel A) and
the Fama-French and Carhart four-factor model (Panel B) and. All results are equal-weighted, and
standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
Panel A: Fung-Hsieh Excess Returns
Risk Adjusted Excess Returns (FH)
All Controls All Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (percent) 0.0017∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Skin (log of gross) 0.0244 0.0726∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0143)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Log(Fund Size) No Yes Yes Yes
Fund Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 63,978 63,978 63,978 63,978
R2 0.0003 0.1048 0.0003 0.1049
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel B: 4-Factor Excess Returns
Risk Adjusted Excess Returns (4-Factor)
All Controls All Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (percent) 0.0018∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Skin (log of gross) 0.0238 0.0499∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0127)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Log(Fund Size) No Yes Yes Yes
Fund Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 63,978 63,978 63,978 63,978
R2 0.0003 0.0938 0.0002 0.0937
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Table 2.7: Cuts by Fund Size
This table illustrates our main specification (column (2) of Panel A in Table 2.5) across the fund size
distribution. We cut by the quantiles of fund size, which correspond to the buckets: [$10m-$43m),
[$43m, $102m), [$102m, $340m), [$340m+). All results are value-weighted by Gross Asset Value,
and standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (Percent) 0.0007 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗ 0.0043∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0019)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inception Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Strategy FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,017 15,975 15,998 15,988
R2 0.1027 0.1066 0.1062 0.1153
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.8: Flow Performance and Return Predictability
This table shows the panel regression of fund flow-performance and return predictability regressions.
In both cases, the key dependent variable is lagged return (excess of the Fama-French and Carhart
factors). The independent variable in columns 1-2 is Fund Inflows, where flows are defined as:
FLOWit =
AUMit−(1+rit)·AUMi,t−1
AUMi,t−1 . The specification in this regressions is: FLOWit = β(1 +
rei,t−1→t) + εi,t. Columns 3-4 are return predictability specifications, in which the independent
variable is next period excess return: rei,t→t+1 = βrei,t−1→t + εi,t. Funds are divided by the average
level of inside investment into insider funds (> 20.8% Inside Investment) and outsider funds. Flows
are winsorized at a 1% level. All results are value-weighted using Net Asset Value, and standard
errors are clustered at the fund level.
Flow Current Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Excess Return 0.001 0.002 0.265∗∗ 0.082
(0.002) (0.003) (0.111) (0.063)
log(AUM) −0.018 0.070∗∗ 2.130 −0.781
(0.017) (0.033) (1.370) (0.957)
Constant 0.363 −1.270∗ −30.537 25.749
(0.334) (0.657) (25.782) (19.022)
Sample: Insider Outsider Insider Outsider
Observations 279 552 279 552
R2 0.010 0.066 0.114 0.010
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.9: Inside Investment and Fund Size
This table shows the panel regression between size and inside skin in the game. Panel A conducts
analysis on the matched sample connecting Form ADV with commercial hedge fund datasets (where
the key dependent variable is assets under management, taken from the commercial hedge fund
datasets, reported as the log of AUM or in millions). Panel B performs analysis on the complete
ADV dataset, using as the dependent variable Gross Asset Value. All specifications regress the
fraction of the fund which consists on insider investment against a measure of size, measured yearly.
Columns (1) and (3) across all specifications perform this regression with no additional controls;
columns (2) and (4) add firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Panel A: Results on Matched Dataset
Dependent variable:
AUM (in $m) Log(AUM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Skin in Fund −3.54∗∗∗ −6.48∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.79) (1.28) (0.002) (0.003)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Fund Controls No Yes No Yes
Dataset Matched Matched Matched Matched
Observations 3,558 3,558 3,558 3,558
R2 0.01 0.90 0.03 0.87
Panel B: Results on ADV Dataset
Dependent variable:
Gross Asset Value (in $m) Log(Gross Asset Value)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Skin in Fund −6.34∗∗∗ −10.14∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(1.07) (1.59) (0.001) (0.001)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Fund Controls No Yes No Yes
Dataset Matched Matched Matched Matched
Observations 35,960 35,960 35,960 35,960
R2 0.002 0.57 0.03 0.57
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.10: Fund Flows and Performance
This table shows the panel regression between size and flows by insiders and outsiders. “Insider
Flow” corresponds to changes in capital provided by insiders and related parties, while “Outsider
Flow” captures changes in capital provision by all other investors. Inside and Outsider flow changes
are measured annually with the release of new ADV forms. Column (2) adds year fixed effects, and
column (3) adds firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the fund level.
Excess Return
(1) (2) (3)
Insider Flow (%) −0.00002 −0.00001 −0.00018∗
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00011)
Outsider Flow (%) 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002)
Year FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 833 833 833
R2 0.00283 0.00560 0.63798
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.11: Firm-Level Equity Ownership and Returns
This table shows a panel regression with alternate measures of firm ownership. # of Equity Holders
captures the total number of beneficial owners listed in Form ADV for the firm’s equity. HHI of
Firm Equity captures a Herfindahl-Hirschman index measure of concentration of equity ownership.
Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are shown in parenthesis.
Monthly Excess Return (FF)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (Percent) 0.0043∗∗ 0.0046∗∗ 0.0048∗∗ 0.0039∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019)
# of Equity Holders −0.0002 −0.0058 −0.0038
(0.0057) (0.0083) (0.0050)
HHI of Firm Equity −0.1660 −0.2061 −0.1440
(0.1559) (0.1881) (0.0904)
log(Gross Assets) 0.0057 −0.0013 0.0027 0.0148
(0.0247) (0.0219) (0.0250) (0.0139)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log(Size) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Controls No No No Yes
Observations 59,588 59,588 59,588 59,588
R2 0.0230 0.0237 0.0238 0.0420
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.12: Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Fees
This table shows a yearly panel regression of inside investment and fees. We focus on the main fee
components of hedge funds; the management fee levied on assets under management, as well as a
performance fee charged on proportional returns which clear a pre-defined hurdle rate. Columns
(1) and (2) present a univariate regression; while columns (3) and (4) add a variety of fund and
firm-level controls. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
Management Fee Performance Fee Management Fee Performance Fee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skin (Percent) −0.0030∗ 0.0040 −0.0014 0.0056
(0.0016) (0.0153) (0.0014) (0.0128)
Log(Fund Size) No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Inception Year FE No No Yes Yes
Strategy FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 5,925 5,848 5,925 5,848
R2 0.0137 0.0002 0.3216 0.5405
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Chapter 3
The Impossibility of Communication
Between Investors∗
Kunal Sachdeva†
All investors face the same decision problem: either invest for themself or dele-
gate their portfolio problem to an outside investor. Typically, asset managers will
communicate their superior knowledge to these potential investors to attract capital.
However, such communication by asset managers comes with the risk of revealing
the particulars of their valuable information to potential investors, without the ex-
plicit commitment of delegation rights. This risk in communication may lead to
a breakdown in trade and sub-optimal information aggregation in financial markets.
This paper explores this invest-delegate tradeoff through developing an entropy-based
model of information choice, where investors can communicate their informativeness
rather than the particulars of their information when solving their portfolio decision
problem. Linking information to trade, this paper endogenizes the decision to be a
principal or an agent in a highly generalized setting to shed light on if, and how,
communication can help investors resolve this tradeoff.
∗I have benefited from conversations and comments from Wouter Dessein, Arpit Gupta, Ye Li,
Andrea Prat, Tano Santos, Paolo Siconolfi, Pablo Slutzky, Laura Veldkamp, and seminar partici-
pants at Columbia Business School for helpful comment.
†Columbia Business School, Email: kunal.sachdeva@columbia.edu
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3.1 Introduction
Consider a problem that all investors share – should they select assets privately or
seek help from an asset manager? To maximize their own returns, an investor must
resolve the tradeoff between using their own skills for free, versus using a costly asset
manager. An investor that is poorly informed about future asset payoffs may find it
beneficial to delegate this problem to an expert. Yet, delegation can only be achieved
if an asset manager is able to credibly signal that they are superiorly informed about
asset payoffs. This may be difficult for a manager, as they may be concerned about
revealing the valuable specifics of their information, as they don’t have any ex-ante
commitment of delegation rights.
What role does communication play in an investor’s decision to become a principal
versus an agent? To answer this, the paper developes an entropy-based model of
information choice, where investors can communicate their ‘informativeness’ rather
than the particulars of their information when solving their portfolio decision problem.
The baseline model showes that credible communication is difficult, but possible
through the use of an interval equilibrium approach. Further, the model predicts
that moderately informed investors may underperform less informed investors, as
they cannot credibly attract assets nor credibly believe other investors are superiorly
informed. This friction in truthful communication may lead to a breakdown in trade,
resulting in self-investing, even when delegating would have been optimal.
In practice, institutional investors have long struggled with the self-invest ver-
sus delegate (invest-delegate hereafter) tradeoff. Ted Eliopoulos is the former chief
investment officer of California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS).
With over $289 billion in assets under management, Mr. Eliopoulos describes the
pensions decision to exit twenty-four hedge funds and
six hedge fund-of-funds in 2014.71
71See news release at https: // www. calpers. ca. gov/ page/ newsroom/ calpers-news/ 2014/
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“We are always examining the portfolio to ensure that we are efficiently
and cost-effectively achieving our risk-adjusted return goals...Hedge funds
are certainly a viable strategy for some, but at the end of the day, when
judged against their complexity, cost, and the lack of ability to scale at
CalPERS’ size, the ARS [Absolute Return Strategies] program is no longer
warranted.”
Duffie 2010 However, this view is not shared by all institutional investors. The
Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), with over $287 billion in assets
under management, continues to invest a large portion of its portfolio with external
hedge fund managers. Pierre Lavallée, senior managing director at CPPIB, discusses
their continued interest and the value proposition of hedge funds and monitoring.
“While we do not disclose returns by investment programme, hedge funds
have added value to the total fund over the past several years...We closely
monitor our [external fund managers’] performance and make adjustments
when warranted, but we continue to be committed to our hedge fund pro-
gramme.”
How do we reconcile the different approaches of Mr. Eliopoulous and Mr. Laval-
lée? Both programs are highly sophisticated, similar in size, mandate, and access.
Yet, to Mr. Eliopoulous, self-investing into assets have very specific benefits. As
suggested in the press release, he avoids paying costly fees to an agent. Further, his
mention of ’complexity’ suggests that there were agency issues.
In contrast, to Mr. Lavallée and the CPPIB, the benefits of delegating part of
their portfolio problem outweighs its costs. The most direct benefit of delegating to
external managers is the ability to access specialized skills that may not exists at
the pension. The latter part of the quote seems to suggest the ability to terminate
managers based on their performance as a benefit.
eliminate-hedge-fund . In fact, other programs such as New York City Employees’ Retirement
System (NYCERS) and the Dutch retirement fund, PFZW, have eliminated hedge funds from their
portfolios.
113
More broadly, this invest-delegate tradeoff is shared by a broad range of investors.
Retail investors – although different in sophistication, access, and wealth from insti-
tutional investors – must also resolve the same invest-delegate tradeoff. That is, they
must decide to either self-invest directly into assets or to delegate this decision. It has
long been considered prudent advice to encourage less sophisticated retail investors
to purchase low-cost index products.72 For example, Burton Malkiel, distinguished
professor and best selling author of A Random Walk Down Wall Street and co-author
of The Elements of Investing: Easy Lessons for Every Investor, cites the empirical
evidence against active portfolio management and benefits of passive strategies.
“It is very tempting to try to time the market. But neither individuals nor
investment professionals can consistently time the market ... [Passive] is
still a strategy that is good for people of all income levels ... If I took all
the mutual funds that existed in the early 1970s and asked the question
how many really beat the market through 2009, you can count them on the
fingers of one hand.”
If active strategies haven’t consistently outperformed passive strategies, why don’t
large institutions generally follow this advice?73 Does a retail investor’s invest-delegate
decision relate (or differ) from the institutional decision? If it differs, how so and why?
What margins impact the difference in this choice?
The aim of this paper is to provide answers to these questions by modeling the
invest-delegate tradeoff between investors. It presents a theory of delegation that is
able to link the decision problem across a broad set of investors and highlight how
different margins impact their tradeoff. Further, it provides guidance of if and when
72A famous quote by John C. Bogle, founder of Vanguard Funds: “Beethoven could tell you how
to write a symphony, but you can’t write a symphony like Beethoven does. You can’t copy, with any
hope of success, a Beethoven or Buffett. You can copy Bogle at any moment of time. Just buy the
damn index fund.”
73In fact, Nevada Public Employees’ Retirement System is an example of a large pension fund
that pursues a low-cost passive strategies. See: http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-does-nevadas-
35-billion-fund-manager-do-all-day-nothing-1476887420
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it is efficient to switch between being a principle versus an agent and vice versa. The
model consists of three main features:
1. (Representation of Information) Information is modeled using the diver-
gence measure, entropy, based on the seminal work of Shannon 1948. Informa-
tion is typically assumed to take a parametric form for tractability, as discussed
in Sims 2006. I move past this by using the divergence measure of entropy. This
reflects the true nature of information and extends the results to any parametric,
or non-parametric, specification.
2. (Endogenous Determination of Type) The choice to be a principal or agent
is endogenously determined in this model. Information about asset payoffs is
dispersed and held by potential investors who are biased towards maximizing
their self interests. As a result, the decision to be a principal or agent is not
pre-determined, and instead is determined through information acquisition and
strategic communication.
3. (Lack of Commitment) Investors lack commitment – the ability to commit
to ex-ante delegation rights prior to communicating. In the spirit of Grossman
and Hart 1986, and Hart and Moore 1990, there is no ex-ante allocation of
delegation rights prior to their communication. Said differently, investors are
unable to commit to make their decisions dependent on the information they
receive. Thus, communication between investors follows the form of ‘cheap talk’
as first proposed by Crawford and Sobel 1982.
Taken together, this paper develops an entropy-based model of information choice
where investors can communicate their ‘informativeness’ rather than the actual
specifics when solving their portfolio problem. Linking information to trade, I first
endogenies the decision to be a principal or an agent in a general setting. I then show
that agents that are similarly informed may not be able to credibly communicate their
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level of information, leading to suboptimal delegation. Lastly, I link the predictions
of this model to the growing trend of low-cost index funds.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper relates and contributes to three distinct strands of literature. The first
strand it contributes to is the literature on ownership and agency. While this litera-
ture is too large to summarize here, the main references is Berle and Means 1932b,
Jensen and Meckling 1976a. Recent empirical work studies insider ownership of del-
egated asset managers. Works include, Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge 2007b, Evans
2008b, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang 2008b, and Cremers et al. 2009b and for mutual
funds, and Gupta and Sachdeva 2017 for hedge funds.
The second strand of literature that this paper contributes to is the theory work
on cheap talk and experts. The main reference from this literature is Crawford and
Sobel 1982. This also relates to Melumad and Shibano 1991. This paper closely
follows and builds directly on the work of Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek 2008.
Finally, this paper relates to the strand of literature using information theory
to answer an economic agent’s decision problem.74 The use of information theory
in macroeconomics was popularized by theory works of rational inattention models
such as Sims 2006 and Sims 2010. In finance, information choice models using the
concept of entropy have recently increased. My paper most closely relates to Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2009, and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2010. An
excellent summary of theory models relating information choice and economics is
Veldkamp 2011.
74This paper primarily uses the seminal work of Shannon 1948 on information theory. An excellent
textbook treatment of information theory is Cover and Thomas 2012.
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3.3 Model Primitives
This section describes all elements and assumptions of the baseline model. The
following section studies the self-invest strategy and develops results and intuition
that link Economic Utility Theory to Information Theory. These results are then
used to analyze strategic communication between investors. Note, a reference for the
notation and definitions can be found in Table 3.1.
Economy, Investors and Preferences
The model focuses on two investors, Investor 1, Investor 2, and potentially a large set
of outside investors.75 Investor i ∈ {1, 2} begins with initial wealth Wi,0. The initial
wealth between the two investors is related through αW1,0 = W2,0, where α ∈ (0,∞).
A pure exchange economy, with two dates, t = 0 and t = 1. There are l = 1, . . . , L
Arrow-Debreu assets that correspond to s = 1, ..., S states of the world. Spot prices
at t = 0 are normalized to 1. A unit holder of the state contingent commodity ls
is entitled to receive the payoff of the asset at time 1, only if state s occurs. The
state contingent payoff vector is specified by x ∈ RLS. Further, the investor can
invest a fraction of their initial wealth, θl, into asset l. Future wealth of investor i is
related to assets through Wi,1 =
∑L
l=1Wi,0θlxl. Investors face the budget constraint,
1 ≥∑Ll=1 θl.
Investors face an invest-delegate tradeoff at t = 0: a first option, investor i may
use their initial wealth and private information to invest directly into Arrow-Debreu
assets. A second option, investor i delegates their portfolio decision problem to
investor i′. However, this delegation choice comes with a fee – the principal must
pay a fraction of the terminal wealth, (1− β)Wi,1 to the manager, and retains the
residual βWi,1, where β ∈ (0, 1].
75The existence of outside investors is required for asset not to be fully revealing, as originally
addressed in Grossman Stiglitz (1980).
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The possibility of both investors delegating to the other investor is ruled out. This
limits the possible outcomes for investor i to: (i) delegate, (ii) self-invest, (iii) self-
invest and manager other’s assets. Note, the last possibility depends on the choice of
the other investor. Further, at β = 1, the fees collapse to zero and full cooperation
exists in the economy. Fees, (1− β), are assumed to be constant and exogenous to
the model.
Investors have von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) preferences. Specifically, in-
vestors have logarithmic preferences under uncertainty and are maximizing their ter-
minal wealth.
U(Wi,0) = E [??? (Wi,1)] (3.1)
Where U is the expected utility of terminal wealth. Given the investors and pref-
erences, we now turn the attention towards the information structure in the economy.
Information
In this model, information refers to the beliefs of future asset payoffs, and is the
main tradeable good in the economy. Yet, unlike normal goods, information has the
unique properties that make them difficult to model. Specifically, information can be
considered as a non-rival, non-excludable good.
Information is non-rivalrous because it can be consumed simultaneously by more
than one agent. In the context of this model, the information about a securities
payoff can be used by two or more investors at the same time. Free duplication and
consumption may effect the scarcity of valuable information in modeling. Information
is a non-excludable good because it is not possible to prevent the consumption of
information by an agent who has not paid for it.76 In the context of this model,
76I rule out the possibility of obfuscation as a form of excludability.
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information about an asset payoff can be used by an individual who may, or may not
have, purchased for the specifics of some information. This too may effect the scarcity
of valuable information in modeling. To account for these properties, I explicitly
model the structure and assumptions around information in the next section.
Information Structure
Information is about the objective probabilities of future payoffs of the Arrow-Debreu
assets. Given initial beliefs, the assets are not subject to arbitrage.77 This means that
the assets provide no-arbitrage opportunities ex-ante, but they may be reasonable
investments given additional information.78 The true probability distribution of the
future states of nature are given by ?. It should be emphasized that the probability
distribution does not make a parametric assumption. This is a key strength of this
model as it allows for a generalized and realistic approach.
Both investors start with the same, uninformed diffuse prior, Z, at t = 0. That is,
investor i investor believes that each state s is equiprobable. Valuable information is
denoted by Y . This represents a garbled version of?, the true probability distribution
of future payoffs at t = 0. The specific information structure of Investor i is denoted
by Yi. The specific information structure of investor i can be thought of as arising
from Yi = Gi?, where Gi is a left stochastic matrix.79 The specific information
structure Yi represents a column vector given by a finite set of probabilities over the s
states of nature. The probability of state s for an information structure Y is denoted
by π (y), where y ∈ Y .
77See Duffie 2010 for further discussion on no-arbitrage
78Using an example from Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano 2013, consider an economy where there
is one risky asset (l = 1) and three possible states in the future (s = 3). Further, consider the payoff
vector x = (−7, 2, 3). If an investor has a uniform prior over the three states, the assets would offer
no-arbitrage opportunities, ex-ante. However, if the investor receives information that state one had
a probability of zero, there would exist an arbitrage opportunity.
79A left stochastic matrix is a real square matrix with each column summing to 1.
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Investor i updates their prior, Z with Yi using Bayes’ rule to form posterior
beliefs about the probability of asset payoffs.80 For the baseline model, information
acquisition of investor i is assumed to be independent and uncorrelated to any investor
characteristics.81
Information Theory Identities
This paper relies on many well established identities from Information Theory.82 As
such, this section provides a very brief introduction of concepts and identities of
entropy, conditional entropy, and mutual information. I also discuss units, notation,
and bounds of informativeness used in the paper.




π(z) ??? π(z) (3.2)
Intuitively, it measures the uncertainty of a given random variable. The function
H (Z) is a non-negative, concave function that measures the level of uncertainty of a
probability function. Building on the previous definition, the conditional entropy for
two random variables Z and Y is:





π(y, z) ??? π(z|y) (3.3)
As interpreted by Cover and Thomas, conditional entropy is the expected value of
the entropies of the conditional distribution, averaged over the conditioning random
variable.
80I assume that the quality of information is unrelated to the level of wealth of the individual.
81Any change in this assumption would need to model the Gi matrix between investors.
82These concepts were born out of Shannon’s seminal work. See Cover and Thomas 2012 for a
textbook treatment of Information Theory.
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For two random variable , Z and Y , the mutual information, I (Z;Y ), is the
relative entropy between their joint distribution and product distribution.83 It is
defined by











As interpreted by Cover and Thomas 2012, it explicitly states the mutual information
between two random variables as a function of their joint distribution and product
distribution. More commonly, it is written as I (Y ;Z) ≡ H(Z)−H (Z|Y ), and equals
the difference between entropy and conditional entropy. Because all investors start
with a diffuse prior, Z, going forward, the paper uses a shorthand Ii to represent
I (Yi, Z). Mutual information can be interpreted as the amount of information that
one random variable contains about another random variable. This is a symmetric,
non-negative function, that is increasing in informativeness.
Without loss of generality, this paper will parameterize the logarithm base by
b, and default to logarithm base 10. The the corresponding information mea-
sure for base 10 is bans.84 Information gain is mathematically bounded by Ii ∈[
0,ΣSs=1 (1/s) ??? (1/s)
]
, and is dictated by the total number of states, S, in the
economy. The difference in mutual information, or gain in informativeness, between
investors i and i′ is denoted by Ii − Ii′ ≡ ∆Ii,i′ .
Ordering of Information
Information sets are ranked in the order of their value. I first rely on the work
of Blackwell et al. 1951. It states that for two arbitrary information structures,
{Y1, Y2}, for information structure Y1 to be more informative than Y2, it is necessary
and sufficient that the value of information structure Y1 is greater than the value of
83Note, mutual information I i a symmetric function.
84Units of information can equivalently be expressed in bits (base 2 ), or nats (base e). For
reference, 1 bit = ???10 2 (≈ 0.301) bans
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information structure Y2 for all sets of terminal actions, all utility functions, and all a
priori beliefs.85 While this theorem provides a simple criteria for ranking information
structures, it is highly restrictive. As a result, the theorem produces an incomplete
ordering of information.
To complete the ordering of information structures, this paper depends on the
main results of Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano 2013 for complete rank ordering of
information sets. In doing so, it makes three key assumptions about the investors in
this paper:
1. (Common Priors) All investors are assumed to have a common prior, Z.86
I assume every investors has a common and diffuse prior. This assumptions
also results in the highest level of uncertainty as each state is assumed to be
equiprobable.
2. (Ruin-Averse Preferences) All investors have the same, ruin-averse prefer-
ences under uncertainty and are maximizing their terminal wealth. All investors
have ruin-aversion in the form of logarithmic preferences.87
3. (Common Application) The information needs to be applied to the same
decision problem. Information about future asset payoffs is used by all investors
to resolve the invest-delegate tradeoff.
Relying on these three assumptions, information can be rank-ordered by its mutual
information, I (Y, Z) to a diffuse prior. A point estimate, the larger the mutual
information of an investor’s information structure, the better informed they are about
future asset payoffs. We will use this result in our analysis of the model.
85As interpreted by Bielinska-Kwapisz 2003.
86Necessity of this assumption is show in Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano 2013, theorem 2
87Ruin-aversion can be seen from the condition ???W1→0+ U(W1) = −∞
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Timeline
The timing of the model can be described in five steps and is illustrated in Figure
3.1.
1. Information Stage: Investor 1 and 2 receive exogenous and independent infor-
mation structures about future asset payoffs.
2. Calculation Stage: Both investors calculate their own mutual information be-
tween their original information structure and exogenous information structure.
A sufficient statistic, it gives a complete ordering of informativeness between
information sets.
3. Communication Stage: Both investors communicate their level of informative-
ness to each other. Investor sends message m1 ∈M1 to Investor 2, and simulta-
neously, Investor 2 sends message m2 ∈M2 to Investor 1. This communication
does not need to be truthful.
4. Action Stage: The investors choose their action to maximize their expected
utility over terminal wealth.




An investor has two possible actions in this model. First, they may manage their
own money using their private information. This is costless and serves as their best
outside option.
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Figure 3.1: Sequence of events
This figure summarizes the sequential timeline for both investors. Step 1, both investor receive
exogenous and independent information structures about future asset payoffs. Step 2, both investors
calculate the mutual information between their diffuse priors and the new information structure.
Step 3, both investors simultaneously communicate their mutual information to each other. Step
4, both investors simultaneously decide either to self invest or delegate their assets to the other
investor. Step 5, time moves forward one period, a state of nature occurs, and the state contingent
securities payoff.
A second possibility is that an investor they can delegate their portfolio problem to
a manager. If they choose to delegate, the manager will use their private information
to invest these assets. In exchange, the outside investor will pay the manager a
fixed management fee, parametrized by (1− β). This is proportional to a percent of
assets under management and independent of the ex-post performance. This type of
contract mirrors the type of agreement used in mutual fund and passive investment
products.
Lack of Commitment
A key friction in this model is the lack of ex-ante commitment by an investor to
delegate their assets based on information they receive. This is an issue because,
as discussed earlier, information is a non-rival, non-excludable good. This lack of
commitment, and positive fees, gives each investor a incentive to strategically com-
municate with one another.
This form of communication mirrors the realistic friction that delegated asset
managers face in teh real world. That is, they must be able to attract investors
through communicating that they are superior investors. However, without ex-ante
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commitment from outside investors, the asset manager faces the risk of revealing the
actual specifics of their information freely. Because of this, the final model will follow
the form of cheap talk, as first studied by Crawford and Sobel 1982.
3.5 Self Investment
This section characterize the optimal self-invest decision made by an investor that is
assumed to be unable to communicate or delegate. This corresponds to the first two
stages of the model’s timeline. The identities developed in this sections are relied on
in the full model.
There are three main results to emphasized: (1) Given an information set, in-
vestors should allocate their wealth proportionally to the probability of its state
payoff. (2) The solution to the optimal utility can be decomposed into a return and
disutility in uncertainty, measured by its entropy. (3) the differential improvement
in expected utility can be expressed as the difference in mutual information from the
posterior and prior beliefs. The proof of all lemmas, propositions, and theorems are
in the Appendix.
Diffuse Priors
Prior to the game, both investors have diffuse beliefs about future asset payoffs. If
investors were to self-invest based on this information, they would have to solve their
portfolio problem with the diffuse information structure Z. The portfolio problem
can be expressed as:
???
θl
E [??? (W1) ;Z] s.t.
L∑
l=1
W0θl ≤ W0 (3.5)
Where W1 = ΣLl=1W0θlxls relates current wealth to future wealth. The optimal
solution to this problem states that the optimal proportion of asset l in the portfolio
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corresponds to the probability of state s of it occurring. Formally:
θl = π (z) (3.6)
This suggests that, given a diffuse prior, an equal portfolio strategy is the optimal
solution.88 I can fully characterize the optimal solution by substituting the optimal
allocations into the original portfolio problem. Using the identity of entropy, the
optimal utility can be decomposed into a deterministic return component and an
entropy component.








Equation (3.7) denotes the maximum expected utility, U∗, for a given initial
wealth, W0 and initial information structure, Z. The first term has an obvious in-
terpretation and is deterministic.
The second term, however, has a unique interpretation and allows for a direct
representation of information in an expected utility framework. The function H (Z)
measures the entropy, or uncertainty of information, and comes from the well estab-
lished Information Theory literature. The the function H (Z) being non-negative and
increasing in uncertainty, it can be interpreted as the disutility from uncertainty of
future payoffs. This function is maximized for a diffuse prior, and thus equation (3.7)
is the lower bound for an optimized utility.
A corollary of this results is that the utility of information is independent to the
investor’s level of wealth. Said differently, for two investors with different wealth
levels, an identical improvement in information results in an identical improvement
in level of utility. Further, this allows us to directly relate the utility of wealth to the
reduction of uncertainty.
88This result is mirrors the well known identity first solved by Kelly (1956).
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Updated Posterior
What if they have new information? The prior subsection characterized the optimal
solution of an Investor with a diffuse prior that chooses to self-invest. I reconsider this
problem, but when they have initial beliefs Z that are updated by new information,
Yi, when analyzing the full game.89 Investor i solves a similar problem as equation
(3.5), but now does so with updated beliefs. The problem can be expressed as:
???
θl
E [??? (W1) ;Z|Y ] s.t.
∑
l∈L
W0θl ≤ W0 (3.8)
The solution to this problem again states that the optimal proportion of asset l
in the portfolio corresponds to the probability of state s of it occurring. Formally:
θl = π(z|y) (3.9)
In contrast to (3.6), equation (3.9) would not result in an equal weighted portfo-
lio.90 Similar to the previous subsection, I can fully characterize the optimal solution
by substituting (3.9) into the original portfolio problem of (3.8). Using the identity
for conditional entropy, the optimal utility can be decomposed into a deterministic
return component and entropy components.
U∗ (W0;Z|Y ) = U∗ (W0;Z) +H (Z)−H(Z|Y ) (3.10)
The first term of equation (3.10) the optimal utility given a diffuse prior and
corresponds to the previous result (3.7). This corresponds to the baseline utility of
the investor given a diffuse prior. The last two terms are different between the entropy
and conditional entropy. This corresponds to the gain in certainty by observing
89Note, a similar extension of the Kelly Criterion was recently found in an unpublished online
book of Fellingham 2014.
90This is assuming the posterior is updated by a diffuse information set.
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Y , conditional on the prior Z. More directly, I can use the identity for mutual
information, IY = I (Y ;Z) ≡ H(Z)−H (Z|Y ), and equivalently write (3.10) as:
U∗ (W0;Z|Y ) = U∗ (W0;Z) + IY (3.11)
Or as a gain in utility as:
IY = ∆UY,Z = U
∗ (W0;Z|Y )− U∗ (W0;Z) (3.12)
Equation (3.12) states that the mutual information between the prior and new in-
formation structure is equal to the differential in expected utility between the updated
and original. The function on the left hand side, I (!, !), is the mutual information
function from probability theory.91 It represents the mutual dependence between
the two variables. It also quantifies the amount of information obtained about one
random variable from a second random variable. Symmetric and non-negative, it
provides a direct measure of improvement from an uncertain state.
The right hand side is the difference between equations (3.7) and (3.10). This
is the difference in utility level between the optimal solution for an informed versus
uninformed investor and can be thought of the gain in utility from receiving informa-
tion.
3.6 Communication Between Investors
Up to this point the paper has only considered the possibility of self-investing, and
has excluded the possibility of communicating or delegating. This section studies
how investors can communicate information to one another when solving their invest-
delegate tradeoff.
91As noted before, I omit the subscript of Z of the mutual information, as all investors have a
common diffuse prior.
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The first subsection discusses what communication is and how it can be used to
solve this problem. The next subsection shows that if truthful communication exists,
improvements from trade may be possible. Lastly, I relax the assumption of truthful




It is difficult to communicate valuable information because information has the partic-
ular properties of being a is a non-rivalrous and non-excludable good. In the context
of this model, it is worsened because of the lack of commitment in negotiations. Can
investors communicate with one another to solve their invest-delegate tradeoff, and if
so, how?
This paper proposes a mechanism where investors communicate their informa-
tiveness rather than the particulars of their information when signaling their type.
In the context of this paper, first an investor starts with a diffuse prior. Next, they
receive an exogenous information structure by which they can update their prior be-
liefs. Further, they can calculate the mutual information, or gain, from their prior
and update. This measure, investor i’s mutual information maps directly to the level
of their informativeness.
The use of an investor’s private mutual information, Ii, has several distinct ad-
vantages. First, it provides a complete rank ordering of value of information. Also,
counter parties cannot learn anything from the mutual information communicated.
This is because there is no reverse mapping from Ii " Yi, and it should be emphasized
that communicating the mutual information of information does not signal anything
about the underlying information other than its precision. Lastly, this measure can
summarize any complex distribution of environment into a single point estimate. For-
129
mally, it folds all information about assets L and states S into a single point statistic
with the domain Ii ∈
[




To fix ideas, I provide a very simple concrete example of an economy with two
investors, {1, 2}, four states of nature S = 4, four independent assets L = 4,











. Consider the case where Investor 1























, respectfully. Investor 1 unambiguously has superior information
as compared to Investor 2.92 This corresponds to I1 > I2. If both investors were to
simultaneously communicate to their mutual information, and there were no incentive
to lie, both would come to the same conclusion. Further, there would be no way for
each investor to infer the other’s private information. Depending on the revealing fees
and size of each investor, it would be beneficial for investor 2 to delegate his assets
to investor 1. Given this simple numerical example, we now move to a more formal
analysis of truthful communication.
Truthful Communication
The delegation of wealth to another investors may be Pareto improving under the
assumption of truthful communication. In this example, I ignore any issues associated
with truthful communication and return back to this in the next subsection. For the
remainder of the paper, without loss of generality, I assume that I1 > I2, Investor 1
is better informed than Investor 2.
92This corresponds to conditional entropy of H (Y1) = 1.168, and H (Y2) =1.194, using base e.
Smaller numbers indicate more certainty.
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Self Invest Option
I consider both investor’s outside options. If both investors were to rely only on their
own private information when investing, Y1 and Y2, the expected utility for Investor
1 and 2 is given by
U∗1 (W1,0;Z|Y1) = U∗1 (W1,0;Z) + I1 (3.13)
U∗2 (W2,0;Z|Y2) = U∗2 (W2,0;Z) + I2 (3.14)
The first expression describes the utility to investor 1, given her initial wealth,
using her prior, and updated information set Y1. The interpretation for the second
expression is similar for investor 2. If they have the same level of initial wealth, α = 1,
and we keep with the assumption I1 > I2, investor 1 has an unambiguously higher
level of utility than Investor 2.
Delegate Option
I next consider the case that an investor can delegate their assets to a more informed
investor, in exchange for a fee. Given our setup, can investor 2 improve on her level
of utility through delegation? If investor 2 was to delegate her capital to investor 1,
her new expected utility at t = 0 is, U∗2 (βW2,0;Z|Y1). Investor 2 is strictly better
off delegating versus self-investing iff the gains from delegating are greater than her
outside option of self investing. That is:
U∗2 (βW2,0;Z|Y1) > U∗ (W2,0;Z|Y2) (3.15)
Notice that Investor 2 is now using Investor 1’s information to solve his portfolio
problem, but receives a fractional amount β. After some algebra, this can be simplified
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down to:
∆I1,2 > − ??? (β) (3.16)
Intuitively, (3.16) states that Investor 2 is strictly better off if the relative dif-
ference in informativeness between investor 1 and 2, ∆I1,2, is larger than the wedge
created by the delegation fee. This statement is independent of wealth, and specific
priors or posteriors. The only things that matter are the fees and the relative differ-
ence in informativeness. Further, it may be possible that I1 > I2, but delegation is
suboptimal, even with truth telling, as fees may be too high. In the limit of β → 1,
delegation is always optimal.93
To make this example concrete, suppose there are 10 possible states, S = 10, and
thus Ii ∈ [0, 1].94 Further, the investor’s informativeness is given by I1 = 3/5, I2 =
1/10. Lastly, asset managers charge a 5% fee on terminal assets under management
(β = 0.95). It is immediate that inequality (3.16) is satisfied.
What is the improvement in utility for investor 1, the asset manager? Investor 1
will collect management fees from Investor 2 based on the ex-post returns in exchange
for his services. If we suppose that the investor’s initial wealth is related by αW0,1 =
W0,2, Investor 1’s is new optimal expected utility is U∗1 (W0,1 + (1− β)αW0,1;Z|Y1).
Comparing to the self-investing option, he is strictly better off iff:
??? (1 + α (1− β)) > 0 (3.17)
This inequality is satisfied for the domain of β ∈ [0, 1), and α ∈ R+, as he is still
relying on superior information, but is now collecting management fees.
Delegation of wealth between investors may be Pareto improving under the as-
sumption of truthful communication. Unfortunately, this assumption is not ideal
93The case with β = 1 leads to the possibility of individuals sharing information. This is ruled
out in this model.
94Maximum improvement calculated by: Σ (1/10) ???10 (1/10) = 1 nats.
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as the tension between accessing superior information and earning management fees
from other investors may lead to a breakdown in trade. In the next subsection I high-
light this tension and discuss a case where investors have an incentive to misrepresent
their information.
Example of Incentive to Misrepresent
This subsection relaxes the truthful communication assumption and consider the
possibility of profitable deviations. In particular, I instead focuse on an investors
incentive to misrepresent their informativeness when communicating to others and
how this leads to a breakdown in trade. The main intuition is that an uninformed
investor may benefit more from earning management fees versus paying fees to access
superior information.
Continuing with the previous example where I1 > I2, consider the case where
Investor 2 misrepresents his informativeness. Specifically, she communicates Î2, where
Î2 > I1 > I2. I emphasize misrepresented information in this paper with a hat
notation. Even with a relatively low information level I2, Investor 2 may benefit
from communicating Î2 through the prospect of attracting Investor 1’s assets and
earning management fees. This, however, comes at the cost of foregoing the superior
information of Investor 1. Formally, the incentive to misrepresent by the low type
can be written as:
U∗2 (W0,2 + α (1− β)W0,2;Z|Y2) ≥ U∗2 (βW0,2;Z|Y1)
Notice on the left hand side of the inequality, investor two earn returns on her own
wealth plus the management fees from investor 1, but is stuck using her own private
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information. The right hand side of the inequality is the residual value of wealth that








We see that the incentive to misrepresent is decreasing as if investor 1 becomes more
informed than investor 2. The inequality 3.18 is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Panel A
shows the incentive boundary for three different fee levels across an array of values for
α. Panel B shows the incentive boundary for four different wealth levels of investor
2 across an array of values for (1− β). In both panels, if the relative informativeness
between investors, ∆I1,2, is above the curves, truthful communication is feasible.
Taking the result of 3.18 and assume that the utility and information is in loga-




All things equal, the greater α is, investor 2’s initial wealth relative to investor 1’s,
the smaller the incentive to misrepresent by investor 2. This is intuitive, as less assets
she manages, with respect to investor 1, the greater her incentive is to misrepresent
her informativeness. This is because the cost of foregoing superior information is
offset by the prospect of managing a relatively large amount of assets. As investor
2’s asset base grows, her incentive to misrepresent shrinks. Next let’s consider the




All things equal, the smaller β is, the residual value an investor keeps after fees,
the greater the incentive to misrepresent by investor 2. This is immediate, as the
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benefits for investor 2 to collect management fees outweigh the benefits of accessing
superior information from investor 1. Also again, the more informative investor 1 is
relative to investor 2, ∆I1,2, the lower the incentive is to misrepresent.
Under what condition would investor 1 rationally delegate his wealth to investor
2 based on the lie of Î2? Investor 1 will delegate if the presumed gains from accessing





≥ U∗ (W1,0;Z|Y1) (3.21)
After some algebra, this reduces to:
∆I2̂,1 ≥ − ??? (β) (3.22)
Notice that this inequality is similar to (3.16), but with a different subscript. If Î2
is large enough, Investor 1 may suboptimally delegate. Further, there exists a region
for β > 0 where both investors choose to invest for themselves, self-invest.
The above analysis raises a key question: If Investor 2 has a profitable deviation
through misrepresentation, doesn’t Investor 1 anticipate this? Further, if Investor
2 misrepresents his information, can’t Investor 1 also reapply the same logic when
communicating? While this is a very specific numerical example, it becomes immedi-
ate that truthful communication is impossible because the incentive to misrepresent
causes a breakdown in trade. To solve this problem we next turn our attention to
the concept of an interval equilibrium.
Strategic Communication, Interval Equilibrium
The previous section showed that gains to trade are possible under truthful communi-
cation. However, if we consider the possibility of misrepresentation, trade will break
down. To solve this we introduce a concept of an interval equilibrium and solve the
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invest-delegate problem.
The first subsection introduces and formally proposes interval equilibrium that
solves the invest-delegate problem. The second subsection provides a numerical ex-
ample to fix ideas and show the intuition of how this equilibrium works.
Interval Equilibrium, Formal Analysis
The interval equilibrium allows for a coarsening of the message space between in-
vestors which, in turn, allows for credible communication. It can be summarized as
followed: (i) Both investors partition the informatinvess space into intervals where
their actual levels of knowledge exits; (2) The investors simultaneously communicate
a message, that maps to their interval to the other investor (3) The corse message
is interpreted using bayes rule and each investor makes an optimal decision based on
their information and received message. Through this, investors are able to coarsely
communicate how informed they are about asset payoffs and may potentially gain
from trade. Also, depending on the choice of partitions, there may not be a prof-
itable deviation from truth telling in this equilibrium. Next, I closely follow Alonso,
Dessein, and Matouschek 2008 to formally state the equilibrium conditions.
Consider an investor, i ∈ {1, 2}, with their information spaces is [0, I1,max], and
[0, I2,max]. The maximum information is govern by the number of states of nature,





. Each investor privately knows where their
informativeness, I1 and I2, belongs to. The information space is partition into k
finite number of intervals, with each region mapping to Ak. This partioning can be
thought of as a coarse information being transmitted.
The investors establish a communication protocol between each other such that for
investor i = 1, 2 states probability of communicating message mi ∈Mi. Each possible
message maps into a specific interval Ak. Further, each message is conditional on his
informativeness Ii, where the probability is given µi (mi|Ii).
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Next, the investors must establish a decision rules for the messages they recieve.
This decision rule map the possible messages mi ∈Mi into decision di, where decision
notation is given by di (m, Ii). The decision is supported by the belief function for
the message received by investors. Here, the belief function are denoted by gi (Ii|mi),
and can be thought of probability of observing Ii, conditional on observing mi.
This model centers on the concept of a perfect Bayesesian equilibria (PBE) for the
sub-game. Thus, belief functions are derived from communication rules using Bayes’
rule whenever possible. For this model, the belief functions come from g (Ii|m) =
µi (mi|Ii) /
´
P µi (mi|Ii) dIi, where P = {Ii : µi (mi|Ii) > 0}, for i = 1, 2. This means
that for a positive probability of message m1, the conditional probability of observing
I1 is µ1 (m1|I1) > 0.
Numerical Example
To fix ideas and provide intuition about the equilibrium solution, this section con-
siders a concrete and show how partitioning the information space may help with
communication.95 A supporting diagram of this economy and its communication can
be found in Figure 3.2.
Consider an economy with S = 10, and thus Ij ∈ [0, 1).96 For simplicity, assume
Ii is uniformly distributed with the information structure for each investor Yi, in-
dependently drawn. Identical with the above example I1 > I2, Investor 1 is better
informed than Investor 2. For concreteness I1 = 3/5, I2 = 1/10. Initial wealth is
related by αW0,1 = W0,2 and fees are given by β = 0.95.
Next consider the case of an interval communication protocol and partition the











, which correspond to A1, A2, A3.
95These intervals are ad-hoc for simplicity and not optimal as shown in the previous section.
96I make the assumption that no investor is perfectly informed about future asset payoffs.
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The communication rule is that if an investor’s mutual information falls within
this range, they communicate the corresponding message mj,Ak that maximizes their
utility. Receivers of this message use Bayes’ rule when possible to infer the other
investors informativeness. Investors have a diffuse prior of the states and believes
informativeness is uniformly distributed across investors.
Investor 1 would communicate that their informativeness corresponds to A3 , and
investor 2 would form the corresponding expectation v1 = E2[I1|m1] = 34 . Similarly,
investor 2 would communicate their informativeness corresponding to A1, and In-
vestor 1 would form the corresponding expectation of v2 = E1 [I2|m1] = 110 . This is
illustrated in Figure 3.2.
From this interaction, investor 2 would infer that investor 1 is a higher type
corresponding to A3. Further, Investor 2 will delegate iff U∗ (βW2,0;E [I1|m1]) >
U∗ (W2,0; I2). This reduces to the condition (3.16), specifically v1 − I2 > − ??? (β).
Investor 2 clearly benefits from delegating, given the specific example.97 Symmetri-
cally, investor 1 would infer that investor 2 is of a lower type and would not delegate.
Can either investor do better by deviating from this protocol? That is, can In-
vestor 2 do better by sending a message corresponding tom2,A2 , orm2,A3? The answer
is no. If Investor 2 was to deviate from the interval equilibrium protocol, he would
not be able to attract assets from investor 1. By inspection, we also see that there
are no gains to investor 1 by sending m1,A2 or m1,A3 .
3.7 Discussion
Limits to Communication
The previous section demonstrated that communication without committement can
be difficult. As a possible solution, the paper appealed to the concept of an interval
97In this simple example, investor 2 would delegate to investor 1 for any values of β > 0.52.
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equilibrium, where investors partion the message space and agree upon a communi-
cation protocol. This framework leads to several key results:
Proposition 1. Gains from communication is possible using a mutually agreed upon
interval equilibrium.
This proposition is immediate from the numerical example provided above. High
information types are able to credibly signal their relative informativeness to the low
information type. As a result, the high type manages both investors wealth, achieving
the first best outcome. Investor 2 does not have any profitable deviation from this
protocol, and the outcome is self reinforcing. Given this proposition, there is a direct
corollary:
Corollary 1. Even when optimal, gains from communications between investors from
the same interval is impossible.
This corollary states that communication is helpful for investors across intervals,
but not for investors within the same interval. Trade through communication is
impossible, even when it may be optimal. This results in a second-best outcome for
investors from the same interval. This corollary is most biting for investors from the
top interval, the most informed investors in the market. While these higly informed
investors may attract capital, they are unable to delegate to other, investors that are
even more informed, resulting in a deadweight loss.
Next, consider the case set of possible actions:
Proposition 2. With no search frictions, it is sub-optimal to use a mixing strategy
This proposition is also immediate from the numerical example provided above.
According to the example, there is, at most, one dominate action taken by an investor.
Mapping the model to policy, investors should commit to either delegating their entire
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portfolio problem or solve this problem by themself. As a result, running a dual
mandate is sub-optimal, and an investor should stricty pick one action.
Harvard versus Yale – anecdotally, the implications of Proposition 2 can be most
vividly seen when comparing the performance of their endowments. Yale’s endowment
has famously taken the approach of delegating all of their investment decisions to
outside managers, while in contrast, Harvard has historically used a mixed approach
of both delegating and investing in assets on their own. Does a pure strategy, such as
Yale, dominate the mixed strategy, like Harvard? The proof is in the performance –
over the past 30 years since 2014, Yale has outperformed Harvard 19 times, with one
tie. It is hard to argue that Yale has access to better investment professionals, better
investment opportunities, different risk preferences, or investment horizon. When
broadening the analysis, Harvard has historically lagged all ivy-leauge endowment,
expect for Cornell.
More broadly, empirical research has shown that pure strategies tend to dominate
mixed strategies of investing. This can be seen by the dirth of fund of funds, investors
that act as intermediaries acting as both a principal and an agent, do not have prime
brokerage relations. Funds either invest directly into assets, or invest in funds, but
rarely both. This observation is large investors – retail investors rarely invest both
in delegated managers and directly into assets. This evidence and conclusion of the
model is also supported by the deep expert liturature.
Caveats and Possible Extensions
The results of this paper comes with numerous caveats and possible extensions that
could address them. First, the model and information framework is a simple two
period, partial equilibrium model. While it gives insights to the tradeoff of the agents
in the model, it is impossible to model the aggregate effects in an economy. An
extension of this model may speak to the information production, acquisition, and
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aggregation within such an economy. Another possibility would be to extend this
model into a dynamic setting where investors communicate and learn over time.
Second, the nature of information acquisition and search costs were assumed to
be costless and independent of wealth. The first assumption may not be ideal if in-
dividuals can exchange wealth for credibly more precise information. Altering this
assumption may provide more realism and additional results, at the expense of in-
creased complexity of this basic framework. Further, there is no uncertainty in ones
ability to observe all other investors. Altering this assumption with multiple investors
could introduce the possibility of intermediaries investors, such as fund of funds. Such
investors would specialize in finding other asset managers.
3.8 Conclusion
Investors of all asset classes, size, and sophistication face the identical problem of
choosing to either self invest or delegate capital an asset manager. This paper con-
siders how investors solve the invest-delegate tradeoff when communicating and facing
a lack of commitment. In doing so, the paper links several strands of research to show
how information theory, decision theory, and utility theory can be linked.
To solve the primary problem of the invest-delegate tradeoff, the paper directly
addresses the issues of non-rivalrous, non-excludability of information. It develops a
simple mechanism of communicating one’s mutual information versus the particulars
of their information when coordinating. This allows investors to accurately express
their precision of any complex distribution, while protecting the particulars of their
information. The paper shows that the incentive to misrepresent ones information
when communicating leads to a breakdown in trade. As a possible solution to the
invest-delegate tradeoff, the paper shows that investors can partition the space and
coordinate their communication using an interval equilibrium to solve their invest-
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delegate tradeoff. The model shows how communication is both may be helpful to
facilitate trade between investors. However, such communication may still lead to a
second-best outcome, as gains from communications between investors from the same
interval is impossible.
The framework provides powerful results. Rather than relying on the linear-
quadratic setup of the overwhelming majority of models, this provides a link. Builds
on previous research and operationalizes how to value information and include in a
utility framework. Further, shows how communication is possible between investors.
This paper contributes to our ongoing understanding of how investors choose, if, and
who to delegate their wealth.
142
Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Important Notation and Definitions
i Index of investor. Model limited to two investors, x ∈ {1, 2}
Wi,t Initial wealth of investor i at time t.
α Relation of wealth between two investors. This is defined as αW1,0 ≡W2,0. The
large α, the larger investor 2 is relative to investor 1.
l Index of stated dependent Arrow-Debreu assets.
s States of the world that corresond to they payoffs of Arrow-Debreu assets.
x State contingent payoff vector, specified by x ∈ RLS .
(1− β) Management fee, which is a fixed percent of assets under management and
independent of realized performance.
Z A diffuse prior shared by all investors. All states of the world are equiprobable.
? Information set containing the truthful probabilities of each state of nature.
Gi Left stochastic matrix that garbles the truth ? to produce Yi
Yi Private information structure of investor i. This is used to update their prior.
π (y) Objective probability of state s occuring, according to an information structure Y .
H (Y ) Entropy of an information structure Y . Captures the level of uncertainty of an
information structure.
H (Z|Y ) Conditional entropy of Z|Y , and is the expected value of the entropies of the
conditional distribution, averaged over the conditioning random variable.
I (Z;Y ) Mutual information between information structures Y and Z. For a diffuse prior Z,
the paper uses a shorthand of I (Y ) and Ii to represent I (Yi, Z).
b Assumed base of logarithm
k Number of partitions







υ2 = E [I2|m1]








Figure 3.2: Example of an Interval Equilibrium
Above is an example of an interval equilibrium, with the horizontal axis correspond-
ing to investor 1, and the vertical axis corresponding to investor 2. An ad-hoc ex-
















, with each region
corresponding to A1, A2, and A3. The economy has then states, s = 10, and using
based b = 10, the maximum mutual information is Imax = 1. The example assumes




















Management Fees Low Fee Moderate Fee High Fee



















Size Compared to Client 0.1x 1x 10x 100x
(b) Incentive Boundary as Management Fees Increase
Figure 3.3: Incentive Boundary for Truthful Communication
This figure corresponds the incentive boundary for truthful communication. Panel A shows the
incentives boundary for three different fee levels. The vertical axis corresponds to the relative
difference in mutual information between investor 1 and 2, ∆I1,2. The horizontal axis is the relative
initial wealth of investor 1 with respect to investor 2, α. The three management fee levels, (1− β),
correspond to 0.3?, 1.5?, and 3?. Panel B also shows the incentive boundary for four different
relative wealth levels. The veriticle axis corresponds to the relative difference in mutual information
between investor 1 and 2, ∆I1,2. The horizontal axis corresponds to different management fees. The
four relative initial wealth of investor 1 to investor 2, α, correspond to: 0.1×, 1×, 10×, and 100×.
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Analytical Results
Lemma 1. Kelly Criterion
Setup: Consider an pure exchange economy. Assume that there are two dates,
t=0 and t=1, where an investor begins with W0 and is maximizing their expected
logarithmic utility of their terminal wealth. There are l = 1, . . . , L assets, and s =
1, ..., S, states of the world. Spot prices at t = 0 are normalized to 1. A unit holder
the state contingent commodity ls is entitled to receive the payoff of the asset at time
1, only if state s occurs. The state contingent payoff vector is specified by x ∈ RLS.
For a given information structure Z, where z ∈ Z, the probability of asset paying off
is π (z). Further, the investor can invest a fraction of their wealth, θl into asset l.
The maximization can be expressed as:
???
θl
E [??? (W1) ;Z] s.t.
L∑
l=1
W0θl ≤ W0 (3.23)




solution to the first order condition is θl = −πs(z)λW0 . Substituting into the budget
constraint, we get λ = − 1Wo . Substituting the multiplier into the original first order
condition, we obtain the classic result
θl = π (z) (3.24)
The above result states that the proportion of asset l equals the probability of
paying z. This result was first, to my knowledge, proven by Kelly (1956), and is
known as the Kelly Criterion. Given a diffuse prior, Z, investors believes that each
state of nature is equiprobable. Result (3.24) suggests that the optimal portfolio is
an equal weighted portfolio.
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Lemma 2. Utility Decomposition Given a Diffuse Prior
Consider an investor starting with an information structure, Z, about the future
states of the economy. Using the result from the Kelly Criterion (3.24), substitute













Where U∗(W ;Z) represents to maximum of the expected log utility for a given wealth













[π (z) ??? (π (z))] (3.26)
Using the identify for entropy, H(Z) ≡ − ∑
z∈Z
π (z) ??? (π (z)), this simplifies to:










Equation (3.27) is decomposed into a return and uncertainty term. Of interest, the
second term is a concave function that is increasing in uncertainty. This is interpreted
as a disutility attributed directly from uncertainty.
Lemma 3. Utility Decomposition Given an Exogenous Information Structure
Setup: Consider an identical setup Lemma 1. In addition to this, consider an
agent that receives an exogenous information structure Y
???
θl
E [??? (W1) ;Z|Y ] s.t.
∑
l∈L
W0θl ≤ W0 (3.28)
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Following the same steps to solve for the Lemma 1, I get a similar result,
θl = π(Z|Y ) (3.29)













Using the property of logarithms the above equation can be decomposed into two
terms:




















π (y, z) ??? (π (z|y)), into the second term:





π (y, z) ??? (π (z|y))−H (z|u) (3.32)
Notice that the previous result (3.27) can be manipulated by taking expectation











−H (Z) . Sub-
stitution this into the above equation to get our utility decomposition:
U∗ (W0;Z|Y ) = U∗ (W0;Z) +H (Z)−H(Z|Y ) (3.33)
Using the identity for mutual information I(Y, Z) ≡ H(Z)−H (Z|Y ), the above
result can equivalently written as:
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U∗ (W0;Z|Y ) = U∗ (W0;Z) + I(Y, Z) (3.34)
Theorem 1. Mutual Information Theorem
Assume an initial wealth W0, a prior information structure is Z and the updating
information structure is Y . Starting with equation (3.33) and re-arranging, it is
immediate to see that:
IY = I(Y, Z) = ∆UZ,Y = U
∗ (W0;Z|Y )− U∗ (W0;Z) (3.35)
Note, following my independent work, I found a similar derivation in the unpub-
lished online book of Fellingham (2014).
Proposition. Incentive to Misrepresent
Assuming truthful communication, investor 2 would misrepresent her informative-
ness over delegating to a high type if:
U∗2 (W0,2 + α (1− β)W0,2;Z|Y2) ≥ U∗2 (βW0,2;Z|Y1)
The left hand side of the inequality states that investor 2 gains from both investor
her own money, and the management fees managing investor 1’s assets. Notice that
This relies on investor 2’s private information. The right hand side is the utility
corresponding delegating to investor 1, net of management fees. Using 3.35, the
above inequality becomes:
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U∗ (W0,2 + α (1− β)W0,2;Z) + I2 ≥ U∗ (βW0,2;Z) + I1
















Using the property of ???, this reduces to
???
(
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The intermediation data is made available by a leading national life settlement broker,
which facilitates settlement between policyholders and investors. The data is orga-
nized at the policy level and captures transactions from January 2009 thru February
2017. A handful of life expectancy that date prior to 2009 are also captured. Data
about policies can be organized into several sets: life expectancy estimates, insured
details, and auction details. This data captures policy and related data for success-
ful transactions, failed auctions, and screened/inquiry data. Time stamps from each
of the sets are used to construct a timeline of interaction with the broker and the
secondary market.
Mortality Data
The mortality database is a service provided by a third-party vendor specializing in
death verification for a variety of subscribers such as pensions, government, finance,
unions, and insurance. Due to recent regulation affecting the social security adminis-
tration’s death master file (DMF), state-protected death records are underreported.98
Thus there is an elevated concern that matching against this database alone would
result in underreporting of mortality events.
The advantage of the third-party service is that it is backfilled using a national
obituary database to observe missing state-protected records and is updated weekly.
From this service, the date of death (DOD) is most critical for the analysis, as it
measures both the event of death, and the realized life duration.
Census Data
The 2010 decennial census data was accessed through from Social Explorer. Data
at the census tracts level, generally have a population size between 1,200 and 8,000
98This is due to the re-interpretation of Section 205r of the Social Security Act in 2011.
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people, and is dependent on the density of the settlement.99 Data from the survey is
used to control for regional social-economic factors.
Carrier Credit Data
A panel of credit ratings were generously provided by A.M. Best. Ratings were also
supplemented by S&P ratings the small fraction of carriers that had incomplete data.
Merge and Cleaning
Data Merge
Broker Data to Mortality Data
To measure the outcome variable of interest, longevity, the insured dataset is matched
against a third-party death database to obtain dates of death (DOD). Matching was
completed using a fuzzy match algorithm. Partial matches were hand checked using
obituaries and other public sources.
Carrier to Credit
The financial strength ratings comes from A.M. Best and were matched using Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) codes of the policy’s insurance
carrier.
Insured Address to Tract
Address standardization was done by using Google’s geocoding API. Coordinates data
was used to query the federal communication corporation (FCC) API to generate US
Census Block number, (known also as 15 character FIPS code). 100The block numbers
were used to match against census data.
Data Cleaning
The following cuts were made to ensure comparability within the sample:
1. Retain death benefit settlements were dropped.
2. ’Jumbo’ sized policies, defined as policies with net death benefits over $10 mil-
lion dollars, were omitted due to the lack of comparability to the rest of the
sample.
Retained death benefits (RDB) have a different incentive structure than a typical
life settlement. Further, it only represents a small fraction of all settlements in the
99Please see https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_ct.html for further information.
100Visit https://www.fcc.gov/general/census-block-conversions-api, for more information.
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sample. The cut on jumbo policies are made due to the appropriateness for this study.
These policies are typically purchased to ensure against key man risk of a business.
It is assume that a key man hedge for a business would not be applicable to a study
of financial liquidity of an individual.
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Financial Strength Rating
(a) Risks for Securitized Life Settlement Asset
(b) Gross Impairment Rates By Rating
Figure 1: Economic Relevance of the Financial Strength Rating
This figure illustrates the economic relevance of the financial strength rating of a life insurance
issuer. Panel A describes the main risks that exists to investors in life settlement securitized assets.
The graphic comes from an A.M. Best Criteria Procedure manual on life settlement securitization.
The final item in the panel stresses the potential and important risk that an insurer may default on
the payments of death benefits. Panel B describes the average cumulative gross impairment rates
over time. Broken down by rating, it demonstrates the correlation between rating and impairment
rates to insurers.
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Internal Estimate Tertiary Underwriter Underwriter A Underwriter B Underwriter C
Figure 2: Description of Data
This figure illustrates life expectancy estimates and age demographics. The figure shows the life
expectancy distribution of the broker dataset in a stacked histogram. The vertical axis represents the
number of occurrences, while the horizontal axis corresponds to the raw life expectancy estimates.
Life expectancy estimates from third-party underwriters are categorized for the largest three sources
(censored names), while the remainder are aggregated into a tertiary group.
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Aggregation of Life Expectancy Estimates





































Median Estimate Last Estimate Mean Estimate
(b) Histogram of Aggregated Life Expectancy Estimates
Figure 3: Aggregation of Life Expectancy Estimates
This figure sketches how multiple life estimates are aggregated for a single individual. There are
three methods illustrated here (1) mean estimate, (2) median estimate, (3) last estimate. The
preferred method in the paper is the mean estimate. Consider three estimates taken twelve months
apart, 35, 30, and 18. For mean and median life expectancy estimates, the estimates need to be
adjusted for the elapsed time. Simple arithmetic adjustments are incorrect and not used. This can
been seen by the first estimate, 35, and the resulting -1 estimate. Instead, life expectancy estimates
are adjusted for elapsed time but conditional on the implied impairment of the individual at the
time of underwriting. Panel B shows the resulting life expectancy estimates in a stacked histogram.
169
Test of Proportionality Assumption
Table 1: Proportionality Tests
The figure shows a panel of tables testing the proportional hazard assumption. The rho column is
the Person product-moment correlation between the scaled Schoenfeld residuals and time for each
regressor. The p-value column tests is a test of the null hypothesis of proportionality, with a value
less than 0.05 indicating a rejection of the null. Test is based on Grambsch and Therneau 1994,
Proportional hazards tests and diagnostics based on weighted residuals. Biometrika, 81, 515-26
(a) Mean Impairment
rho chisq p
Mean Impairment −0.022 0.206 0.650
log(Death Benefit) −0.049 0.755 0.385
Male(TRUE) 0.055 1.125 0.289
Age 0.004 0.008 0.928
Health Care −0.004 0.007 0.932
Median Income 0.048 0.999 0.318




Median Impairment 0.016 0.086 0.769
log(Death Benefit) −0.041 0.511 0.475
Male(TRUE) 0.056 1.170 0.279
Age 0.013 0.075 0.784
Health Care −0.001 0.0001 0.992
Median Income 0.044 0.843 0.359




Last Impairment −0.047 0.660 0.417
log(Death Benefit) −0.036 0.405 0.525
Male(TRUE) 0.059 1.322 0.250
Age 0.013 0.084 0.772
Health Care −0.014 0.075 0.785
Median Income 0.052 1.200 0.273
Financial Strength Rating −0.014 0.060 0.807
GLOBAL 4.041 0.775
(d) Mean Life Expectancy
rho chisq p
Mean Life Expectancy −0.005 0.011 0.915
log(Death Benefit) −0.044 0.613 0.433
Male(TRUE) 0.020 0.144 0.704
Age −0.043 0.682 0.409
Health Care −0.005 0.008 0.927
Median Income 0.046 0.879 0.349
Financial Strength Rating −0.022 0.150 0.698
GLOBAL 2.974 0.887
(e) Median Life Expectancy
rho chisq p
Median Life Expectancy −0.016 0.100 0.752
log(Death Benefit) −0.041 0.533 0.465
Male(TRUE) 0.019 0.127 0.722
Age −0.050 0.899 0.343
Health Care 0.0003 0.00003 0.995
Median Income 0.041 0.708 0.400
Financial Strength Rating −0.020 0.120 0.729
GLOBAL 2.822 0.901
(f) Last Life Expectancy
rho chisq p
Last Life Expectancy 0.043 0.893 0.345
log(Death Benefit) −0.042 0.537 0.464
Male(TRUE) 0.045 0.726 0.394
Age 0.004 0.006 0.940
Health Care −0.009 0.034 0.854
Median Income 0.045 0.882 0.348
Financial Strength Rating −0.018 0.100 0.752
GLOBAL 3.396 0.846
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Access to the Nearest Hospital
Table 2: Access to the Nearest Hospital
This table presents analyzes the relation between the access to healthcare and individual level char-
acteristics. Column (1)-(3) relates observables to the individual level time to the nearest hospital.
Column (4)-(6) relates obsevables to the invididual level time to the nearest hospital. Distance to
the nearest hospital better relates to the individual level characteristics. Using this measure, the
table shows that policyholders with large policies, more fragile health, and lower life expectancy
expectancy live closer to a hospital.
Access to Hospital
Distance to Hospital (km) Time to Hospital (minutes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Life Expectancy (Years) 0.104∗∗ 0.031
(0.045) (0.039)
log(Impairment) −0.612∗ −0.633∗∗ 0.017 0.016
(0.317) (0.315) (0.269) (0.269)
log(Death Benefit) −0.606∗∗∗ −0.052
(0.197) (0.168)
Health Supply −3.005∗∗∗ −1.568∗∗
(0.738) (0.630)
Median Income ($K) 0.002 0.006
(0.005) (0.004)
(Intercept) 8.580∗∗∗ 10.021∗∗∗ 12.542∗∗∗ 12.984∗∗∗ 13.269∗∗∗ 14.126∗∗∗
(0.487) (0.314) (0.722) (0.414) (0.266) (0.616)
Observations 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962
R2 0.003 0.002 0.015 0.0003 0.00000 0.003
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Examples of Downgrades
The Phoenix Companies, Inc.
(a) Ratings of The Phoenix Companies, Inc. and Its Subsidiaries
This figure captures A.M Best rating downgrade of Phoenix Companies Inc. and
the Subsidiaries. The press release indicates that the financial strength rating is be-
ing lowered from A to B++. It also highlights its concern about Phoenix’s expo-
sure to residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed secu-
rities (CMBS) and financial sector holdings. The full press release can be found at
http://www3.ambest.com/ambv/bestnews/presscontent.aspx?altsrc=10&refnum=13903.
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Conseco Inc. and Its Subsidiaries
(a) Ratings of Conseco Inc. and Its Subsidiaries
This figure captures A.M Best rating downgrade of Conseco Inc. and Its Subsidiaries. The
press release indicates that the financial strength rating is being lowered from B+ to B.
It also highlights that, in part, the downgrade is related to the delay in filing its An-
nual Report and concerns about it’s going concern. The full press release can be found at
http://www3.ambest.com/ambv/bestnews/presscontent.aspx?altsrc=10&refnum=13890.
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Genworth Financial, Inc. and Its Subsidiaries
(a) Ratings of Genworth Financial, Inc. and Its Subsidiaries
This figure captures A.M Best rating downgrade of Genworth Financial, Inc. and Its Sub-
sidiaries. The press release indicates that the financial strength rating is being lowered
from A- to B++. It also highlights is concern about Genworth’s business restructuring and
reliance on its long term care (LTC) business. The full press release can be found at
http://www3.ambest.com/ambv/bestnews/presscontent.aspx?altsrc=10&refnum=23603.
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Figure 4: Impairment as a Measure of Fragility
This figure illustrates the mapping between life expectancies estimates to impairment level for male
non-smoking population. The horizontal axis represents age. The vertical axis represents life ex-
pectancy. Impariment levels represent age-gender adjusted health fragility, and is drawn in terms
of gradients. Each curve represents a level of impairment, with the upper-right most line indicating
perfect health. Moving towards the bottom-left, the curves captures individuals with higher health
fragility. Estimates are made from VBT 2008 tables and used a local polynomial regression to infer
the curves.
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A Brief History About Life Settlements Market
This appendix provides a very brief overview of the life settlement market and is based
on conversations, websites, papers, and books from this market. For further reference,
see papers such as Januário and Naik 2014, and reference textbooks including Bhuyan
2009 and Chaplin, Aspinwall, and Venn 2009.
The secondary market for life insurance policies, also known as the life settlement
market, is primary based in United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In the
United States, the legal president for the secondary market for life insurance policy
is based on the Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911) (United States Supreme
Court). 101 This case established that life insurance contracts had all attributes
of property, similar to real estate, stocks, bonds, and were deemed “transferable
without limitation”. More recently, as of 2014, 42 states (and the territory of Puerto
Rico) regulate life settlements and protection policyholders under comprehensive life
settlement laws and regulations (See lisa.org).
The life settlement market has gone through waves of growth and contraction.
The life settlement market first gained popularity in the 1980s during the HIV/AIDS
epidemic with the introduction of viatical settlements, where the proceeds of these
policies were typically intended to fund their medical treatments.102 However, as
the prognosis for HIV/AIDS patients improved, demand for these policies dwindled.
Since then, the market has become increasingly sophisticated to account for different
forms of risks. Since then, the market has gone through various expansions and
contractions cycles.
There is no one accepted measure of the life settlement market, it is clear that life
settlements is a relatively under used option. In terms of transactions, it is estimated
that around 1,650 Americans entered into settlements for their policies in 2016 (The
Deal, Donna Horowitz, 2016). Measuring by total net death benefit, it is estimated
that $1.7 billion were sold in 2014. This is smaller than the markets peek, which was
estimated to be roughly $12 billion in 2007.
101(See http://members.lisa.org/content/51/Life-Settlement-History.aspx for more details.) Dr.
A. H. Grigsby treated a patient named John C. Burchard, being in need of a particular surgical
operation, offered to sell Dr. Grigsby his life insurance policy in return for $100 and for agreeing
to pay the remaining premiums. Dr. Grigsby agreed and so the first viatical settlement transaction
was born. When Mr. Burchard passed away about a year later, Dr. Grigsby tried to collect the
benefits. An executor of Burchard’s estate, R. L. Russell, challenged him in Appeals Court and
won. The case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court where Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
delivered the opinion of the court.
102This is typically for individuals with less than two years in life expectancy.
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Discussion of Exclusion, Non-Positive Price
In this Appendix I present a simplified model to illustrate the basic pricing and
incentive of an insurance policy. The general takeaway from this section is that
uncertainty in either longevity and in a counterparty may result in an insurance
policy being worthless at any non-negative discount rate.
Death is Guaranteed But Date Unknown In Advance
E[Vmarket]
P1 P2 P3 PT˜−3 PT˜−2 PT˜−1
F
First consider the expected value of a life insurance policy. They must weight the
expected cost of the future premiums to keep the policy in force against the expected















This is the expected value of the cashflows for the objective survival probabilities
of individual i. In the above equation, the first term is the expected premium for
keeping the policy in force, with Ci,t the minimum cost of insurance and is specified at
the time the insurance policy was originated. Where ?? (Deatht), is the instantaneous
probability of death. Si,t is the survival probability of the individual and is one minus
the CDF of the death distribution. The second term is the expected benefit from a
death event, with Fi,t the death benefit. This term is weighted by the instantaneous
death probability Di,t, and comes from the PDF of the death distribution.
The valueness of the policy is primarily driven by the death probability of the
insurance policy. It should be immediate that the higher the mean of life expectancy,
holding all things constant, the expected value decreases. In fact, insurance policies
are typically issued at a negative NPV to the client, and only realize a positive
expected value
103This Appendix provides a generalized method of pricing the expected intrinsic value. In practice,
there are many other considerations that a capital provider may consider. Considerations include,
but is not exclusive to, delay between death and collection, minimum account value, and the counter-




To fix ideas, we outline a simple, rational, two period partial equilibrium model
that highlights how the internal capital allocation decisions of hedge fund managers
interact with measured performance. We model active portfolio managers that are
maximizing their profits by selectively allocating insider capital between a family of
funds under their control. Insiders rationally allocate internal capital across strategies
to maximize total profits.
Our simple model has several salient features that differ from previous works.
First, we disaggregate capital from insiders and outsiders. This captures the idea that
an insider’s compensation is tied to both management fees earned on outside capital
and returns on insider capital. We also model for endogenous fund generation in
the form of multiple investment strategies and managerial discretion to differentially
allocate insider capital across these strategies. For clarity, both in notation and
results, we focus on a two-period model. Finally, costs in our model are convex in
gross returns, as this helps match stylized facts we observe in the data.
Capital: Insider and Outsider
There are two types of investors in this model: insiders and outsiders.
An insider is an investor with highly specialized arbitrage skills.104 This maps
into practice to someone who has access to a positive alpha strategy (i.e., portfolio
managers, hedge fund employees, and closely related parties). An investor can invest
either in their strategy, the appropriate passive benchmark portfolio, or combination
of both.
An outsider refers to anyone who is not an insider. They can be thought of
as limited partners who delegate their capital to a manager through a fund. By
definition, outsiders do not possess such specialized skills. As such, outsiders can
invest their capital in the appropriate passive benchmark portfolio, delegate their
capital to these insiders to access investment strategies, or a combination of both.
Capital is denoted by q and any superscript notation denotes who supplies the
capital. Total capital, insider capital, and outsider capital are denoted by qT , qI and
104We take a similar view to Shleifer and Vishny 1997 that arbitrage is typically carried out by a
few, highly specialized investors.
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qO, respectively. Total capital is defined as:
qT ≡ qI + qO (36)
We exclude the possibility of leverage and define total capital (qT ) as the sum of inside
(qI) and outside capital (qO). Further, we exclude the possibility of short-selling, so
qI , qO ≥ 0.105
Investment Technology
An active manager specializes in N strategies indexed by n. Each strategy has limited
investible capacity. The more capital invested in a strategy at time t, either from an
insider or an outsider, results in a lower gross excess return. Formally, we define the
gross return to strategy n at time t+ 1, for an investment of qn,t by:





The excess return is above an appropriate passive benchmark, which all investors
are assumed to have access to. The first term, αn, captures the maximum alpha





, which depends on the total capital invested at period t in strat-
egy n. The cost function is strictly non-negative (C ≥ 0), increasing and convex
(C ′ > 0, and C ′′ > 0). Further, at no investment, C(0) = 0, and in the limit,
?? qTt →∞C ′(qTn,t) =∞.106 The assumption of decreasing returns to scale is motivated
by research suggesting a negative relationship between size and performance, such as
Fung et al. 2008.
It is important to emphasize that different strategies have different αn and cost
functions Cn. For simplicity of this model and to make our analysis concrete, we







)2. The scale cost
is non-negative, an ≥ 0, and captures how well the strategy scales.107 A smaller
scale cost indicates that a strategy scales better. An example of the tradeoff between
strategies with different excess return and scale is shown in Figure 5.
To simplify notation, we assume that capital is allocated at time t and suppress
time subscripts on all capital variables q. All returns are assumed to occur at t + 1,
and time subscripts are omitted for returns as well.
Baseline Model: One Strategy
We focus first on the case in which firms have only one strategy N = 1, and omit
the subscript indexing of strategies. We first identify the total dollar payoff to man-
105Including leverage subject to a collateral constraint does not affect our model results.
106This results in a decreasing returns to scale in the gross excess return and a departure from the
Berk and Binsbergen 2017, where costs are linear in the return equation.
107Costs are orthogonal to risk factors and collinear with αn.
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agers. The total dollar payoff, V I , is defined as the profit from investing in their own
strategy in addition to fees collected on managed outsider capital. We assume that
the management fee f , is a fraction of outside capital invested, and take these as
given. Outsider dollar payoff is similar to the insider dollar payoff, but subtracting
the fees:108













Case 1: Unconstrained Inside Capital
We first consider the case where insider capital is unconstrained. How much would
an insider invest in their own fund? Absent outside investors, the insiders’ objective
can be written as:
??????
qI









Notice that if q¯I∗ = qT , insiders are sufficiently capitalized and refuse outside
capital. Substituting back into equation 38, the total dollar payoff to insiders, we get
2αqI
3 , and corresponds to the maximum achievable benefit from the strategy.
Case 2: Fully Constrained Inside Capital
Next we consider the case where insider capital is fully constrained, and are unable
to pledge any of their capital to a strategy. How much outsider capital would they
accept? Outsiders will continue to invest until the benefit from investing in the






Notice that the total dollar payoff to outsiders is driven to zero and that insiders
only earn from management fees. Further, the insider only earns management fees.
Case 3: Constrained Inside Capital
We next consider the interior case where an insider has only one investment strategy




. How much outside capital should
the insider accept? The insiders choose the amount of outside capital to maximize the
objective, subject to the outsider capital providers’ participation constraint. These
108More realistically, hedge fund fees also incorporate a performance fee on returns above a certain
hurdle rate, assuming the fund’s value exceeds a high water mark, as well as exit fees.
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α− C (qT ))+ fqO (42)
V O = qO
(
α− C(qT ))− fqO ≥ 0 (43)
When qO > 0, and the insider collects a proportional and fixed management fee,

























The first region is the case where both insiders and outsider allocate to the strat-
egy. Insiders are highly capital constrained, and outsiders can allocate capital up to
the point where their participation constraint is binding. As a result, the total dollar
payoff to outsiders is equal to zero. In this region, insiders can increase their capital
level, which would directly replace the level of outsider capital.
The second region is the case where an insider can maximize their own total dollar
payoff by limiting the level of outsider capital. Outsiders would prefer to contribute
more capital but this would not maximize the total dollar payoff to insiders. As
a result, the remaining outside investors earn a positive total dollar payoff from
investing in the strategy.
The final region is the case where the outsider’s participation constraint is binding.
The insider has reduced the gross return of the strategy to the point where the
marginal benefit to an additional dollar from an outsider is less than the marginal
cost of fees and the capacity constraint. As a result, no outsider would contribute to
this strategy. Notice that there an insider may continue to contribute to this strategy,
as they do not pay fees.
Proposition 1 There exists a positive fee where outsider total dollar payoff equal
zero for all levels of investment.





α− C (qT ))+ fqO (44)
s.t. V O = qO
(
α− C(qT ))− fqO ≥ 0 (45)
With the solution corresponding to f = 23α. The insider will choose management
fees, f , to capture the entire surplus from investing. As a result, the outsider’s
participation constraint will be binding.
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Proposition 2 For a non-binding management fee and positive level of outside
investment, total capital is weakly decreasing as a portion of insider capital.
Proof. Consider an investment strategy managed by an insider with a non-binding
the fee, 0 < f < 23α, and a positive level of outside investment, qO > 0. Outsider



















Proposition 3 Total dollar payoff to insiders is weakly increasing as a fraction of
insider investment
Proof. Plugging in the optimal level of outsider capital qO∗ into the total dollar payoff






a if α− f < f
2
2a(qI)2































0 if α− f < f2
2a(qI)2



















Proposition 4 For a non-binding management fee and positive level of outside
investment, gross fees are weakly increasing as a portion of insider capital.
Proof. This is immediate when substituting the optimal level of outsider capital, qO∗ ,




Up to now we have considered the case of one strategy. We extend the analysis to an
insider which has access to two strategies, N = 2. Consider the insider with access
to the following returns:








Without loss of generality, assume that α1 > α2. The interesting case is if, a1 < a2.
This means that strategy one has a higher alpha, and also a lower higher scale cost
as compared to strategy two.
Capital between the two strategies and investors is given by qTn = qIn + qOn with
n ∈ {1, 2}. For insiders qI = qI1 + qI2 , for outsiders qO = qO1 + qO2 , and in aggregate
qT = qT1 + q
T
2 . Shorting an insider’s management service is ruled out, so qIn ≥ 0 and
qOn ≥ 0.
Case 1: Constrained Inside Capital, One Fund
The insider’s total dollar payoff is now the sum from each strategy, V I1 + V I2 . Given
this, how should an insider allocate their capital between strategies? If so, should the
insider capital be allocated across strategies? Would an insider ever invest in the low
alpha strategy? If so, what rule would govern this?





Intuitively, an insider would invest in the high alpha strategy up to the point where
the marginal total dollar add equals the low alpha strategy. Said differently, the








While an the above inequality is satisfied, insiders maximize their dollar payoffs
by allocating their capital to the high-alpha strategy. That means qI1 = qI and qI2 = 0
for the initial insider capital region. The dollar payoff for this partial regions is equal
to V I1 , and is outlined in the previous section.
Case 2: Two Strategies, Sufficient Insider Capital, Two Funds
As an insider allocates capital towards strategy one, the marginal payoff of each









for some 0 < qˆI1 < q¯I∗1 . Once an insider’s capital level reaches
the threshold of qˆI1 , they will optimally mix between their two strategies to equate
their marginal payoffs to insider capital.
An insider will continue to allocate to both strategies, equating the marginal dollar
payoff from strategy 1 equal to the marginal payoff from strategy 2. While we do not
explicitly solve the optimal mixing scheme in this paper, we can see a sketch of this
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strategy in Figure 6. An insider will continue to strategically allocate insider capital












If funds raise outside capital, they do so to maximize dollar payoff in each fund
subject to the fund-specific participation constraint.109
109We rule out the possibility that outside investors receive negative payoffs in some funds in order
to participate in others.
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Important Notation
Rn,t+1 Gross excess return over the relevant benchmark
portfolio, after accounting for scale effects of investing
in strategy n.
αn Gross alpha for the first dollar invested in strategy n.
This is the maximum gross excess return over the
relevant benchmark. This is taken to be exogenous.
rn,t+1 Net return from strategy n.
qTn Total capital invested in strategy n. By definition,
qTn ≡ qIn + qOn .
qIn Insider capital invested in strategy n. This is taken to
be exogenous.
qOn Outsider capital invested in strategy n. This is taken
to be exogenous.
q¯I∗n The maximum amount of capital an insider choses to
invest in a strategy if unconstrained.
V In Dollar payoff to insiders from strategy n. This equals
the profit from returns and fees.
V O Dollar payoff to outsiders from strategy n. This equals













)2 in this paper.
an Scale factor of strategy that is associated with strategy
n. This is taken to be exogenous.
f Management fee as a fraction of the assets delegated
by the outsider to the insider.
N Total number of strategies available to an investor.
n Refers to an individual strategy n. A strategy has a





















Strategy High Alpha, High Scale Cost Low Alpha, Low Scale Cost
Figure 5: Gross Return Profiles of Different Strategies
The above figure shows two strategies. The horizontal axis is the total dollar invested qTt in a given
strategy, while the vertical axis is Rn,t+1. The red line refers to a high alpha, high scale costs,
while the blue dotted line refers to the low alpha, low scale cost strategy. The first strategy is
parameterized by α = 10?, and a = 4 × 106, while the second is parameterized by α = 5?, and











Capital Provider qI qO qT











Component vI vO vT
Panel B: Components of Payoffs
Figure 6: Capital and Payoffs
This figure illustrates the distributions of fund size and returns by fraction of inside investment.
Panel A illustrates that the total size of the fund is decreasing in the fraction of inside capital—the
fund operates at a smaller capital capacity the more insiders are invested. Panel B shows that net
returns to outsiders are higher the greater the proportion of inside investment. Parameters used in












Component fees investments vI
Figure 7: Payoffs to Insider and Components
This figure illustrates the payoffs to insiders and outsiders over the range of insider investment.
Outsiders have zero value add when insiders have no capital in the fund, or are fully invested.
They share in rents when insiders are partially invested in the fund, but also accept outside capital.




















Component Strategy One Strategy Two Aggregate













Component Strategy One Strategy Two Aggregate
Panel B: Payoffs Between Two Strategies
Figure 8: Percent Inside Allocation and Payoffs of Two Strategies
This figure shows the optimal percent insider invested in each strategy across the total insider
capital. Parameters for the high alpha strategy is α = 10? and a = 4× 108. Parameters for the low




This section introduces an intuitive way of measuring and ranking uncertainty of an
information structure. To do so, I borrow two key concepts from the Information
Theory field: Entropy and Mutual Information.110
Shannon Entropy
The concept of Entropy as it applies to Information Theory was born out of Shannon
(1948) seminal work.





Intuitively, entropy measures the uncertainty of a given random variable. The
function H (Y )111 is a non-negative, concave function that measures the level of un-
certainty of a probability function.
Conditional Entropy
Building on the previous definition, conditional entropy is defined as
Definition 2. For two random variables Z and Y , if (Y, Z) ∼ πy,z, the conditional
entropy H (Z|Y ) is defined as





π(y, z) ??? π(z|y)
Definition 3. As interpreted by Cover and Thomas, conditional entropy is the ex-
pected value of the entropies of the conditional distribution, averaged over the con-
ditioning random variable.
110For a textbook treatment of information theory, see Cover and Thomas 2012.




The second major concept that we extensively use is mutual information.
Definition 4. Given two random variables, Y0 and Yi, the mutual information,
I (Y, Z) is the relative entropy between their joint distribution and product distri-
bution.





π (y, z) ???
(
π (y, z)
π (y) π (z)
)
After some algebra, this can be written as:
I (Y, Z) = H(Z)−H (Z|Y )
As interpreted by Cover and Thomas (2012), the first equation explicitly states
the mutual information between two random variables, as a function of their joint
distribution and product distribution, while the second equation describes mutual
information in terms of entropy and conditional entropy. Mutual information can
also be interpreted as the amount of information that one random variable contains
about another random variable. As such, it is a symmetric function.
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